Daily Report

Central Eurasia

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Chubays To Replace Shokhin in World Financial Bodies

MK2502083095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 25 Feb 95 p 1

[POSTFACTUM report: "Chubays To Represent Russia in International Financial Organizations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A Russian Federation presidential edict has been drawn up on appointing First Vice Premier Anatoliy Chubays a director in international financial organizations, a State Duma source said yesterday. Mr. Chubays is presumed to be Russia's director in the IMF, the World Bank, the International Financial Corporation, the International Investment Agency and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. These positions have up to now been held by Aleksandr Shokhin.

Cabinet Approves Guaranteed Oil Supplies to Former COMECON

MK2502114095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 25 Feb 95 p 3

[Report by Marat Salimov under the "Foreign Trade Regulation" rubric: "Government Guarantees Former COMECON Countries Oil Supplies for an Entire Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The government decree "On Oil and Oil Product Export Supply Volumes in 1995 According to Intergovernment Agreements" was released for official distribution yesterday. With the document signed, the countries of the former socialist camp can be assured of receiving the guaranteed minimum Russian energy supplies required for their economies. Deliveries under the intergovernment obligations will be made by specialized exporters.

After the collapse of the COMECON, its participants, which had close ties with Russian industry, particularly the fuel and energy sector, found themselves in a fix. This was caused by the dropping of transferable rubles as legal tender in interstate settlements and the switch to hard-currency payments for Russian energy supplies at world prices. In order to smooth over negative trends in relations with its former socialist partners, the Russian Government began signing annual bilateral intergovernment agreements on energy deliveries to these countries. Currently, these deliveries are being made only by specialized exporters on a competitive basis. The two latest tenders on Russian oil and oil product deliveries to meet intergovernment obligations were held in late December and early January. The tenders featured lots for oil deliveries to Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Bulgaria in the first quarter of 1995. Their results were unknown at the time, however. The distribution of export lots was plagued by difficulties because participants in the competitions offered the same conditions to the Finance Ministry. Specialized exporters effectively offered to split their revenues with the state two ways: the price of Russian oil is currently $90-100 per tonne, of which $51 (first as export duties of 23 ECU or $28.4 per tonne and then as an after-payment of the remaining $22.6) is to be paid to the federal budget. Given that, the choice depended primarily on the geographical specialization of export organizations. Judging from the fact that the government has already specified the volumes of oil and oil product deliveries under intergovernment agreements, the traders have already been selected. For buyers of Russian fuel and energy resources supplied under intergovernment agreements, however, the choice of suppliers does not make any particular difference. What is needed is that the deliveries be made on time, which completely depends on the supplier's access to the "tube," the export pipeline controlled by "Transneft." [Article includes the following boxed table]

Oil and oil product supply volumes from Russia under intergovernment agreements in 1995

Country	Commodity	Quantity (thousands of tonnes)
Czech Republic	Oil	7,000*
Slovakia	Oil	5,000*
Cuba	Oil	1,600
Cuba	Diesel fuel	200
Mongolia	Diesel fuel	80
Mongolia	Industrial fuel oil	40
Mongolia	Automobile gas	160
Mongolia	Jet engine fuel	20

(*—All extra earnings received by specialized exporters from these deliveries are to be spent on financing the development of the Russian oil extracting and oil processing industries.)

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ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 25 Feb

LD2502073995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0605 GMT 25 Feb 95

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 25 TASS—Under the headline "Road to Caucasus Open", the ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA newspaper features an interview with Railways Minister Gennadiy Fadeyev, dealing with regular railway traffic to the Chechen Republic via Astrakhan, which started on February 24.

The minister notes that 500 kilometers of tracks were put out of action as a result of the armed conflict in Chechnya. Engineers cleared mines and restored 300 kilometers of tracks.

According to Fadeyev, the Finance Ministry appropriated 57 billion roubles for restoring the remaining part of the Groznyy section of the North-Caucasian railway.

The IZVESTIYA newspaper runs an article by experts of its analytical centre, examining the balance of political forces before the elections to the Russian parliament and giving a forecast of future victories and defeats.

Authors of the article claim that "the party of power" has completely disassociated itself from "democrats", the left-wing electorate is consolidating, while the support basis of "democrats" and "national radicals" is eroding.

They also believe that "trade unions (above all independent trade unions) and the federation of manufacturers are actively joining the election race". IZVESTIYA analysts forecast that "the left-wing bloc" will win up to 40 seats at the elections.

However, IZVESTIYA notes, much depends on an election bill to be adopted by the legislature. If elections are supposedly held in the near future and not in December, as scheduled, "the reds" would win, judging by the present situation, the article claims.

When deciding the question on supplies of some or other weapons to other countries, the Russian Defence Ministry is guided by the following principle: interests of national security are supreme, said Lieutenant-General Nikolay Zlenko, deputy head of the International Military Cooperation Department in an interview with the army newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

He stresses that the guiding principle for the Defence Ministry is that "Russian weapons should not be used against us or our allies as a result of possible armed conflicts".

According to the general, only 50-60 per cent of arms samples offered for export are, as a rule, okayed as a result of examination of applications.

An interview given to the ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI newspaper by Aleksandr Pochinok, chairman of the State Duma (Russian parliament lower house) Committee on Budget, Taxes, Banks and Finance, describes changes in taxation legislation to be made this year.

According to Pochinok, a bill on amendments and addenda to the law on the basics of taxation system is being drafted for adoption this March. For instance, the number of taxes will be cut down to about 29 types.

The number of taxes to be levied by local self-government bodies will be also sharply slashed. True, Pochinok admitted that the total sum of taxes will remain high all the same.

He claims that government outlays should be cut in order to decrease this sum, including "cancellation of subsidies to profit- losing enterprises and outlay cuts for the army (its numerical strength should be halved)".

The NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA newspaper writes about "disastrous cuts" of funds for scientific research in Russia. It writes in its historical background that appropriations for science were no less than two per cent from the gross domestic product in the former Soviet Union over the post-war decades, that is were at the level of industrialised Western countries.

According to the newspaper, these outlays amounted to 0.32 per cent of the GDP last year as against the planned 0.63 per cent. They are envisaged at the level of the same 0.63 per cent in the draft budget for 1995.

The daily claims that this will result in halving appropriations for scientific research, taking into account current inflation.

According to the newspaper, taking into account the fact that appropriations for scientific research proper dropped by 10-15 times in Russia, science "lapsed into a comatose condition" which resulted in a brain drain, "now developing into a mass emigration".

The newspaper cites the example of South Korea for comparison which spends three per cent of the GDP for science, noting that fundamental science is fully supported by the state throughout the world.

"In actual fact, the question about the future of our science and education becomes a question of a political choice: either we shall build a democratic industrialised society or it will be a compradore structure of the third world," NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA concludes.

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Clinton Moscow Visit for Victory Day Seen Unlikely

MK2502112095 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Feb 94 p 1

[Commentary by Mikhail Stoyanov under the "Politics" rubric: "Clinton May 'Sacrifice' Paris and London Not To Hurt Moscow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The diplomatic steps performed in recent days by White House staffers around President Clinton's trip to Moscow for the Victory anniversary are very reminiscent of the old childrens' ditty: "Don't pick either black or white, don't say yes or no." Press Secretary Michael McCurrie is evincing the agility of a tightrope walker balancing between the possibility of his boss' visit and the possibility of its postponement.

He elegantly warns journalists that "there still remains the possibility that the U.S. President will pay a visit to Moscow 8 to 9 May or on some other suitable date" because the work schedules of both presidents will have to be considered in preparation for the summit.

Journalists who can read between the lines and detect the nuances of political stylistics know very well that the White House is conducting a subtle game, trying to leave the door for the visit open while at the same time keeping Moscow at a certain distance.

Boris Yeltsin's invitation to the U.S. President to attend observances of the 50th Victory anniversary landed the latter in a somewhat tricky situation. On one hand, the visit could help thrash out "one-on-one" the recently unglued relations; on the other, it would signify that the White House has "forgiven" the Kremlin the bloodshed in Chechnya. Although the administration's spokesmen officially state that the war in Chechnya is not a "determining factor" to be reckoned with in deciding the visit question, it undoubtedly plays a major role. At any rate, 63 House of Representatives members of both parties urged Clinton to turn down Yeltsin's invitation until the war comes to an end. That this will happen by 8 May is hardly probable.

This is not quite sufficient for deciding on the Moscow visit. Observers note there are also other motives for hesitations. Clinton cannot visit the Russian capital without attending the observances put on by the European allies. Such an overload would make a mess of his demanding work schedule. To mark Victory Day in London and Paris and ignore "friend Boris" would mean inflicting yet another hurt to Yeltsin—last year, Russia was not invited to the 50th anniversary of the Allied landing in Europe. Therefore, it is thought that to preserve the political equilibrium Clinton will most probably not leave home, and the meeting with the Russian president will take place in June.

Nevertheless, the men in Moscow seem not to have lost the hope of getting the U.S. President over precisely for the May celebrations; this would naturally boost Yeltsin's reputation, which has faded somewhat in Russia and elsewhere. Realizing this, the Americans would not mind using the visit as "the carrot," making it clear that Moscow can get it only on certain terms. In addition to a sensible relaxation in Chechnya, these include the joining of the NATO "Partnership for Peace" program, canceling plans to sell nuclear reactors to Iran, and stopping the war against the U.S.-sponsored international consortium which is to supply nuclear reactors to the DPRK.

Mamedov To Seek 'Prolongation' of NPT in Talks With Iran

LD2502131595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1238 GMT 25 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Kuzmin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tehran February 25 TASS—Iranian-Russian negotiations, mainly devoted to the prolongation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, began here today. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov arrived in the Iranian capital late on Friday [24 February] evening to take part in the talks.

ITAR-TASS has learned from diplomatic sources that Iran deems possible its further participation in the said treaty only for a limited period and on several conditions. Russia, on the other hand, comes out for an unlimited and unconditional prolongation of this international document.

Having signed with Tehran an agreement on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and a contract to complete the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, Moscow now wants Iran to soften its attitude to the treaty. Russia's efforts to uphold this cooperation may be jeopardised in light of Washington's sharp objections to the Russo-Iranian cooperation in nuclear energetics and Tehran's refusal to prolong the treaty or its excessively tough terms.

The United States suspects Iran of wanting to possess nucler weapons. Russian officials have repeatedly stressed that the equipment, which is to be supplied to Tehran under the concluded contract, cannot be used for military purposes. The Iranian authorities also deny these accusations. For instance, Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati stated a short while ago that his country was strictly honouring all the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He believes that the region's security is threatened by Israel, which has not signed this international document, although it possesses quite a few nuclear warheads.

Moscow Will Not Unilaterally Lift Sanctions Against Iraq

LD2402150795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1358 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Feb 24. (Interfax)—Russia does not intend to lift international sanctions against Iraq unilaterally. "That's not at issue now,"

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Viktor Posuvalyuk, Russia's deputy foreign minister, told Interfax Friday [24 February].

"Russia is a major power and must behave as befits its lofty status," he declared. "Moscow has done more than others to bring nearer the line beyond which the suspension of sanctions against Iraq and their subsequent lifting will follow. In this context, a unilateral withdrawal from the regime of sanctions would be a thoughtless and unjustified step," Posuvalyuk stressed.

He also reported that senior Baghdad officials—Riyad Qaysi, a deputy foreign minister, and General Amer Rashid, assisting the elimination of arms as part of Iraq's cooperation with the Rolf Ekkeus-led UN special commission—would arrive in Moscow Sunday for talks with Russian leaders. "Negotiations will start Monday", Posuvalyuk remarked, adding that Ekkeus himself is due to arrive in Moscow early next month. "We fully trust conclusions by experts from the UN Special Commission on Iraq's disarmament and rely on their opinion," Posuvalyuk said, commenting on a recent statement by Ekkeus that once Iraq scraps its germ weapons, a relaxation of sanctions against Baghdad can be discussed.

He noted, however, that the matter would be cleared in full only after a direct contact with Ekkeus in Moscow.

Posuvalyuk reiterated the invariable Russian position toward the possibility of easing sanctions against Baghdad. "In our view, the UN Security Council and the world community at large should appropriately respond to Iraq's positive steps. What is meant is the need to partially soften sanctions, above all the oil embargo," Posuvalyuk said.

"Otherwise, the situation in the region can deteriorate, and so can Iraq's behavior. Because of the sanctions, there is a catastrophic situation with food and medicine there," Posuvalyuk concluded.

The interview is published in full in the Diplomatic Panorama issue of February 24.

Zhirinovskiy Arrives in Baghdad With Appeal for Coalition

LD2602111995 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1047 GMT 26 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Amman, 26 Feb—A delegation of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] led by its leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy arrived in Baghdad today. The delegation includes LDPR parliamentary faction deputies, military men, businessmen, and political scientists.

On arriving in the capital of Iraq by bus from Amman, Zhirinovskiy stated that he had brought a friendly appeal to the Arab and Muslim peoples, which he intends to hand to Saddam Husayn. According to the LDPR leader the main idea of the document is the creation of an anti-Western coalition between Russia and the Orthodox and Muslim worlds.

Zhirinovskiy advocated the speediest possible lifting of the international sanctions against Baghdad.

Meets Parliament Speaker

LD2602145095 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1428 GMT 26 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Yelistratov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Cairo, 26 Feb—Sadiq Mahdi Salih, speaker of the National Assembly of the Republic of Iraq received [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, who is leading an LDPR delegation on an official visit to Baghdad, in the Iraqi capital today. According to reports received in Cairo, ways of developing and deepening bilateral ties between the parliaments of Iraq and the Russian Federation were discussed at the talks. Furthermore the parties discussed Baghdad's relations with the UN Security Council and the negative effects of the international sanctions imposed on Iraq by the world community, particularly the acute shortage of medicines and food in the country as a result of the economic embargo imposed upon it.

Meets With Tariq 'Aziz

LD2702072895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0715 GMT 27 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Yelistratov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Cairo February 27 TASS—The visiting leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] Vladimir Zhirinovskiy on Sunday [26 February] night met First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Tariq 'Aziz.

According to official sources, Zhirinovskiy and 'Aziz discussed "development and stabilisation of relations between the two countries, including at the parliament and government levels".

Just as during his earlier talks with Chairman of the Iraqi Parliament Sa'di Mahdi Salih, Zhirinovskiy raised a question about the "negative effects of the sanctions imposed on Baghdad by the United Nations and affecting the entire Iraqi people".

The LDPR leader reiterated that his party favoured full and immediate lifting of the economic embargo because, according to Zhirinovskiy, "Iraq has already fulfilled all its obligations before the world community and it is now the United Nations' turn to take adequate steps in return".

Urges Cancellation of Sanctions

LD2502203095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2008 GMT 25 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Viktor Lysechko]

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] Amman February 25 TASS—Russian Liberal-Democratic Leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy made a brief stop here today on his way to Baghdad. He is heading a large Russian delegation that includes deputies of the Liberal-Democratic Duma faction, military, businessmen and political scientists.

He told ITAR-TASS at the airport that the visit aims to consolidate relations with Iraq at the interstate level and discuss cooperation proposals, including those in economic and military spheres. The Liberal-Democratic leader called for the soonest cancellation of international sanctions against Baghdad and expressed the assurance favorable changes in the stand of the United Nations Security Council will occur before the end of this year.

"We are influencing the Russian Government and leadership of other states-permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, including France and China in this respect," said Zhirinovskiy. Commenting on the threat of U.S. and British veto, he said that "Russia should use this right in its own interests".

Speaking of payment of the Iraqi debt to Russia, he said it will not be in the center of attention during the visit. "The most important is to create fundamentals for solid bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Baghdad for the future, for the post-sanction period," he said.

The delegation left the Jordan capital for Baghdad by bus. It will stay in the Iraqi capital till March 1. Amman is the major transit point between Iraq and the outer world under conditions of banned direct air communications with Iraq.

Moscow, Pyongyang Sign Cooperation Agreement

LD2402184195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1717 GMT 24 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Valiyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pyongyang February 24 TASS—An agreement on cooperation in wooding, timber processing and restoration of forests on Russian territory for 1994-98 has been signed by Deputy Chairman of the Russian State Committee for Industrial Policy Aleksandr Kalin and Deputy North Korean Timber Minister Li Eung-sok [name as received].

The documents establishes the sides' shares of the product made by 7,000 North Korean tree fellers in the Russian Far East. North Korea will pay for transportation of timber on Russian territory to its borders but pay no export dues. The terms of work and payment for North Korean workers will be regulated by the Korean side with due account of the Russian labor legislation. The document stresses the ban on North Korean hunting of wild animals and birds and fishing with the exception of angling on Russian territory.

This is the seventh agreement in joint wooding in the Russian Far East. Members of the Russian delegation told ITAR-TASS that the cooperation brings a 57 million U.S. dollar revenue to Russia every year.

Head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's First Asian Department Valentin Moyseyev told ITAR-TASS that mutually beneficial cooperation in the area will be continued. In his words, the new agreement takes into account the rights of North Korean tree fellers: The right to employment, eight-hour working day and so on. Every tree feller, including that North Korean, shall have the right to free exit from the Russian Federation to any state.

The lawfulness will be ensured by local police whose representatives have access to all production and recreation facilities. That is why, the rumors about camps controlled exclusively by North Korea are ungrounded despite the fact North Korean workers are "living by themselves," said the diplomat.

Commentary on Border Agreement

OW2602133395 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in Mandarin 1100 GMT 25 Feb 95

[Krichevskiy commentary; from the "Current Events and Commentary" program]

[FBIS Translated Text] A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman called remarks by officials in some Russian localities extremely irresponsible. In this connection, our station observer Krichevskiy has written the following commentary:

In recent months, officials of two Russian Far Eastern provinces bordering China have strongly criticized the agreement signed in 1991 concerning the middle section of Russo-Chinese border. Such criticisms have evoked an unfavorable response from the Chinese Foreign Ministry. The Maritime Province Duma even (?tried to make) a motion to the Russian parliament to revise the Russo-Chinese agreement. In accordance with this agreement, three not too large sections of Russian territory, totaling 150,000 square kilometers in area, were indeed delineated to China in the process of demarcating the Russo-Chinese boundary. This is the bone of the aforesaid contention, and was a compromise because there was no other alternative. If this were not done, overall relations along the Russo-Chinese border could not have been normalized. As the agreement was signed and ratified, it naturally should be implemented to the letter. In particular, remarks on the beginning of changes on the Russian border should be avoided at any cost. While voicing remarks on this issue, local officials of the Far East administration obviously neglected the fact that new tension in border areas could damage overall Russo-Chinese relations.

Nevertheless, attaching importance to the development of Russo- Chinese relations is one of the priorities of Russian foreign policy. Any deterioration in bilateral relations is not beneficial to either of our two countries, not to mention that such relations involve the boundary

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issue which admittedly is difficult to handle. The 1991 agreement on the Russo-Chinese border was based on historical documents and the generally recognized norms of international law. I would like to emphatically point out that officials of the Russian Federal Government have taken an explicit stance on this issue, that is, there shall be no changes—in particular, the 1991 agreement shall be upheld!

Rectifying order in the border areas is another matter. Admittedly many issues have been ignored in regard to this matter. Dear listener-friends, you will probably agree with me: In recent years alone, Chinese citizens crossed the border almost without any surveillance; and they did not always settle down on Russian soil according to the law. This, of course, has stirred up concern among the Russians. However, Russian citiizens' unlawful activities in China's border areas have also aroused the Chinese authorities's concern. Certain measures have been taken. For example, now a visa is needed when citizens from either side want to cross the border; while the customs inspection has been tightened. These measures have proved effective. Of course, efforts from both sides are required. (?What I have stated above probably suffices to prove) that the Russian and Chinese border authorities failed to properly handle practical problems already cropping up in the new era of Russo-Chinese relations. It is time to promptly correct mistakes made in the past.

I also would like to point out that there are people who are trying to confound black with white, Japan's TOKYO SHIMBUN in particular. The newspaper cited alarming results from a so-called public opinion poll in the Russian Maritime Province, spreading rumors about China mustering troops along the Sino-Russian border and, in response, Russian troops preparing to carry out military maneuvers in the Maritime Province. The Russian Defense Ministry formally refuted the rumors as groundless fabrications. Any interference in Russo-Chinese relations will not be tolerated. Our two countries, proceeding from the need to cherish the achievements already made in our bilateral relations and continuing along the road of strengthening goodneighborly relations, will certainly be able to overcome constantly emerging difficulties .

Chinese Diplomat Opposes Accord

LD2602101495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1005 GMT 26 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Marat Abulkhatin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Beijing February 26 TASS—A desire by the leadership of the Maritime territory of the Russian Federation to secure a denunciation of the 1991 Sino-Russian accord on the demarcation of the border line may have most serious negative political consequences, a Chinese Foreign Ministry official, who asked not to be named, told ITAR-TASS on Sunday [26 February].

The diplomat said Beijing "takes a positive view of the Russian Foreign Ministry stand on the problem, the stand which signifies a strict observance of the agreement reached in 1991".

It has become known to the ITAR-TASS correspondent that the Chinese side, during Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev's forthcoming official visit to China on March 1-2, intends to return to the discussion of the joint border demarcation issue and secure guarantees that Russia will abide by the existing accords.

FCS Denies Agreement With Turkish Intelligence

LD2502103895 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1003 GMT 25 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 25 Feb—The Russian Federal Counter-Intelligence Service [FCS] today denied reports that have appeared in some of the mass media that FCS director Sergey Stepashin recently signed an agreement in Ankara on cooperation with Turkish intelligence.

"The FCS does not have any agreements with Turkish intelligence," a FCS public relations spokesman told ITAR-TASS.

He added that the Russian counter-intelligence service does have an agreement with the Turkish Interior Ministry, but this was signed in 1992 and not during this visit by Sergey Stepashin.

Chernomyrdin, Lithuania's Slezevicius Agree on Cooperation

LD2402140795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1219 GMT 24 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Yezov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 24 TASS—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and his Lithuanian counterpart Adolfas Slezevicius, on a working visit here, agreed shortly to institute an intergovernmental Russo-Lithuanian commission on commercial, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation. Its purpose will be to step up bilateral ties.

Inaugurating on Friday the intergovernmental negotiations in a broader format, both premiers said that during the preceding one-on-one meeting that lasted for almost an hour they agreed on the necessity to set up a commission which, in Viktor Chernomyrdin's words, will have a right to decide all matters at regular meetings and to refer them to heads of state and government.

In his turn, Slezevicius noted that the intergovernmental commission will greatly promote the expansion of bilateral economic ties and suggested that its composition be determined sooner.

The intergovernmental talks in a larger format also discussed such priorities in the further development of

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bilateral ties as transport, energy, construction, agriculture and the creation of favourable conditions for mutual trade. Much attention is given to problems of cooperation in the development of the Kaliningrad region. The Lithuanian prime minister noted that his Cabinet had done a great deal to decide positively such a problem of importance to Russia as military transit from the Kaliningrad region and ensuring viability of this Russian enclave.

In an interview to ITAR-TASS before the beginning of the talks, Russian Minister of Fuel and Energy Yuriy Shafranik said his ministry intends to suggest that Lithuanian partners somewhat decrease the tariffs for the transportation of Russian energy carriers via the Lithuanian territory. This lowering of tariffs would enable Russia to increase the volume of the transportation of oil and gas, so this would be of advantage to both sides. Otherwise Russia may gradually scale down the transportation of energy carriers via Lithuania and find alternate routes for their transportation to Europe.

The Russian-Lithuanian intergovernment agreements on checkpoints at the state border, on cooperation and mutual assistance in customs affairs and on citizens' travel between Russia and Lithuania are expected to be signed upon the conclusion of the intergovernmental talks.

German Consulate Opens in Novosibirsk

954F1511A Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR in Russian 21 Feb 95 p 1

[Unattributed report under the rubric "International Relations": "First Consul in Novosibirsk"]

[FBIS Translated Text] General Consul of Germany Uve Neubauer has arrived in Novosibirsk to head the consulate which has opened up in our city. This event is seen as exceptional, since Novosibirsk is emerging onto a new level of international relations.

Mr. Neubauer has arrived for permanent residency here. The Consulate General is located at 28 Krasnyy Prospekt. Long-time residents will know this as the former location of the Siberia restaurant.

Ministry Agrees to Buy Ukraine's Strategic Equipment

LD2402152095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1148 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, February 24 (Interfax)—The Russian and Ukrainian defense ministries agreed that Russia would assume control of 19 Tu-160 and 25 Tu-95 MC strategic bomber planes and air-based winged rockets, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Air Force Petr Deynekin told Interfax Friday.

"Although Russian experts price those planes at U.S. $75 million, Moscow and Kiev have yet to make a final decision on the price, by March 30," Deynekin said. The money will help square part of the Ukrainian debt for Russian fuel.

Deynekin is confident that the Russian and Ukrainian governments will approve the deal and that "the Russian Air Force will have an additional 44 planes soon."

Half a year ago Russian Prime-Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin "issued orders for the return of the air group to Russia." From the technical point of view, his orders have been met in full, Deynekin told Interfax.

Illegal Selloffs Complicate BSF Solution

MM2402083095 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Yanina Sokolovskaya: "While Moscow and Kiev Are Reaching Agreement, the Black Sea Fleet Is Being Sold Off in Sevastopol"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev—A few days ago, the Ukrainian Navy Command drew up information "about the unilateral sale of property, weapons, and military equipment by the Black Sea Fleet."

As the documents make clear, for four years now the Russian command of the Black Sea Fleet [BSF] has been selling missiles, ships, and the infrastructure belonging to the fleet right and left. Given that the sale of the Ukrainian-Russian joint property was going on underground and without the knowledge of the Ukrainian side, it is not surprising that this story has had extraordinary repercussions in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian Navy stood its ground firmly on only one question—the division of the bases and the infrastructure. And it stubbornly rejected Pavel Grachev's proposals to hand over bases in Balaklava, Donuzlava, Feodosiya and Kerch for the Russians' use. In Sevastopol it agreed to lease the base temporarily. But the infrastructure, under the law, is Ukraine's state property and is therefore not subject to division. Talks on this subject ended fruitlessly.

Last year the small stream of fleet property flowing into Russia turned into a full-flowing river. As the document "On the Unilateral Sale of BSF Property" testifies, Eduard Baltin's command "prepared a contract" with a certain firm called "Bit" for the sale of the Crimean airfield to the "Veseloye" garrison "with all the aviation-technical backup structures and the barracks and accommodations fund" covering an area of 2,296.82 hectares. Just in case, all the garrison's installations have already "been taken under the protection of the 'Bit' security service."

Similar events regarding the sale, looting, or removal of equipment occurred at the radiotechnical posts on the island of Zmennyy and Tendrovskaya spit, at the base in Balaklava, and in the 116th River Ships Brigade in Izmail. And also at the Gvardeyskiy airfield. Property

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worth enormous sums has been handed over to businessmen who are known to hardly anyone.

As one of the most high-ranking officials from the Ukrainian Navy reported, "all this did not go on without E. Baltin's knowledge. Many documents were signed by his subordinate, Major General Shevchenko, chief of the fleet Aviation Rear Services."

Apart from sales, the Russian naval command has successfully leased some property. The Sevastopol 688th Liquid Fuel Base and the Sakskiy 6,410th Liquid Fuel Depot went to the "Ukraina-Krym-Petrol" joint stock company, the 116th River Ships Brigade in Izmail was taken by the "Voyazh" cooperative, the Ochakov 839th BSF Base became a storehouse for "harmful chemicals from Germany," and the Nikolayev 1,467th Naval Hospital was partially turned into a furniture workshop. Cabins on the hospital ship Yenisey are being rented out as hotel rooms. A total of 29 installations are listed as illegally leased.

But for some reason this subject was not raised a year or two ago but today, at exactly the wrong time, it would seem—on the eve of Boris Yeltsin's visit to Kiev and the planned signing of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership. Why is this?

"We did not want to make interstate relations more difficult by publicizing this matter," a high-ranking official from the Ukrainian Naval command informed me. "But at a political level this problem has been under discussion since 1992. We have sent notes and tried to get a reaction to them from the Russians, but this has not proved successful. Today, following the looting of Balaklava and Veseloye, the situation has been exacerbated to the extent that it did not appear possible to keep it a secret."

On 18 January the Ukrainian Navy leadership sent an official letter to Eduard Baltin explaining, in fairly tolerant terms, why he is wrong.

There was no answer to the letter, except a verbal one: "Baltin reported very modestly that he did not cause any damage to Ukraine."

In order to avoid accusations of tendentiousness, the Ukrainian Navy leadership resorted to seeking assistance from the deputies from the investigation commission on the BSF. The parliamentarians returned from their trip to the Crimea confused and depressed. From what they said, in places of the fleet's former glory they only found pitiful ruins. "The infrastructure has been completely destroyed; it is no longer there," the people's deputies grieved.

Now the case of the plundering of the fleet's property has been handed over to the BSF and the Ukrainian Navy Military Prosecutor.

The scandalous events in the fleet have caused damage to Ukraine, and they will scarcely bring Russia any profit. For example, deputies have already stated that after all that has happened they will not allow either Sevastopol or any other harbor to be handed over to the Russian Navy as a base.

On finding out what had happened, the seamen from Izmail, Ochakov, and Nikolayev swore the Ukrainian oath practically to a man. Now, according to the Navy leadership, "they will announce that they are transferring to the Ukrainian side. It will not be possible to divide the fleet in these conditions."

Most likely, following the spreading scandal, the Ukrainian side's flexible and compliant line will become tougher.

"We will undoubtedly have the sold fleet property returned to us. And if in some cases we agree to the sale, then we will register it properly, according to Ukrainian laws. As for what has been secretly removed from our country, nothing need be returned. It is simply that what has gone to Russia should henceforth be deducted from its part of the fleet," a representative of the Ukrainian Navy command stated.

The Russian side will scarcely agree to such a turn of events. The problem of the fleet is once again tying itself into a knot, which will be difficult to untie and dangerous to cut on the spur of the moment.

Ukraine's Bombers, Missiles To Cost Moscow $75 Million

LD2402184895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1519 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, February 24 (Interfax)—The Russian and Ukrainian Defense Ministries agreed that Russia would assume control of 19 TU-160 and 25 TU-95 MC strategic bomber planes and air-based winged rockets, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Air Force Petr Deynekin told Interfax Friday.

"Although Russian experts price those planes at US $75 million, Moscow and Kiev have yet to make a final decision on the price, by March 30," Deynekin said. The money will help square part of the Ukrainian debt for Russian fuel.

Deynekin is confident that the Russian and Ukrainian governments will approve the deal and that "the Russian Air Force will have an additional 44 planes soon."

Half a year ago Russian Prime-Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin "issued orders for the return of the air group to Russia." From the technical point of view, his orders have been met in full, Deynekin told Interfax.

Nuclear Official Says U.S. Blocking Iran Reactor Deal

LD2702104995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1035 GMT 27 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Yurkin]

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 27 TASS—The United States will stand to gain if it succeeds in disrupting the 800 million dollar contract for the delivery of Russian nuclear reactors for the Bushehr nuclear power station in Iran, said Georgiy Kaurov, chief of the Information Directorate of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry.

Kaurov said in an interview with ITAR-TASS today that the business and political circles of the United States are making all kinds of efforts to force Russia to cancel its contract for the delivery and assembly of four reactors in Iran.

These efforts include the recent diplomatic attack on Russian Foreign Minister [as received] Georgiy Mamedov during his visit to the United States. Next came a threat of cuts in the U.S. financial assistance to Russia under the Nunn-Lugar programme for American subsidies to Russian defence enterprises for conversion to civilian production and utilisation of missile armaments under the international Start-1 treaty.

According to Kaurov, now that Mamedov is in Tehran for talks on an extensive range of questions relating to inter-state cooperation, including in the field of the development of the Iranian power- engineering sector, the United States is again raising the ghost of nuclear threat allegedly emanating from the fulfilment of the contract for the delivery of Russian energy installations.

"Our reactors cannot be used for the accumulation of weapons- grade plutonium, as all specialists know, but the technical side is of the least interest to our competitors. After securing the cancellations of the Russian-Iranian contract, they will immediately proceed to the signing of American-Iranian, as evidenced by the stiff competition for the North Korean market from which Russia was ousted by the American business, inflicting a loss of hundreds of millions of dollars," Kaurov said.

World market competition, according to Kaurov, presupposes harsh methods, but Russia has one chief advantage as the products of its atomic machine-building industry not only the best in the world not only as regards their performance and reliability characteristics but also as regards their price, the world's lowest.

This is most attractive for foreign potential consumers of our equipment for nuclear power stations, which gives rise to uncompromising competition. Competition of this kind can only be won by pooling the efforts of manufacturers, diplomats and politicians. Their skills are needed to protect the country's national interests. It would not be amiss to learn a lesson or two from our competitors who have an extensive experience of operating on the free market, Kaurov said.

Mamedov: Moscow To Continue Nuclear Cooperation With Iran

LD2602121395 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1111 GMT 26 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Kuzmin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tehran, 26 Feb—"Russia won't give in to pressure from the U.S. and will continue to cooperate with Iran in the nuclear sphere," Georgiy Mamedov, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation, said in an ITAR-TASS interview today. He stressed that the talks in Tehran with Iranian officials were useful and positive.

The Russian diplomat noted that Iran had expressed a readiness to sign an agreement in April on extending the nuclear weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, the deputy minister did not specify whether Tehran had laid down any conditions for its agreement.

Georgiy Mamedov arrived in Tehran from Washington on Friday [24 February]. He held talks here with Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati to whom he conveyed a message from Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev.

The Russian diplomat said that the U.S. did not have any evidence that Iran's nuclear program had a military thrust. As far as Russian-Iranian cooperation in nuclear power engineering was concerned, it would continue in accordance with the declared principles, Mamedov said.

As is known, the U.S. Administration and Congress, which are hostile to the Islamic Republic of Iran, are striving to prevent the implementation of the contract for the completion of the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power station which Russia and Iran signed on 8 January of this year. Some officials in Washington even say aid to Moscow should be stopped unless it renounces this agreement. The cost of the Bushehr project is about $800 million.

Nuclear Official Says Russian Reactors 'Highly Competitive'

LD2402163195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1549 GMT 24 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 24 TASS—Russian reactors are highly competitive and made with the use of high technologies which is disliked by U.S. producers of nuclear equipment, head of the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry's Information Department Georgiy Kaurov told an exclusive ITAR-TASS interview today.

In his words, the attempts of the U.S. business and political community to break the 800 million dollar Russian-Iranian contract on delivery of Russian reactors to Iran have the only goal—to force Russia out from the world market of products it is competitive in.

A pronouncement to the effect was made to comment on today's reports saying that the United States wants to

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press on Russia with changes in financing of missile disarmament and conversion envisaged by the Nunn-Lugar program. The official reminded that the program was used to dismantle over 2,000 warheads in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus and Ukraine. Some of the money was used to launch technological processes of utilization of Russian missile complexes.

Kaurov stressed that Iran is unable to use Russian reactors for piling up war plutonium and making nuclear arms which is claimed by the American rivals. Technical characteristics of these energy sources prevent their military uses. "after forcing Russia from North Korea, the Americans will supply it similar reactors at a price much larger than the Russian one," stressed Kaurov.

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Political Issues

Shumeyko Accuses State Duma of 'Political Mongering'

LD2302191795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1803 GMT 23 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Leonid Bagdatyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Perm February 23 TASS—The State Duma deputies, half of whom were elected by party tickets, are concerned with power struggle rather than with the interests of the people, said Vladimir Shumeyko, speaker of parliament's upper house (the Federation Council).

Upon arriving in the Ural city of Perm on Thursday, Shumeyko met deputies of the regional legislative assembly.

Because of the political mongering of State Duma lawmakers, many laws and regulations do not work. It also affects adversely relations between the centre and localities, the speaker noted. He spoke against any agreements on delimitation of powers between the federal authorities and Russia's component regions, since this is likely to enhance the inequality of subjects of the federation.

Speaking about the Chechen crisis, Shumeyko ruled out the possibility of any negotiations with Groznyy until Dudayev loyalists agreed to surrender arms and to cease hostilities.

On Friday [24 February], the Federation Council speaker is leaving for the regional centre of Kudymkar in the Komi-Perm Autonomous Province.

Justice Minister Meets With OSCE Human Rights Officials

LD2302210495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1941 GMT 23 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Olga Solodova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 23 TASS—Russian Justice Minister Valentin Kovalev met with a visiting group of human rights experts from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Moscow on Thursday [23 February]. They discussed forthcoming visit to the area of the Chechen conflict which OSCE observers intend to undertake.

Kovalev told visitors about activities of provisional observing commission, of which he is in charge, aimed at protection of constitutional rights and freedoms in the course of restoration of constitutional law on the territory of the Chechen Republic.

The justice minister emphasized that he hails forthcoming visit of OSCE observers, "because Russia is interested in that world community should get comprehensive and truthful information about developments in the area".

CIS Cooperation Minister Serov Profiled

954E0587A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 18 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Dmitriy Lvov, under the "Cadres" heading: "The Last Vacancy in the Government Has Been Filled. Valeriy Serov Has Become the Newest Member of the Cabinet"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The last vacancy in the government, which has remained empty since way back in April 1994, has finally been filled: Valeriy Serov has been appointed minister for cooperation with member states of the CIS. Vladimir Mashits, who earlier headed the State Committee for Economic Cooperation With Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States from the moment of its transformation into a ministry, never did receive the ministerial portfolio, remaining acting minister for almost a year. It is known to the editorial board that Mashits was not the only one left hanging, but also the ministry itself, which found itself called into question from the moment of the creation of the Intergovernmental Economic Committee. Neither was any light shed upon this by the appointment as deputy prime minister with responsibility for cooperation with the countries of the CIS of Aleksey Bolshakov, a man far removed from such problems, the initiator of many never-realized projects in his post of vice-mayor of St. Petersburg and the head of the High-Speed Rail joint-stock company. As is also known, it was proposed that Yuriy Yarov take responsibility for the complex of questions connected with cooperation with the countries of the CIS, but he refused any such broadening of his authority.

Meanwhile, the progress of integration, hopes for whose development had just recently been illusory, is today picking up strength and gaining real prospects. And the portfolio of the minister for ties with the CIS is also taking on new weight. The demands made of that figure are also increasing. Hardly appropriate here would be unexpected moves such as the recent appointment of Polevanov, who was unable to last even two months at his post. And that is what justified turning to a wide range of experienced professional managers who had occupied key posts back in Nikolay Ryzhkov's Union government. Valeriy Serov was deputy chairman of the Gosplan [State Planning Committee], and then he headed the USSR State Construction Committee [Gosstroy]. It is worth mentioning that it was at exactly that time, after his dismissal as first secretary of the Moscow City Committee, that the first deputy chairman of the Gosstroy was Boris Yeltsin. It is possible that this acquaintanceship also had its role to play in the appointment of Valeriy Serov.

It must also be noted that in Ryzhkov's government, Serov was no mediocrity, but was a very vivid and

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colorful figure. For example, as chairman of Gosstroy, Valeriy Serov outlined plans for a fundamental change in the very approach to the work of the construction complex. Already at that time, he was resolute that the Gosstroy renounce gratis injections of capital from the center, substituting budget sources of financing with bank credits with a flexible system of interest rates. He also proposed clearly to delimit rights and responsibility for the realization of investment policy between the center and the republics and local government organs. A great deal in these good ideas was never put into practice. During the time when Serov headed the Gosstroy, such unrealizable, ambitious programs as "Housing 2000" were also adopted.

Aleksandr Smirnov, Russian plenipotentiary at the Intergovernmental Economic Committee with the rank of minister, evaluated the appointment of the new minister positively. In his words, Valeriy Serov "has an excellent knowledge of the economy and resource base of the former Union republics," since he was in charge of capital construction on the entire territory of the former USSR.

As for Vladimir Mashits, it is not known whether, having rid himself of the specification "acting," he will remain first deputy. It is said that he has had health problems.

The appointment of the minister for cooperation with the countries of the CIS also bears witness to the fact that with the formation of the Intergovernmental Economic Committee, the center of gravity still lies, not in the sphere of such integrationist structures, but in the field of bilateral relations, which the Ministry for Cooperation With Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States is called upon to develop.

Soskovets To Visit Chechnya 'Early Next Week'

LD2602104595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1037 GMT 26 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 26 TASS—Russia's First Vice-Premier Oleg Soskovets will go to the Chechen republic early next week to preside over a meeting of the state commission for the rehabilitation of the economy and social welfare sector of Chechnya. Executives from key Russian ministries and departments will go to Groznyy together with him.

Soskovets intends to meet with the leadership of the territorial administration of federal power bodies in the Chechen republic, the Chechen government of national rebirth, Anatoliy Kulikov, commander of the joint group of federal forces in the Chechen republic, tour federal units and converse with elders and clergy in Chechnya, a well informed government source has told ITAR-TASS.

The same source said Soskovets will bring with him a draft federal programme for the economic rehabilitation of the republic and a draft federal law about financing the programme at the expense of federal budget funds. The draft programme sets out, in particular, specific phases in rehabilitation work.

It must be recalled that on February 21 Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin signed a government resolution about additioanl measures to promote the rehabilitation of the economy and social welfare sector of Chechnya. With this end in view, a state commission was formed and Soskovets was appointed to head it. On the commission are executives from all ministries and departments.

According to the government resolution, the Russian Ministry of Construction is being given the functions of general contractor to rebuild appartment houses, social welfare facilities and public utilities in the countryside.

The rehabilitation of other destroyed facilities will be tackled by respective ministries and departments. A construction directorate, which is to function under the authority of the state commission, is being formed at the territorial administration of federal executive power bodies in the Chechen republic.

Lipitskiy Scores Kozyrev, Policy on Chechnya

MK1802081695 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Feb 95 p 2

[Report by Vasiliy Lipitskiy, chairman of the board of the Russian Social Democratic People's Party and cochairman of the Russian Social Democratic Union, under the "Contacts" rubric: "Between Us Socialists. Russian Foreign Policy in Light of Chechen Fire"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A new surge of interest in Russia is mounting in the world. This time, however, it has been prompted not by admiration and bright hopes, as was the case in 1985 and 1991, but by shock and antipathy, as in 1993.

I had to experience that during my recent meetings in Brussels, where we (a delegation of the Russian Social Democratic Union) stayed at the invitation of the European Parliament's largest and most influential faction—the Socialist Group, which comprises more than 250 deputies. The European Parliament operates according to the party and faction principle, so a typically mixed or strictly nonpartisan lineup of Russian delegations coming there elicits mild confusion among the hosts. We were the first to arrive with a specific address in mind, for which reason our visit proceeded to the accompaniment of sighs of relief and shouts of "Finally!"

But this alone was not enough to account for the particular attention to and interest displayed by most experienced Western politicians in yet another delegation from Russia. The reason is Chechnya and the acute shortage of information about it that is evident in Europe.

Before setting out for Brussels, I suggested that the Duma leadership, the government, and the Defense Ministry

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use this occasion presented by an invitation to address the European Parliament's largest faction to outline not only our party's assessment of the situation, but an official stance as well and to distribute relevant materials. This proposal did not generate any interest. I thought at the time that the official circles have evidently had plenty of opportunities to convey their stance to the European audience, and think that the duplication of efforts would make no sense.

Given that, the European MPs' literally virgin lack of information proved all the more surprising for our delegation. They perceived the tritest pieces of news as a sensation. This applies not only to "rank-and-file" MP's, for whom Russia, naturally, is located somewhere on the periphery of their interests, but also to the speakers of international groups, who formulate their factions' stances and shape the parliament's decisions (the European Parliament's latest resolution on Chechnya was 90 percent drawn up by Socialist Group experts).

Enrique Baron (Spain) was European Parliament chairman during Boris Yeltsin's first visit to Strasbourg. Formerly he was proud of that, but now he recalls his historic role with obvious embarrassment. Then a question follows: "What would be your reaction if we demanded that Chechnya be given an autonomous status?" He hears our information that Chechnya has long had such a status and possibilities related to it with unconcealed astonishment and even in disbelief.

Magdalene Hoff (Germany) is considered to be expert No. 1 on Russia. It is on her that the tone of decisions made by the European Parliament depends. Following our story about events leading up to the Chechen crisis, mass violations of human rights by the Dudayev regime, she exclaims: "Why didn't we know that earlier?" In response, I could only raise my hands in a helpless gesture.

It would be absurd to expect that European MP's, even those specializing in international affairs, would be able to obtain and adequately interpret on their own all the information they need on the situation in Russia. They need help. Or, to be more precise, we need to help them if we are to have good relations with them.

Amazingly, while making provisions for multi-billion-dollar Western loans in the 1995 draft budget, our government did not even lift a finger to create diplomatic support for its plans. Representatives of a number of countries told us in Brussels that as soon as the current developments began in Chechnya, Russian embassies have been keeping mum, refusing not only to give information on the situation, but even to comment on what is going on in Russia.

Meanwhile, even Boris Yeltsin's most cordial personal relations with Bill Clinton, Helmut Kohl, and so forth cannot guarantee that the United States and Europe will pass decisions we see as vital, because, unlike Russia, leaders in democratic countries can act only under strict parliamentary supervision.

One has to acknowledge that our Foreign Ministry has not been up to the task at a time of an emergency. The foreign minister clearly prefers to utter vague threats and improbable sounding great-power slogans than to carry out daily explanatory work, the only thing that can lessen world public opinion's negative reaction to Russia's actions in Chechnya.

This applies not only to the European continent. The conflict in Chechnya accompanied by the Foreign Ministry's inaction has done irreparable damage to our relations with the Arab world. One should not delude oneself with the restrained reaction of most Near East governments—there is visible internal tension lurking behind it.

We have lost virtually all chances we had in Libya. Having incurred huge losses from participation in absurd sanctions (it has now turned out that the "Lockerbie case" has been entirely cooked up), Russia has missed an opportunity to assist in lifting them on time, while currently the Jamahiriyah no longer needs our conditions. Its leadership has taken Chechnya's pain to heart and is now firmly anti-Russian. Some more wavering and delays, and the same thing will happen to Iraq.

Meanwhile, new friends are not rushing to replace old ones. Saudi businessmen familiar to me, who have already made considerable investments in Russia, say that they feel unofficial, but still palpable, pressure at home. They are not sure that they can withstand it and that they will not have to take back their investment. But here, again, the fundamental reason is our inability to explain to our partners Russia's intentions in the Caucasus and to give them the full range of information on the subject.

Instead, the Foreign Ministry affects Russia's participation in the Near East settlement. It is unclear for whom this posturing is meant, who in particular is ready to believe in our influence on Israel or the Palestinians. These actions in a region where everything has long been fixed by the Americans smacks of self- satisfaction.

Gleams of the Chechen fire have yet another time shed light on the already endemic vices of Russian diplomacy, which once again not only proved to be unable to help the country in its hour of need, but even compounded the present-day difficulties.

Going back to our visit to the European Parliament, it can be concluded that, unlike official diplomacy, it turned out to be a success. Contacts between Russian and European social democrats have become regular and businesslike in nature. We were invited to attend the congress of European socialists in Barcelona next March. Russian social democracy has gained international acclaim and along with it the possibility at least to alleviate, if not to offset completely, blunders of the government's foreign policy.

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Agrarian Leader Protests Government Decree on Land

MM2402092595 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 23 Feb 95 p 1

[Message from Agrarian Union Chairman V.A. Starodubtsev to Constitutional Court Chairman V.A. Tumanov: "To Constitutional Court Chairman V.A. Tumanov"—last paragraph is SELSKAYA ZHIZN note]

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed Vladimir Aleksandrovich!

The Russian Agrarian Union considers it its duty to inform you that the Russian Federation Government has adopted Decree No. 96 dated 1 February 1995 "On the Procedure for Implementing the Rights of Owners of Shared Land and Property," which contravenes the requirements of the Russian Federation Constitution (Articles 36, 71, 76, 104, and 115), is aimed at a fresh reorganization of agricultural enterprises, and will legalize the uncontrolled sale of parcels of land. The implementation of this decree will create an unpredictable situation within the labor collectives of existing kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and joint-stock companies and will create additional tension in society.

The authors of this decree do not understand that its implementation will lead to a further decline in agricultural production, the final ruin of the countryside, and—a point which is particularly important for every real citizen of our country—the loss of food self-sufficiency.

We draw the Constitutional Court's attention to the fact that the Government adopted this decree on the eve of the adoption of the Law on the Land Code, the draft of which contradicts the adopted decree. We believe that this haste in adopting the decree is deliberate and that its authors should bear criminal responsibility for their violation of the fundamental principles of the current Constitution,

Similar appeals have been sent to the Russian Federation president and the acting Russian Federation general prosecutor.

Military Issues

General: Ground Troops Not Fit To Join Military Actions

LD2502144595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1329 GMT 25 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Feb 25 (Interfax)—Russia's ground troops are not in a position to join military actions at once either physically or theoretically, the commander of ground troops Col.-General Vladimir Semionov told Interfax. They are understaffed: Only 40 percent of the personnel are available now.

As Semionov said, usually a week is needed to staff a motorized infantry regiment in full, but under the circumstances it will take no less than a month to knock together a normal regiment. According to him, at first it is necessary to condition each man individually and establish interaction between units and their headquarters.

Reservists were not added to the units dispatched to Chechnya, Semionov said. Had the relevant decision been taken, the results of the operation would have been better, since it would have involved 30 or 40-year-old men, not young fellows, he said.

According to Semionov, the outcome of fighting for Groznyy was no surprise to the military leadership. "Developments in Chechnya simply forced us all to think about our army's combat readiness in earnest. In my view, the experience of the operation in Chechnya must compel our government to pay due attention to the problems faced by our armed forces," he said.

Russia's military leadership knows what should be done to enhance the combat readiness of troops. "In the first place, they should be properly manned, supplied with advanced equipment and allowed to do their own business.

General: Dudayev 'Stands No Chance' in Fortifying Gudermes

LD2502143895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1329 GMT 25 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Feb 25 (Interfax)—By assessments of the Russian Interior Ministry troops command, Dzhokhar Dudayev stands no chance at all to turn Gudermes into a fortress.

As General Stanislav Kavun, a deputy commander of the Interior Ministry forces, has told Interfax, although Dudayev's son-in-law is in charge of Gudermes defence, representatives of the city's intellectuals and elders have got in touch with the Russian command and have asked it not to capture Gudermes. They pledged to spare no effort to force militants out of the city, and as Kavun noted, "use force, if needed", even though the command has been doing all it can to move militants out of communities by peaceful means.

FCS Says Ex-Azeri Interior Minister Helping To Arm Dudayev

LD2502145195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1329 GMT 25 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Feb 25 (Interfax)—The public relations center of Russia's Counterintelligence Service (FSK) [FCS]) has published a collection of documents on developments in Chechnya from the moment President Dzhokhar Dudayev took power there.

One of the papers is what is said to be a record of a secret conversation between Dudayev and former Azerbaijan

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Interior Minister Iskander Gamidov, according to which Gamidov has been arming Chechen forces with Stinger antiaircraft systems, rockets for Grad multiple-launch systems and mines. Gamidov said he had obtained the Stingers "in one of the neighboring states," the document says.

It also says Gamidov offered to send in men but that the Chechen leader replied that what he currently needed were weapons and not manpower. "If we had something to hit with, we'd throw them out and drive them all the way to Moscow," the document quotes Dudayev as saying.

According to a report by the Russian General Staff dated June 24, 1992, the Russian Army, in withdrawing from Chechnya, was forced to leave behind at just one training center located in the breakaway region 42 tanks, 37 armored personnel carriers, 145 artillery pieces, 15 antiaircraft guns and some 40,000 items of small arms. Russian air defense units abandoned 23 radars, 939 items of small arms and 319,500 pieces of ammunition as they pulled out. Chechen forces also lambasted a Russian Interior Ministry regiment and an air force training regiment, the report says. (endall) 251329 Lastova/mc 25/1452

Army Units To Support Interior Troops in Chechnya

LD2502144295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1329 GMT 25 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Feb 25 (Interfax)—Some army units will support Russian Internal Ministry troops in Chechnya, General Stanislav Kavun, a deputy commander of the Interior Ministry forces has declared in an interview with Interfax.

"Appropriate forces are essential to fight a heavily armed foe," Kavun said. He complained that the internal troops were equipped with armored vehicles for only 39 percent, and these vehicles were outmoded. So, the Army should provide more armor, artillery, and air support, Kavun said.

He then lashed out at the Ingushetian President Ruslan Aushev's stand over a settlement in Chechnya. In his opinion, Aushev "is pursuing ideological work not in the interests of Russia." Kavun noted that Dudayev's militants had quite often been attacking federal troops from Ingushetia and on its territory. "Aushev should better adopt all measures so that there would be no militants in his republic," Kavun declared.

Nuclear Issues

Civilian Production of Atomic Industry Declined

LD2302150095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1432 GMT 23 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anna Bakina]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 23 TASS—Civilian production of the atomic industry dropped by 16 percent in 1994, Viktor Mikhaylov, Russian minister of nuclear energy, told a meeting of the Russian cabinet on Thursday [23 February]. The commissions for defence also dropped by 42 per cent, Mikhailov said.

The generation of electricity at nuclear power plants decreased by 18 per cent as compared with last year. Twelve per cent of the decline is accounted for by the limited use of energy and the decline by six per cent is explained by fuel shortage. In addition, the output for the agrarian and processing complex dropped by 62 per cent as consumers refuse the services of nuclear scientists because of lack of funds. Still the consumption of electricity for civilian products went up by 23 per cent, the minister said.

The Ministry of Nuclear Energy overcome the financial crisis last year, Mikhaylov said. Eighty per cent of funds to finance the ministry came from the state budget. The remaining funds were obtained through the cancellation of debts and mutual settlement. Thus, 650 billion roubles were cleared by mutual settlements.

It is not often that nuclear power stations receive funds from energy consumers. The debt of energy consumers now amounts to 1,700 billion roubles. Particularly large debts were run up by the Tambov energy department, the Ivanovo energy department and the Karelian energy agency. The pay for electricity to nuclear power stations made up 54 per cent last year. Only one- third was paid in ready money. As a result, nuclear power stations owe 1,500 billion roubles to fuel and equipment suppliers.

Atomic science for civilian purposes is in an even sorrier state. It received only 40 per cent of funds as compared with what was earlier planned. The average salaries of researchers amount to 350 thousand roubles, while operators at nuclear power plants earn on an average 850 thousand roubles.

The minister believes the situation may further deteriorate in 1995 as the allocations for the branch under the draft 1995 budget amount to 3,000 billion roubles, while six billion roubles is needed. The 3,000 billion roubles lacking, not included in the budget, should be equally split between nuclear power plants, fundamental science and the fund for repaying obligations to Ukraine which supplies fuel assemblies for nuclear stations. If these sums are not paid, Ukraine may delay the shipment of fuel.

Need for Nuclear Safety Measures Viewed

MM2102101995 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Feb 95 First Edition p 5

[Report by Vladimir Kuznetsov, director of the International Chernobyl Safety Fund's Russian Information Analysis Center for Preventing Accident Situations at Atomic Energy Facilities: "A Mosquito Bite Can Be

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Fatal. Even Low-Capacity Research Reactors Are Dangerous If Operating Procedures Are Violated"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From 1986 through 1992 there were 791 incidents involving nuclear safety violations at Russia's 47 largest nuclear research facilities alone.

When people talk about the danger of atomic energy, as a rule they are referring to nuclear power stations. That is understandable: A large beast is always more frightening. But a mosquito bite can also cost a life.

In 1972 two accidents involving the discharge of radioactive substances took place in critical testing units stands at the Kurchatov Institute. Three people from among the operating personnel and experimenters died from overirradiation. I cite this example in order to make it clear that if not treated seriously even the lowest-capacity unit can prove to be extremely dangerous.

Here it must be recalled that most of them are located in densely populated cities.

Most concern is caused by Moscow and the immediate surrounding area, where over 70 nuclear research facilities and storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste are concentrated. In addition, 1,500 of the capital's enterprises use sources of ionizing radiation, and half of them produce radioactive waste. Considering that most nuclear research facilities were designed in the fifties and sixties, that these designs do not meet modern safety norms, and that during their operation by no means isolated violations occur, the danger to inhabitants becomes fairly real. This has been confirmed by the conclusions of a number of commissions.

The Moscow Government has adopted decisions on taking certain nuclear research facilities out of operation, but the deadlines for implementing them have been broken. Chiefly because of the lack of finance for this kind of work. But apparently this does not worry anybody. Last September the Moscow authorities adopted the "Comprehensive Ecological Program Through 2005." Strange as it may seem, it does not even mention the problems of operating nuclear research facilities. Maybe there are no problems? Let us take a look.

Currently over 200 tonnes of radioactive waste with a high total radioactivity (58,000 curies) is located on the territory of the Kurchatov Institute Russian Scientific Center in temporary storage facilities. Having been chief of the Gosatomnadzor [Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety] inspectorate in the recent past, I can testify that the storage of radioactive waste does not meet the requirements of safety norms and regulations. In particular, spent nuclear fuel is being put into storage facility No. 1 without its radioactivity having being determined. That means it is impossible to determine precisely the total radioactivity. But according to rough estimates, it is actually 20-30 times higher than the requirements of the public health certificate and totals 20-30 million curies.

At the same time the Russian scientific center's diverse daily activity is leading to the formation of a large quantity of solid and liquid radioactive waste, which is being sent for burial in the Moscow region mainly via the "Radion" scientific production association. In 1993 some 188.9 tonnes of solid and 41 cubic meters of liquid radioactive waste were sent for burial.

Almost all the Kurchatov Institute's nuclear research facilities are obsolete and defective from the safety viewpoint, not a single reactor has a protective cover which, if radioactive substances were discharged, could localize them inside its own area.

Another example. In the past two years Gosatomnadzor organs have twice suspended the operation of an IR-50 nuclear research reactor belonging to an energy technology research institute. But instead of taking it out of operation (under a Moscow City Council decision), the institute's leadership is performing work to modernize the reactor. The aim, by increasing the reactor's capacity tenfold, is to use it to provide heating for the institute and partly for the city, that is to say in operating conditions it was not designed for.

I admit that in principle it is possible to modernize the IR-50, at the same time taking it to a sufficiently high safety level. But this would require such expenditure that the game would not be worth the candle.

In the opinion of specialists of the Russian Information Analysis Center for Preventing Accident Situations at Atomic Energy Facilities, it is necessary to stop immediately the operation of all nuclear research facilities on the territory of the Russian state capital which do not meet nuclear and radiation safety requirements. State research centers located in Moscow and the immediate surrounding area need state regulation and financial support, especially in the matters of taking nuclear facilities out of operation in order to preclude the possibility of their unauthorized conversion into nuclear and radiation dumps.

We also believe that a state program is needed which would encompass all the problems of the existing complex of nuclear research facilities in Russia. In particular, it could prescribe an advisable volume of research and determine a list of facilities to be taken out of operation. Here the reduction of the total number of research facilities would make it possible to channel the freed resources into the partial financing of this program.

Lastly, the question of establishing public monitoring of atomic energy facilities' safety must be considered.

Federal Assembly

Background to Duma's Smooth Passage of State Budget

MK2502091095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 25 Feb 95 p 1

[Report by Boris Boyko: "Everything Turned Out Smoothly"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] A major event in Russia's 1995 economic life occurred yesterday: The State Duma, unexpectedly fast and without debate, approved the federal budget in third reading. The 1995 budget process can be considered effectively complete: Revenues and expenditures on particular articles were approved within the framework of earlier adopted indicators. All that is now left to be done is to approve the budget as a whole: This will apparently happen in March. The ease of yesterday's approval of budget articles and the absence of any disagreements between parliament and the government have an obvious explanation. Yesterday negotiations resumed between Russia and the IMF on granting Russia a standby $6.2 billion credit. Now Russian experts can pronounce a phrase that has long been expected from them: "The budget is nearly there!"

The budget process in Russia considerably depends on contacts with international financial organizations, which became obvious quite a long time ago. Recently this connection has become especially clear, and it simply cannot be otherwise: The new budget is effectively built on Western credits. Interestingly, not only independent observers but also representatives of, for example, the Federation Council predicted earlier this week in informal conversations: "The budget will be adopted 24 February, then negotiations with the IMF will resume." Which is what actually happened.

It is quite natural that in the end a budget was approved, which was expected by IMF representatives. After the vote, First Vice Premier Anatoliy Chubays stated in the lobbies, proudly, that the budget meets the toughest demands. His enthusiasm went quite far: He even tried to convince the audience that things are even better than they seem: The budget deficit, in his opinion, is 5.6 percent, not 8 percent, of actual, not nominal, GDP. Yet, forgetting for a moment about such original statements, it can nonetheless be concluded that while the budget was going through hearings in the State Duma, the government managed to prevent an increase in its deficit; moreover, by third reading its maximum level, relative to expenditures, has fallen from 30.1 percent to 29.5 percent.

The discussion of the budget yesterday took up not more than half an hour. The process of adopting the budget from first to second to third reading has sharply accelerated: Whereas its approval in first reading required 14 votes within one week, in third reading it was done with just one vote, not counting preliminary votes on amendments (according to Aleksandr Pochinok, deputy chairman of the Budget and Finance Committee, this was the result of "Anatoliy Chubays' strong performance").

At yesterday's session the factions abandoned the hopeless attempts to put individual amendments to a vote (the previous session showed that this leads to factions' teaming up with each other) and decided to beat swords into plowshares. Two amendments were approved on a coordinated move by a number of factions: First, the sum of 1 trillion rubles, earmarked for the Army's day-to-day needs, was shifted for additional financing of arms procurements and defense R&D projects, and then state administration expenditures were cut further (true, Ivan Rybkin observed on this count that the deputies may have cut their own salaries). Some 300 million rubles was found to finance science.

It is noteworthy that the need to increase science financing was highlighted also at the 23 February government session, which was attended by a number of deputies. It was apparently owing to the premier's directive to "throw in a little more" that after the session Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov expressed full agreement with the amendments, noting that this strengthens the social orientation of the budget.

It needs to be recognized that yesterday's vote differed little from previous ones. As always, the "no" votes were cast by the communists, the Yabloko faction, the Democratic Party faction, and some deputies not affiliated with any factions. The budget was approved in third reading with 273 votes. The Federation Council, however, will not get it before mid-March: The budget will lie around in the Duma for at least another two weeks: It is also to give it a fourth reading. True, the fourth reading will be basically a formality.

Duma Overrides Veto of Law on Foreign Economic Activity

LD2402172895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1358 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Feb 24 (Interfax)—The Russian State Duma, parliament's lower house, by two-thirds of the votes, has overridden the Federation Council's veto, which rejected the law on benefits to those taking part in foreign-economic activities, which was passed by the Duma on January 20.

During the vote 332 deputies (with the necessary quorum of 300 votes) favored the adoption of the law in the previous edition and turned down comments from the Federation Council. Now the law will be submitted to be signed by the president.

The law envisages the cancelling of tax benefits to participants in foreign-economic activities, which they had by evading the existing legislation, for example, the laws of customs tariffs, on VAT, on excises, as well as by evading the Customs Code.

The Federation Council, returning the above law to the State Duma for further debate, believes "it is not worked out enough" and contradicts, by some of its provisions, the existing legislation, with which the Duma deputies disagreed.

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Duma Seen Passing Contradictory Economic Laws

MK2502092095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 25 Feb 95 p 3

[Report by Vadim Bardin under the "Foreign Trade Benefits" rubric: "Duma Perplexes Western Creditors and Investors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is an open secret that both the 1995 federal budget and the funding of investment policy, whose new guidelines were announced in the presidential message to the Federal Assembly, depend in critical measure on stances of Western creditors and investors. Given that, the State Duma made quite controversial decisions yesterday.

Yesterday, the Russian legislative and executive authorities demonstrated a rare, but symbolic example of teamwork: the Duma approved the budget in third reading, while the government resumed talks with the IMF. The adoption of the budget (basically in the government's version) removes the most important obstacle preventing Russia from receiving the IMF's credit line of $6.25 billion. What remains to be done is to convince the IMF that Russian exports will be liberalized. A head start has already been made—Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Davydov made a crucial acknowledgement at the inauguration of the Russian Oil Exporters Union in London: the institution of specialized exporters will be abolished in 1995.

Not all of yesterday's decisions made by the deputies will please Western investors, however. The Duma once again passed by 332 votes (with the requisite minimum of 300 votes) the Law on Certain Matters of Granting Preferences to Participants in Foreign Economic Activity after it was rejected by the Federation Council. This law is directly linked to the budget; its overriding objective is to replenish budget revenue. It abolishes all previous preferential customs duties and other charges levied at the customs house, except for preferences provided for in the Law on Customs Tariffs, Law on Excises, Law on Value Added Tax, and the Customs Code.

The law's further fate raises virtually no doubts. The president is certain to exercise his right of veto. The reasons are evident: the State Duma brushes off all preferences granted by the government and president. Strictly speaking, even if the law is approved by the president (which is unlikely) the preferences will only be revised, not abolished altogether. Under the Law on Customs Tariffs, the government, to say nothing of the president, is entitled to give preferential tariffs, so they (even if not all of them) will be simply resuscitated, as has often been the case.

The second reason for which the law may be rejected by the president is much more serious. If it goes into force in the State Duma's version, foreign investors in Russia will turn out to be stripped even of the preferences guaranteed to them by the Law on Foreign Investment: the duty-free import of property brought in Russia as contribution to the authorized capitalization of joint ventures, for material production, or personal needs. In addition, benefits granted to foreign investors by presidential edicts will also be abolished. Meanwhile, the exemption from import tariffs of supplies financed with loans given to the Russian Government, and the halving of import duties on finished products of firms participating in projects with an estimated cost of $100 million (with the firm's own contribution of $10 million), should play the key role in attracting foreign investment and setting up assembly production in Russia. Therefore, by uncompromisingly rejecting the preferences, the State Duma risks closing potential sources of foreign investment. Investors can console themselves with the fact that out of two proposed production-sharing draft laws, the State Duma passed in first reading one that opens up realistic prospects for the inflow of foreign investment in mineral extracting industries.

[Box, p 3]

Federal budget losses from nonpayment of customs duties

—In 1992, the federal budget received only 400 billion rubles [R] from the payment of customs duties instead of the R2.5 trillion planned.

—In 1993, R2.5 trillion were received instead of the estimated R4.5 trillion.

—In 1994, preferences in export and import duty payment were estimated at R11 trillion.

Duma Supports Yeltsin Amendments to Law on Savings

LD2402173295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1358 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Feb 24 (Interfax)—The State Duma on Friday agreed with President Yeltsin's amendments to the federal law "On the Restoration and Protection of Russian Citizens' Savings". The law, passed by the State Duma on December 15, 1994 was approved by the upper house, the Federation Council on January 20. Yeltsin made a number of amendments to the law and suggested forming a conciliatory commission to finalize the law at an early date and adjust it to the Constitution or adopting his proposals as a whole.

The latter proposal was supported by 306 deputies. One vote was cast against and there were no abstentions. The minimum number of votes required for the approval is 226.

The law declares the obligation of the Russian Federation to restore and protect people's savings, chairman of the State Duma's committee for the affairs of public organizations Viktor Zorkaltsev has said. He said that as the law was finalized, all presidential amendments were

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taken into account. Most of them concerned the delimitation of federal property and the property of individual members of the Russian Federation.

Experts say that the proposed pattern of restoring peoples' savings would increase Russia's internal debt to 500 trillion rubles.

Duma Amends Central Bank Law; Council To Be Formed

LD2402193595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1800 GMT 24 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 24 TASS—A federal law "on changes and amendments to the russian law 'on Central Bank'" has been again approved by the Russian State Duma after being rejected by the upper parliament chamber.

The Duma approved the law by two thirds of votes and now it will be submitted to the president for signing in evasion of the Federation Council.

Under the document, the Bank of Russia shall be accountable to the State Duma. The Duma shall nominate and dismiss the bank chairman on representation of the Russian president. The Duma shall also nominate and dismiss members of the bank's board of directors.

The Bank of Russia shall submit to the State Duma an annual report and an audit report. The Duma shall decide on the audit form for audit inspection of the Bank of Russia. The Duma shall hold parliamentary hearings on the bank activities. The bank chairman shall submit to the State Duma reports on the activities of the bank twice a year—when submitting the annual report and a report on basic areas of the unified state monetary-credit policy.

The National Banking Council shall be formed to improve the Russian credit-monetary system and include representatives of the Russian parliament, the presidential administration, the Russian Government, the Bank of Russia, credit organizations and experts.

The chairman of the Bank of Russia shall be the chairman of the National Banking Council. The Council shall include three representatives from each chamber of the Russian parliament and one representative from the presidential administration and from the Russian Government, as well as the minister of finance and the minister of economy.

Other members of the Council shall be nominated by the State Duma on representation of the chairman of the Bank of Russia. The National Banking Council shall have a strength of no more than 15 people.

Regional Affairs

Reportage, Commentary on Conflict in Chechnya

Nikolayev Views Border Situation

MM2302120795 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Feb 95 First Edition pp 1-2

[Interview with Andrey Nikolayev, director of the Federal Border Service and commander in chief of the Russian Federation Border Troops, by Ruslan Ignatyev; place and date not given: "Bandit Routes Closed. Administrative Borders With Chechnya Put Under Reliable Guard"—first paragraph is introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] One can now say definitely that foreign mercenaries have been fighting on Dudayev's side, weapons and munitions have been sent from abroad, and armed formations have made repeated attempts at penetration. In this connection the border guards bear particular responsibility. The conversation between ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA's correspondent Ruslan Ignatyev and Andrey Nikolayev, director of the Federal Border Service and commander in chief of the Russian Federation Border Troops, discussed how it has proved possible to avert a greater tragedy and what is now being done to ensure the normal work of restoring the Chechen Republic's national economy.

[Ignatyev] Andrey Ivanovich, when the border guards were directly involved in the conflict zone did they take part in combat operations too?

[Nikoklayev] Formations and units of the Caucasus Special Border District are permanently stationed in the North Caucasus Region. They perform the task of guarding the Russian Federation State Border.

When the situation in Chechnya began to deteriorate (late November 1994) these subunits were transferred to a special regime and by mid-December they were in a state of full combat readiness. In addition, another 32 temporary border posts were stationed on the Russian-Georgian and Russian-Azerbaijani sectors where there are 34 outposts. The protection of our borders in the Black and Caspian Seas was reinforced and checks at all checkpoints and international air and sea ports were tightened up.

[Ignatyev] For what purpose were such tough measures taken?

[Nikolayev] Primarily in order to prevent guerrillas illegally entering (leaving) the Caucasus region, and weapons, munitions, and explosives being brought in along with other means designed for subversive activity, sabotage, and terror. It was also necessary to ensure the troops' own safety. We were subsequently forced to take even tougher measures since the situation in the conflict zone became extremely tense and military operations were in practice mounted in the republic.

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[Ignatyev] What precisely was done?

[Nikolayev] In conjunction with the State Customs Committee, the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD], the Federal Counterintelligence Service, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Railways, and other interested Russian federal executive organs as of 22 December 1994 pending a special directive we stopped other states' citizens entering Russia (apart from those returning to their permanent place of residence) along with transport coming from Azerbaijan and Georgia, transit included.

We collaborated with internal troop subunits in carrying out operational and procedural [rezhimnyy] measures to close the Chechen administrative border. At the same time the Border Troops have established three zones of responsibility: one in Ingushetia and two in Dagestan. Later in accordance with a Russian Security Council decision we took charge of sections of the administrative border with Chechnya in the Russian MVD Internal Troops' zone of responsibility.

[Ignatyev] Do all these actions not contravene the Russian Constitution; do they not violate citizens' rights?

[Nikolayev] Of course, these are enforced measures. But they are being implemented in strict accordance with the Law "On the Russian Federation State Border," they have been coordinated with local organs of power, they in no way impede or restrict Russia's economic, cultural, and kinship ties with neighboring states, nor do they violate our citizens' legal rights and interests, and they meet with the support and understanding of the population of the border areas. Incidentally, we are cooperating constantly with the Georgian and Azerbaijani border troops. In addition we have had meetings with our colleagues from Turkey and Iran. They were told the reasons why the guard on the border with adjacent states in the Caucasus sector has been stepped up. Corresponding work has also been carried out with the presidents of a number of the North Caucasus republics and also with representatives of the Caucasus' religions.

[Ignatyev] What tasks are the border troops now performing in the conflict zone?

[Nikolayev] At present the State Border in the Caucasus Special Border District sector is being guarded on two fronts: The first runs along the Commonwealth states' border with Turkey and Iran and the second along the Russian-Georgian and Russian- Azerbaijani border. I must say that in this region the situation has not changed substantially; there has been no marked improvement. But the situation on the Ingush-Chechen and Dagestani-Chechen administrative border in areas of Ingushetia and Dagestan adjacent to Chechnya is deteriorating. One is conscious of this as the federal troops continue their combat operations to disarm and eliminate Dudayev's illegal formations.

[Ignatyev] What form is this taking?

[Nikolayev] A certain proportion of the local population of Ingushetia and Dagestan is responding in a variety of ways to the closure of the administrative border with Chechnya. Servicemen are being threatened with reprisals. Newspapers produced by the so- called Islamic Revival Party are being circulated among Dagestan's residents urging them to begin combat operations against the Russian troops. There have been over 20 attacks on border guards in recent times alone. Some 10 servicemen have been injured. And five have died.

Thus, at 0930 hours 13 February the bodies of two border guards - - Warrant Officer V. Gutsu and Private V. Rogozhin—were discovered on the outskirts of the village of Ali-Yurt, with traces of firearms injuries. The day before, 5 km southwest of the city of Nazran between the population centers of Surkhakhi and Ali-Yurt, a GAZ automobile was found; a few days before it had taken these servicemen to the city and had not returned. A Russian MVD operational-investigative group and representatives of Ingushetia's law-enforcement organs arrested seven men on suspicion of murder. Three of them—residents of Ali-Yurt—admitted having committed the crime. It turned out that the border guards were shot with an assault rifle in the courtyard of one of the bandits' houses.

[Ignatyev] What solution do you see to the prevailing situation?

[Nikolayev] We need to tighten further measures aimed at sealing the administrative border with Chechnya. We must not allow a further increase in the conflict today. Peaceful life has already begun to be restored in the Chechen Republic and we, in conjunction with the Russian MVD Internal Troops, are obliged to ensure normal working conditions for everyone who has come to Chechnya to revive the republic.

Government Press Service Issues Report

LD2402190595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1843 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 24 TASS—The following report of the Russian Government press service was circulated here today:

"According to a report of the Mobile Press Center, the social-political situation on Chechen territory has remained tense in the past 24 hours. Russian interior troopers were under systematic sniper and militant fire all night long.

"The federal troops had to open fire at location of militants. A total of 2,244 vehicles have been inspected, 16 grenades, two air bombs and four artillery shells have been destroyed, 19 mines, 10 hand grenades and over 1,500 cartridges have been confiscated.

"Relations between Chechen civilians residents and the militants are growing tense in some areas. For instance, elders of the Alkhan-Kala and Yermolovskiy populated

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localities told Dudayev representatives about the need to clear of mines the bridge across the Sunzha River located not far from the settlements. The residents are planning to oppose the militants if their demand is not met.

"Teachers, physicians and pensioners of Gudermes have sent an appeal to the power structures to voice loyalty to the federal troops of the majority of town residents. They noted there are thieves and armed bandits in some clans who are provoking federal shelling of the town in order to conceal their crimes. The appeal drafters request the federal troops to ignore these provocations."

Udugov Cited on 'Fierce Clashes' Near Argun

LD2402201095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1926 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Feb 24 (Interfax)—Federal troops continued to engage in fierce clashes with Chechen militants near the city of Argun, located to the east of Groznyy.

A spokesman for Dzhokhar Dudayev, Movladi Udugov, told Interfax that the clashes were especially fierce around a hill between the village Berdikel and Argun at 17:00. "The Russian troops use artillery and aviation to carry out mass strikes on Chechen formations and militants," he stated.

According to Udugov, the federal troops had "twice attacked a bridge across the Argun River, but the attacks were repelled." Closer to midnight, Chechen militants counter-attacked to destroy a fortified command point and set on fire four Russian tanks and two APCs.

From midnight to Friday morning, "the Russian troops dealt missile strikes on Argun using MLRSs, while the city came under a helicopter attack Friday morning," Udugov said.

Interfax has not received confirmation of this information from Russian military sources.

Military operations continued on the highway Rostov-Baku to the southwest from Groznyy "that the Russian troops are trying to take under control," Udugov said. Federal units are positioned 800-1,200 meters from the highway and constantly shell it, while Chechen militants from the villages Alkhan-Yurt and Alkhan-Kala maintain counter fire, he remarked.

Last night, Chechen militants attacked a group of Russian tanks advancing towards the highway, Udugov said. As a result, three Russian tanks and several APCs were destroyed, he added.

Subcommissions Formed for Chechen Probe

LD2402201195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1926 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Feb 24 (INTERFAX)—The head of Russia's Security Council, Oleg Lobov, on Friday chaired a meeting of a commission whose task is to reveal what "threat to the security of Russia" was posed by the separatist regime in Chechnya before Moscow moved troops into the region, a Security Council source said.

The source told Interfax the meeting had dealt with technical matters, namely it appointed six subcommissions: a political and legal one, headed by Justice Minister Valentin Kovalyov, an economic one (First Deputy Economics Minister Andrey Shapovalyants), a military one (Security Council deputy head Valeriy Manilov), an international one (Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Kolokolov), a border affairs one (Federal Border Guard Service director Andrey Nikolayev), and a social affairs one (Federal Migration Service chief Tatyana Regent).

Some matters may be tackled jointly by two or more commissions, the source said.

The meeting forbade all commission members from making any preliminary judgements or public speeches before the commission presented its findings, which, according to Lobov, should happen in May.

PRAVDA Carries Dudayev Interview

MM2402204995 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Feb 95 p 1

[Excerpts from interview with Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev and M. Udugov, head of Chechnya's Press and Information Department, by INTERFAX correspondent Anatoliy Zhuravlev; place and date not given: "Unseen Side of War in Chechnya"—first two paragraphs are PRAVDA introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] We are continuing the publication of materials shedding light on backstage aspects of the tragedy in Chechnya.

Here are extracts from a conversation between D. Dudayev and INTERFAX News Agency correspondent Anatoliy Zhuravlev, (the editorial office does not know the date but there are some indications that it took place at the end of January).

[Zhuravlev] There are rumors that you gave your last television interview from Khasavyurt. You didn't leave Groznyy?

[Dudayev] I travel out of Groznyy, and did so before; I go everywhere.

[Zhuravlev] After your conversation with the commander of the Air Force in 1991, did you speak to him any more?

[Dudayev] No, I didn't. Only when they organized the hijacking of the helicopter did I help to capture their hijackers, whom they had invented. I offered them my services. Afterwards Soskovets thanked me. After that we did not talk. Evidently, Petr Stepanovich (he apparently is referring to Air Force Commander in Chief

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Deynekin—editorial note) fell under the influence of the Federal Counterintelligence Service or the organizers of this slaughter.

[Zhuravlev] You didn't get a chance to speak to Gromov?

[Dudayev] I met with him in 1991, but not after that.

[Zhuravlev] With whom would you like to have a good talk?

[Dudayev] Who can you talk to there? Deynekin is a criminal; there's nothing to talk to him about. The only person with whom I could compare notes is Lebed: After all, he has not resorted to resolving a political matter by military means. Otherwise blood would have been spilt in that region. Gromov has been removed from power. [Dudayev ends]

M. Udugov, head of Chechnya's Press and Information Department, joins the conversation.

[Udugov] Tolik, clarification of one point: As regards the possible events in spring about which the president has spoken, information is coming in. The president is very anxious about this, as things may happen against our wishes. You must definitely take note of this, Tolik.... [Udugov ends]

[Udugov] We prepared the Chechen Government's reaction, but it is necessary to comment on Yusef's emotional pronouncements in the United States on behalf of the government of the Chechen Republic. The government of the Chechen Republic points out that the several emotional pronouncements made by the Chechen Republic's Foreign Minister Yusef at a press conference in the United States, do not alter in principle the position of the government of the Chechen Republic, which strictly adheres to principles of nonviolence in politics. The government of the Chechen Republic once more states officially that it adheres to and will continue to adhere to principles whereby all norms of international law are executed in the strictest possible manner, and it will not allow acts of violence to be committed in any measure and under any circumstances....

This should be put out urgently, as Yelena Georgiyevna Bonner has just called from Washington and she is extremely concerned about this matter. She said that it would be desirable to do it through INTERFAX.

Udugov Warns Moscow of 'Tragic Consequences'

LD2502015495 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1900 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Chechen side is ready to continue talks at any level on a peaceful settlement of the conflict, Movladi Udugov, a spokesman of Dudayev's government, claims.

[Begin Udugov recording] But, unfortunately, the Russian leadership, the Russian command does not have such aspirations or desires. The only surprising thing is the position of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin who favors the talks' process, that is of course the position of the government of Russia—but the president, the military command are, in fact, ignoring these calls, the position of Chernomyrdin. One gets the impression that there is either a complete lack of control over the situation, that is, the military are being left to their own devices and are doing whatever they want, or, in fact, you and I are seeing the government and some power structures being completely ignored by the Russian state. In either case, it is a very dangerous syndrome which may soon have very tragic consequences in Russia itself, in Moscow. [end recording]

Volkogonov Cited on Russian Casualties

LD2502083695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0827 GMT 25 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mozdok February 25 TASS—There were no new developments in Chechnya overnight. Dudayev's gunmen fired, as before, on positions of Russian interior troops and of law enforcement bodies.

Small skirmishes took place also on Friday. ITAR-TASS learnt at the press centre of the federal troops' command in Chechnya that troops were forced to open fire on places of militants' concentration.

Asked about casualties, the press centre spokesman said that over 1,000 men and officers were killed since the start of the conflict.

According to earlier reports, Dmitriy Volkogonov, chairman of the commission at the Russian president on prisoners of war, interned and missing, cited a similar figure at a news conference in Moscow on Friday: 1,146 servicemen were killed between December 11 (when Russian troops were dispatched to Chechnya to stop hijackings, kidnappings, train robberies and other outrages committed during the three-year rule of illegally elected President Dudayev) and February 23.

Regrettably, this figure is growing with every passing day. According to General Volkogonov, a private and an officer were killed on the night of February 23 as a result of mortar fire.

Journalists Issue 'Harassment' Complaint

LD2502124695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1222 GMT 25 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 25 TASS—"Journalists covering the events in the Chechen Republic are being subjected to further harassment," says a statement released here today by the foundation for the protection of glasnost. The document says that

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the foundation is aware of more than 130 cases when journalists, working in Chechnya and outside the conflict zone, were persecuted.

The statement cites several cases when the rights of journalists were violated. It says that operator of the Kiev bureau of the CNN TV company (USA) Aleksey Stepura was detained by the Interior Ministry's special police on January 27. He was brought to Groznyy, beaten up, and locked up in a cage. His equipment and video cassettes were confiscated. Oleg Kruychek, correspondent of the Moscow newspaper "SEGODNYA", was subjected to pressure by the command of the Far Eastern military area on February 8. It wanted him to reveal the source of his information in violation of the Russian law on the mass media. Editor-in-chief of the newspaper "BIROBIDZHANSKAYA ZVEZDA" Nikolay Nemayev was summoned to the office of Iosif Nekhin, representative of the Russian president in the Jewish Autonomous Region, who ordered him to stop publishing articles criticising the Russian Army's actions in Chechnya. Correspondent-operator of the independent "MIR-TV" company Aleksey Kuznetsov from the town of Shakhtiy, Rostov region, was prevented on February 10 from filming in the Rostov military hospital. His identification card, video-camera and microphone were confiscated. They were returned to the owner only after the intervention of the mititary procurator's office.

Semenov, Chechen Clergy Meet in Nazran

LD2502135395 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1259 GMT 25 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ruslan Maysigov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nazran, 25 Feb—The talks between representatives of the federal authority's territorial directorate in the Chechen republic and Chechnya's highest-ranking clerics concerning a cessation of hostilities in the conflict zone are to be continued. An ITAR-TASS correspondent learned that this decision was adopted during the two-hour talks that took place here today behind closed doors between Russian Federation Deputy Prime Minister Nikolay Semenov and representatives of Chechnya's supreme Muslim clerics. It is quite possible that the next consultations will take place on the same representative level. The sides declined to comment on the details of the meeting.

Forces Clash Near Samashki, Zakan-Yurt

LD2502144095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1427 GMT 25 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Feb 25 (Interfax)—On Friday evening and Saturday night Groznyy's south-western suburbs were subjected to intensive strikes from multiple launch rocket systems.

Our Interfax correspondent reports that the federal forces were simultaneously re-deploying their armored equipment from Chernorechye, a district under control of the Chechen home guards, namely at the approaches to the south-western suburbs; earlier, on Tuesday, the federal forces blocked the road to these suburbs.

According to our Interfax correspondent, the north-eastern part of the horizon is covered with black smoke.

The headquarters of the home guards reported to our Interfax correspondent that they do not rule out possibility that in the near time the federal forces can launch an offensive against the Chechen positions in the suburbs of Groznyy from several directions.

Meanwhile, living quarters which are under control of home guards are burning. The civil population which remained here, primarily women and old people, hide in the basements. Only a few manage to escape from the practically blocked south-western suburbs of Groznyy by foot.

Our Interfax correspondent also reports that on Saturday morning a fight was launched near the village of Zakan-Yurt (20 kilometers from the Chechen-Ingush border) which is under control of the Chechen home guards. Earlier, on Friday evening, the federal forces, which are stationed in the populated center of Assinovskaya which borders Ingushetia, inflicted a strike against positions of the home guards near the villages of Samashki and Zakan-Yurt from the multiple launch rocket systems.

At the same time fire engagements were going on on Saturday night near the populated center of Alkhazurovo (30 kilometers to the south from Groznyy). The home guards headquarters does not rule out that the federal forces will try to take this village under their control in order to block the bypassing route from Chechnya's western regions to Shali where a reinforced stronghold to resist the federal forces is being created now.

Earlier the Russian forces blocked the highway Groznyy-Shali near the village of Chechen-Aul (several kilometers to the east of Groznyy), they still hold it under their control.

Home guards continue creating reinforced resistance points along the highway Rostov-Baku in Chechnya's western regions. This is done in case armored vehicles of the federal forces undertake an attempt to move along the highway to the populated centers of Achkhoy-Martan and Samashki, which are situated at the distance of 10 kilometers from the Chechen-Ingush border. If the federal forces move along the highway Rostov-Baku then the Chechen groupings which are staying in the populated centers of Alkhan-Yurt, Kulary, and Zakan-Yurt (they are located near the highway) will appear encircled.

OSCE Team Visits Prisoners in Mozdok

LD2502155195 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1513 GMT 25 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Sergey Babkin]

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[FBIS Translated Text] Mozdok, 25 Feb—The OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] delegation that arrived in Mozdok today has visited a filtration center where persons suspected of belonging to bandit formations are held until their identity is established. The OSCE representatives spoke to the detainees. None of them complained of the conditions they were being held in.

There are currently 14 people in the center. A total of 341 people have passed through it during the conflict, while only 46 of them have been transferred for further investigation.

The OSCE representatives also met representatives of the Russian-speaking population of Chechnya and North Ossetia today. During their conversation the cossacks stressed that if the war in Chechnya had started for Russia in December 1994 then for them it had been continuing for three and a half years. They said that 35 people had been killed in North Ossetian built-up areas bordering Chechnya as a result of raids from the direction of Chechnya since Dudayev's accession to power.

As for the recent claim by the Dudayev regime's information minister, Movladi Udugov, that 2,000 Chechens were being held in Russian concentration camps, a spokesman for the press center of the command of the Combined Group of Federal Forces told ITAR-TASS that the Russian command saw this as an attempt to mislead the OSCE group.

Meanwhile Russian Human Rights Commissioner Sergey Kovalev today flew out to Groznyy after inspecting the Mozdok filtration center.

Explosion Kills 25 OMON Troops in Groznyy

LD2502175595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1728 GMT 25 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Sergey Babkin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mozdok, 25 Feb—Twenty-five servicemen of the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment], the interior troops, and the Federal Counterintelligence Service were killed on the southern outskirts of Groznyy this morning as a result of an explosive device being accidentally detonated by a combined unit of the federal forces.

The ITAR-TASS correspondent was informed by a spokesman for the press center of the command of the group of federal forces that details of the tragedy were being established.

Recruiting for Dudayev in Dagestan Fails

LD2602092595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0847 GMT 26 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Sergey Babkin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mozdok, 26 Feb—Clashes between local Ingush population and Chechen refugees have increased during the past 24 hours in the Malgobekskiy District of Ingushetia. A representative of a mobile press centre under the territorial administration of the federal executive authorities in the Chechen Republic told an ITAR-TASS correspondent that the conflict has been caused by some refugees stealing personal belongings of the local population. The Ingush population have become angered by the illegal actions carried out by refugees from Chechnya in the populated areas of Novyy Redant, Malgobek, Verkhniye, Sredniye Achaluki, and Sagopshi.

According to the mobile press centre, an attempt made by Dudayev's representatives to recruit mercenaries in the Dagestan town of Kyzlyar was foiled by the local population who banished those who tried to recruit mercenaries from the populated area.

The same source also reported that federal forces' subunits have destroyed an ammunition dump and a radar-station of illegal armed formations on the outskirts of the Chechen town of Gudermes.

Federal Forces Shell Argun, Shali, Gudermes

LD2602134995 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1300 GMT 26 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] There was no fighting this morning in the zones of confrontation between the federal troops and the Chechen detachments in the suburbs of Groznyy and in the west of Chechnya. However, the federal troops shelled the positions of the Chechen irregulars in the south of Groznyy. As for the eastern parts of Chechnya, the towns of Argun, Shali, and Gudermes were subjected to intensive artillery shellings and bombardments. Our radio station learned this at the operational headquarters in Ingushetia.

Kazbek Makhashev, interior minister in Dzhokhar Dudayev's government, told an Interfax correspondent that no serious positional changes have occurred on the confrontation line between the Russian troops and the Chechen detachments in the last six days. All attempts by the federal troops to break through to the town of Gudermes from the north have been frustrated.

Talks With Chechen Commanders Continue

LD2602164595 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1600 GMT 26 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Consultations on a peaceful settlement in Chechnya are continuing in Ingushetia today. According to our radio station, representatives of the federal troop command and Chechen field commanders are taking part in them. They are discussing the exchange of prisoners and the organization of talks with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Nikolay Semenov and the head of the territorial administration of the federal power bodies in Chechnya.

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Dudayev Envoy Presents Peace Option

LD2602180995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1641 GMT 26 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy, Feb 26 (Interfax)—A representative of Dzhokhar Dudayev in the Chechen command, Musa Merzhuyev, said Sunday "it is not too late to settle the Russian-Chechen relations by peaceful means."

In an interview with Interfax, Merzhuyev said: "Instead of insisting on disarming Chechen formations, the first regular division could be formed on the contract basis with its eventual inclusion in the Russian armed forces." "Both sides involved in the conflict would gain from this, since in any case Russia and Chechnya cannot go away from each other being doomed to live together," he added.

Merzhuyev remarked that "only Dzhokhar Dudayev's government has powers to maintain talks and consultations with the Russian side" and regretted that "the Russian side constantly negotiates with those unable to determine the future of the Chechen people."

Rally Organizers Detained in Nalchik

LD2602184895 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1800 GMT 26 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Militia detained three militants of the Kabarda national movement who tried to organize a rally in support of Chechnya in Nalchik today. The Kabarda-Balkaria prosecutor's office has reported that the detained included Ruslan (Gvashev), vice-president of the Confederation of the Peoples of Caucasus, and Vladimir (Meshev), member of the Congress of the Kabarda People. They will be given administrative sentences for violating the Kabarda-Balkar law banning rallies, demonstrations, and pickets.

Agapov Denies Chechen-Russian Talks Held

LD2602211395 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 2030 GMT 26 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The main subject today is the situation in Chechnya. Pavel Guskov reports.

[Guskov] I must refute the report of the "Moscow Echo" radio station that talks are being held today in the Sleptsovskaya Stanitsa [Cossack settlement] in Ingushetia between representatives of the Russian Armed Forces and Chechen groupings under the leadership of Maskhadov.

Boris Nikolayevich Agapov, vice president of Ingushetia, who is the mediator in all these talks, said that no contacts were resumed in the last few days and, the more so, there were no talks. He was also very skeptical about the opportunities Sergey Kovalev will have for settling the conflict his way. He said that evidently Sergey Kovalev no longer had this opportunity.

Peace Proposals to Dudayev 'Unanswered'

LD2702095295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0852 GMT 27 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Babkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mozdok February 27 TASS—Chechen armed units remained inactive last night, ITAR-TASS was told in the press centre of the Russian federal troop command in Chechnya.

A source close to the command in an interview with ITAR-TASS denied the latest media reports that delegates of the Russian command and Chechen fighters held talks in Sleptsovsk, Ingushetia.

The source said Russian previous proposals to Dudayev's forces still remained unanswered. He also denied allegations that Dudayev had proposed, "through special channels", to form "a wild division" from his units for inclusion of it in the Russian Army.

A spokesman for the Russian command dismissed the statement released by Movladi Udugov, head of Dudayev's information department, that the Russian federal forces lost 78 troops overnight Sunday. "This information is untrue," the spokesman stressed.

Further on Pain, Popov Analysis of Crisis

954F1384A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7, 9, 10 Feb 95

[Three of four installments of the article by political scientists Emil Pain and Arkadiy Popov, first in the series on Chechnya under the general heading "The Russian Policy in Chechnya: How It Was Conceived, How It Led to War, and What Repercussions It Will Have Tomorrow"; for the second installment see the article entitled "Influence of Chechen Mafia Viewed," published under 954F1268A in FBIS-SOV-95-030 on 14 February, pages 33-36]

7 Feb p 4: "1. Long Live the Revolution!"

The story of "independent Chechnya," which today is ending in tragedy, began as a farce. In the summer of 1991 the world had learned that a certain not-quite-defined part of Checheno-Ingushetia was seceding from the RSFSR and the USSR and proclaimed itself an independent state under the name of the Chechen Republic. This was the decision of the All-National Conference (later renamed Congress) of the Chechen People (OKChN), which set forth that the supreme body of authority in this state without borders was the OKChN Ispolkom [executive committee], headed by its chairman, retired general Dzhokhar Dudayev.

At the time, few were concerned over this event: The declaration of sovereignty adopted by a public organization looked just too frivolous. However, two months later the farce already began to acquire the attributes of a quite serious drama, when it came out that the OKChN

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had not only serious intentions but also serious support in Moscow. In this respect, unwitting aid to Dudayev accrued from the August putsch, which was imprudently supported by the ChIR [Chechen-Ingush Republic] Supreme Soviet and its chairman, Doku Zavgayev, providing a pretext for his removal from office. It is important, however, to remember how this was done and how the Russian authorities and the Russian public reacted to it.

At the time, democratic Moscow newspapers reported that "the wave of popular resentment swept away the republic Supreme Soviet, forcing it to disband." The way this "popular resentment" manifested itself, however, was that in the beginning of September 1991, Dudayev's armed national guard seized by force the Council of Ministers building and the radio and television center, and then, on 6 September, burst into the room where the Supreme Soviet session was in progress and, as is expected of revolutionaries, took it by storm. Those deputies who attempted to resist were brutally beaten; in the process, Groznyy City Soviet Chairman Vitaliy Kutsenko died (trying to escape from the bandits, he jumped out of the window).

What did the Russian Supreme Soviet do in response to this outlandish arbitrariness? It welcomed the "popular rebellion." Russian parliament speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov, who urgently flew to Groznyy, did everything to attach to the events an appearance of legality and at the same time to direct the course of the Chechen revolution onto a path controlled by him personally. Under his guardianship, the disbanded ChIR Supreme Soviet convened again on 15 September, in order to "officially self-disband," to bequeath its powers to the future new parliament of Checheno-Ingushetia, and to create for the period of transition a transitional organ of authority in the form of a Provisional Supreme Council [PSC], which consisted of some 30 selected deputies of the ChIR Supreme Soviet and, of course, representatives of the revolutionary OKChN.

However, from the very first days of its functioning, the PSC encountered the "congressists'" drive to subjugate it and to use it as a cover for passing decisions aimed at dividing Checheno-Ingushetia and at effecting Chechnya's secession from Russia. Being powerless to withstand the pressure of national-revolutionaries, intoxicated with impunity, the PSC began to pummel Moscow with desperate cables: "Armed formations are committing outrages in the republic; offices of state bodies of authority have been seized; television and radio are being used to discredit persons the OKChN Ispolkom considers objectionable."

On 6 October the OKChN Ispolkom declared the PSC deposed. Only then, having realized what was happening, did the RSFSR Supreme Soviet's presidium issue a decree: "Henceforth and until the election of a new ChIR Supreme Soviet, the republic's Provisional Supreme Council shall be considered the only legitimate organ of state authority on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic." But it was too late. As often happens in politics, the creation got out from under its creator's control.

It was at this point, or perhaps even a little earlier, in September 1991, that it was still possible to carry out a true police operation **"to disarm illegal armed formations."** At the time, such an operation would not have required tanks with artillery or aviation: The procuracy, militia, and state security organs subordinated to the center were still functioning in Chechnya; military units were stationed in Groznyy; and the armaments of Dudayev's commandos consisted mainly of small arms. Most likely, even then there would have been casualties, but at least not among the civilian population, in whose eyes Dudayev, who had only recently returned to his native parts after a 20-year absence, had not yet grown into a national hero. The course toward the division of the ChIR and Chechnya's secession from Russia was opposed at the time not only by the overwhelming majority of Ingush (14 percent of the republic's total population) and the Russian-speaking population (26 percent), but also, by various estimates, by up to 40 percent of Chechens (first of all in the capital and the republic's northern regions). In Groznyy, the rallies of OKChN supporters were matched by no less resolute and crowded rallies of its opponents. However, until as late as November, Moscow preferred not to interfere in the course of the "national-liberation revolution." Why?

First, the Russian authorities at the time clearly had their hands full without Chechnya—an intense fight with the remnants of all-Union structures was under way, and far more grand and fascinating tasks were on the agenda. Second, many influential political forces at the time wanted to tame Dudayev, while he behaved like the main character in the famous Russian tale "Kolobok," skillfully avoiding outstretched hands and wide-open mouths eager for him.

The first to experience the impact of this were those who had facilitated Dudayev's promotion to the post of OKChN chairman. To a considerable extent, Dudayev owed his promotion precisely to his lack of high birth and his long absence from Chechnya. Therefore, heads of Chechen clans, having been unable to agree how to divide the power that was already slipping from the Communists' hands, invited him as a "ceremonial general" but at the same time a man without connections or roots, whom later it would be easy to push aside.

The Russian leadership also had certain designs on Dudayev during the days of the Chechen revolution. In September-October, its emissaries Burbulis, Poltoranin, and Rutskoy left Groznyy encouraged; at the beginning of November, however, at a White House conference where a group of State Council members was meeting with experts on the Chechen problem, Burbulis already described Dudayev as a man "one cannot do business with—he does not keep his word."

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Undoubtedly, Ruslan Khasbulatov, whose power at the time was only beginning to rise, wanted to count on Dudayev as his governor-general in Chechnya. It was Khasbulatov who not only legitimized the disbandment of the ChIR Supreme Soviet but also facilitated the creation of the Provisional Supreme Council and turning it into a political "cover" for Dudayev. But the general had different plans: First, PSC members were declared "betrayers of the Chechen nation," and later the same verdict was pronounced on Khasbulatov.

Finally, even if the Russian leadership decided to conduct a police operation against Chechen "revolutionaries," in the atmosphere of the post-August democratic euphoria it could only attempt such a step with the support of the Russian democratic public. And this is precisely what it could not count on. One only needs to leaf through newspapers of those months to clearly see that despite all reservations regarding "not quite legitimate actions," in the eyes of too many Moscow democrats, General Dudayev was unquestionably a hero.

What happened? Could thundering anti-imperial rhetoric alone possibly overshadow both the punitive Afghan expedition past and the Jacobin present of this, generally speaking, frightening man with his peremptory judgments and openly authoritarian bent? We think that the point was not his personality as an individual—it was the idea personified by the insurgent general, in keeping with which his heroic image was being shaped.

The idea in question is the "national-liberation" (that is, separatist) movement of non-Russian peoples as an ostensibly natural and inevitable form of realizing their democratic aspirations. From the moment the first "national fronts" emerged in USSR republics, this idea turned out so popular among Russian democrats that a habit developed naturally to overlook the nationalists' small and big sins, to forgive them—first quiet lawlessness, and later open violence. Without question, in the "perestroyka" era, the era of struggle with the still-living Soviet communism, democratic movements did indeed frequently develop in the form of nationalist ones, although even then one could see on the example of many movements (the "Zviyadists" in Georgia, the "frontists" in Moldova, and others) that the connection between nationalism and democracy is rather accidental and transient.

However, after the fall of communism and the disintegration of the USSR, when the former Soviet republics found themselves in the roles of mother country and the baton of the "national liberation struggle" was passed from them to their own autonomies, the essence of separatism showed itself in its primordial nakedness. And one had to be very blind or be a very politically committed person to not see behind the calls for "struggle for self-determination of indigenous peoples" the elementary desire of local leaders, now freed from Moscow's hand, to "harness" the ethnic minorities' infringement phobia for their own purposes, far removed from the interests of both democracy and national revival.

The entire history of post-Soviet liberalism is replete with examples of such political blindness. Because, for instance, both Karabakh fighters for independence, who have occupied half a dozen Azerbaijan regions outside the NKR's [Nagorno-Karabakh Republic] borders and are trying to make them a bargaining chip in negotiations with Baku, or Abkhazian ones, who have used Russian planes to bomb Sukhumi into dust and expelled from the republic with the help of North Caucasus mercenaries the 200,000-strong Georgian population, now tauntingly allowing its measured repatriation, have long ceased to be fit for the role of innocent lambs.

This, however, did not affect in any way the reaction of Moscow's liberal public: They neither showed embarrassment over the behavior of their pets nor protested. And never mind that Ardzimba right away, and Dudayev in the third year of his rule, proclaimed themselves loyal supporters of the USSR (Dudayev even proposed to Gorbachev and Lukyanov to move to Groznyy and "resume carrying out their functions" from there). And never mind that among the best friends of both "fighters against imperialism" turned out to be far from the best Soviet-Russian generals and Chekists, who had been illegally supplying their proteges with the most modern weaponry all these past years. It turns out that all of this is of no importance: **"the insurgent people," like Caesar's wife, are above suspicion.**

Likewise, in Checheno-Ingushetia nothing kept the "insurgent people" in the form of the OKChN to act in keeping with "revolutionary expediency." That us, to trample all written and unwritten laws and agreements and hold in greatest haste (almost a month earlier than the legally established date agreed by all sides) parliamentary and presidential elections by the scheme convenient for them, despite the refusal of the populations of six out of 14 ChIR districts to participate in them. During the entire election campaign, for which less than two weeks were allotted, the republic lived practically in a state of emergency (having branded opponents of Chechnya's independence "enemies of the people," the OKChN announced general mobilization of men between 15 and 55 years of age and put the National Guard on full battle alert). Because of the complete dominance of "congressists" in the election commissions, in some districts the number of ballots casts exceeded the number of registered voters, and bundles of ballots allegedly filled out by members of the Chechen diaspora were being thrown into ballot boxes set at city squares. Naturally, Dudayev became president.

The decision of the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies to not recognize these elections was no longer of any significance: The deed had been accomplished: for the first time in its history, Chechnya had a "popularly" elected president! Bad or good—he was **their own**, a man who was not a coward, who did not shy away from openly challenging the mighty Moscow. So why be surprised that the RSFSR president's decree on imposing the state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia—issued

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with "only" a two-month delay (on 7 November)—had the effect directly opposite to the expected?

A mere mention of it, reinforced by a skillfully circulated rumor of alleged preparations of a new deportation of Chechens, roused nearly the entire Chechen society and sharply boosted Dudayev's political stock. By November, all offices of federal authority in Chechnya had already been demolished, military garrisons blocked, and the impregnable KGB building seized (or, to be precise, overtaken fully intact—this is a separate and rather murky story), together with mountains of weapons and lists of agents kept in it—the latter being immediately reoriented by Dudayev "into the patriotic line of work." After this, Russian special services never succeeded in setting up a full-fledged agent network in Chechnya, which caused numerous political mistakes, including making the decision to send troops to Chechnya. Dudayev, on the other hand, through the former network of KGB agents (some of them possibly became "double" agents), gained access to Moscow's plans, and not only regarding Chechnya. In any case, in April 1993 Dudayev bragged in a letter to Yeltsin that he had in his possession "extensive, and trust me, very reliable information regarding the work being conducted by opponents of viable executive authority in Russia...."

In short, in a matter of one month the situation changed dramatically, and an attempt to send Russian troops into Chechnya now could not only create a rift between the president and the Russian democratic movement but also indeed result in serious bloodshed. Therefore, the ill-fated edict was, to everyone's relief, rejected by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

9 Feb p 4: "3. Covert Diplomacy"

It would be wrong to say that the federal authorities did not make any attempts to get negotiations with Chechnya going. The two-year period from November 1992 up to the beginning of the military operations in December 1994 could even go down in the history of the Chechen crisis as an era of diplomatic efforts. There have been negotiations. And at the level of heads of state (at the end of 1992, during the period of exacerbation of the Ossetia-Ingush conflict, RF [Russian Federation] Acting Prime Minister Gaydar met with ChR [Chechen Republic] Deputy Prime Minister Mamodayev, reached an agreement with him on the segregation of Russian and Chechen troops, and outlined approaches to normalization of relations between Moscow and Groznyy). And at the parliamentary level (in January 1993 a Russian delegation headed by Council of Nationalities Chairman Abdulatipov and Deputy Prime Minister Shakhray visited Groznyy at the invitation of the ChR parliament; at the time they even managed to sign a protocol on the preparation of an agreement between the RF and the ChR "On Delineation and Mutual Delegation of Powers").

However, whenever some relaxation was achieved, it was immediately derailed because of firm resistance on the part of Dudayev: First Mamodayev was accused of betrayal, and then, correspondingly, parliament leaders. More than once or twice, Dudayev stated subsequently that "no political agreement with Russia is possible," and he, as president, would "not allow the signing of an agreement that would not formalize the demand to recognize the ChR 'a sovereign state—a subject of international law.'"

It is not hard to explain such an irreconcilable position on the part of the Chechen president: It provided him with the ability not only to maintain his winning image as "a ceaseless fighter for freedom," but also to sustain in Chechen society a charged atmosphere of "siege mentality," where any opposition is easily presented as betrayal of popular interests and becomes extremely vulnerable in the domestic political struggle for power.

Accusing parliament leaders and the entire opposition of a "pro- Russian plot" and "national betrayal" permitted Dudayev without any visible damage to his charisma to disband in May-June 1993 the new parliament, which had been elected at the same time he was, as well as the Constitutional Court that had attempted to hold a referendum on the system of authority in Chechnya; to ban all opposition parties and their publications; and finally to use firepower to disperse a protest rally of many thousands in the center of Groznyy. The Russian public, however, once again "overlooked" it.

But perhaps the whole point is that attempts to invite Dudayev to the negotiating table had been insufficient?

It is true that Moscow carefully avoided direct negotiations with the Chechen president. And it is easy to understand why: The only federal leader with whom Dudayev agreed to conduct official negotiations was the president of Russia. This is an inarguable fact. That Dudayev all this time sought a meeting precisely—and only—with Yeltsin is evidenced by his public speeches, in which he, while angrily denouncing the "imperial" authorities of Russia, carefully avoided criticizing the Russian president personally; his proposals for a "personal meeting" with the RF president passed through confidential channels; and finally, the contents of his own messages to Yeltsin. One of them, sent on the eve of the April 1993 referendum, deserves particular attention.

The situation was highly unusual: The leader of "struggling Chechnya" offers to the leader of "imperial Russia" his services as a volunteer adviser and analyst: "I want to offer to your attention, to be seriously analyzed, the forecasted results of the referendum and a post-referendum strategy of action." And further on, two scenarios for the development of political events in Russia: "If you are to choose between the two evils, I see the disbandment of the Supreme Soviet and setting parliamentary elections, while simultaneously holding a referendum on the adoption of a new constitution for September 1993, as a lesser one" (this was written on 4 April, half a year before the October events). And which

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of the "two evils" does Dudayev see as the greater? The reader would not believe it: the disintegration of the Russian state and the fact that **"the RF president will be accused of allowing the breakup of the Russian Federation"!**

Everything in this letter—which, to the best of our knowledge, remained unanswered—is remarkable. The touching concern for the integrity of Russia (it was precisely at this time that reports began to come from some Russian republics regarding consignments of weapons for local nationalist organizations arriving there from Chechnya); the persistent attempts to impose friendship on the first person in Russia; and, of course, a truly Smerdyakov-like "whispering in the ear," [editorial note: Smerdyakov is a character in Dostoevsky's novel "The Brothers Karamazov"] the very fateful plan to which Yeltsin eventually did, alas, have to resort in October (the adviser himself implemented it even earlier, and in the "Chechen version" the use of arms against the opposition was not provoked by the latter).

Perhaps this detail will help to understand why the Russian president almost instinctively, as it seems to us, tried to avoid contact with his Chechen counterpart. The overly sticky persistence with which Dudayev was soliciting a meeting with Yeltsin suggested that it was simply dangerous to trust him. Had such a meeting taken place, it only would have strengthened Dudayev's hand by giving him the missing legitimacy and thus completely demoralizing the Chechen opposition loyal to Russia and counting on its help. At the same time, no preliminary agreements on conditions for Yeltsin's consent to such a meeting would have been of any consequence: Everything that is known about Dudayev suggests that he is quite an unprincipled man, who does not see it beneath him to go back on his word (when it is "necessitated by national interests").

In short, in this secret diplomacy all trump cards were in the hands of the cunning and aggressive Chechen leader. While the Russian president could not afford an open dialog with the Russian public on the subject of the status of Chechnya. Both for legal and political reasons.

Until October 1993, seriously dealing with this issue was out of question: Khasbulatov's Supreme Soviet, poised to pounce on the president for every miscalculation, would not have missed the opportunity to interpret an attempt at "making peace" with independent Chechnya as grounds for impeachment (and strictly speaking, would be right in doing so, because not only recognizing Chechnya's independence but even recognizing the legitimacy of Dudayev's regime would be a gross violation of the law on the part of the RF president).

After October, Yeltsin, of course, could feel more free in choosing tactics in relations with the regions—which actually did find its expression in the signing of the Russia-Tatarstan agreements. This agreement is not completely proper from the constitutional-legal standpoint—something the Russian president's parliamentary opponents definitely would not have let him get away with only a year earlier. And if in the new situation this "crime against the constitution," truly life-saving for Russia, was in fact committed, it was to a considerable extent due only to the fact that extensive fancy legal footwork enabled him to avoid the procedure of having it approved in the Federal Assembly. This document already was negatively appraised there, and in the event that it had come up for discussion, it definitely would have been struck down.

However, having missed on the president's "move" with respect to Tatarstan, the new parliament quickly caught up and already in March 1994 solidly blocked any feeble efforts to resolve the Chechen crisis through direct negotiations with Dudayev. The Duma adopted a decree in which it recommended to the president and the government, first, to conduct consultations on the question of future negotiations with all political forces in the ChR (and not just with Dudayev); and most importantly, to insist, as a preliminary condition for signing the future Russian-Chechen agreement on delineation of powers, on holding in the ChR elections to republic organs of authority and the RF Federal Assembly. The latter condition already ruled out negotiations with Dudayev for sure, since he considered himself a legitimate president of an independent state and had no intention of holding elections to the organs of authority of "neighboring" Russia.

Realistically, that meant that the president's hands were tied again when it came to the Chechen problem. It is easy to say—"demand to hold elections." But how does one enforce it? With tanks? To disregard the parliament's opinion, however, would have meant derailing the Treaty on Social Accord, into the preparation of which so much effort had gone, and on top of that seriously hurt relations with increasing numbers of influential leaders of Russian regions already extremely unhappy over excessive, in their opinion, concessions to Tatarstan.

And that Chechnya would demand for itself even greater concessions was beyond any doubt: The Chechen leadership immediately made it clear that with respect to Chechnya the "Tatar option" of being a Federation component was out of question.

Nevertheless, even in these conditions, Yeltsin apparently did not abandon his intent to sign an agreement "a la Tatarstan" with Chechnya. On 14 April he instructed the government to hold consultations with Groznyy and on the basis of it "to prepare a draft agreement on delineation of jurisdiction between federal organs of state authority and organs of state authority of the Chechen Republic, and mutual delegation of authority."

In May, the process of forming the Russian delegation for consultations began. But almost reluctantly, slowly, and in a way in many respects strange. It took three months (!) to coordinate the delegation's composition, and in the end Shakhray was appointed to head it—

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undoubtedly one of the most competent figures in ethnic policy matters, but already declared by Dudayev the "enemy of the Chechen people" and on top of that, being the minister of Russian regional affairs, unacceptable for the ChR leader as an official representative at negotiations. In addition, it was Shakhray at whose initiative the aforementioned State Duma decree had been adopted in March and who had been the most consistent opponent of legitimizing Dudayev and hence the possibility of the latter meeting with Yeltsin.

What was then the point of this action, ostensibly aimed at utilizing the "Tatarstan experience" in the resolution of the Chechen issue? If there was not only no hope that one could strike an "amicable" agreement with Dudayev, as had been done with Shaymiyev, but there was not even an intention to meet with him—why then this whole undertaking of preparing for "consultations in Groznyy" and the draft "agreement on delineation..."?

It is amusing that in the attempt to somehow smooth out these absurdities, experts of the just-created Analytical Center under the RF President (the authors of this article among them) prepared in May their "Proposals for Conducting Negotiations with the Chechen Republic." Their substance was as follows: "It only makes sense to conduct **official negotiations** with the current president of Chechnya," and the best choice for a personal representative of the RF president would be one of the top officials in his administration. As to **consultations** with the opposition, envisaged by the Duma decree, on the other hand, it was advisable to conduct them semi-officially. In the event that the first round of negotiations was successful, the plan envisaged a concluding meeting between the RF president and Dudayev.

Alas, the presidential analysts turned out to be victims of some political game. Not being in a position to judge what were at the time the subjective motives and plans of those who were working out the decision on "preparation of negotiations" with Groznyy, we may assume today that **objectively** (and perhaps not even consciously) all of this was being done in order to create an appearance of the negotiations process. And the bad part was not that it had already been internally decided then to give up on negotiations since it was impossible to talk to—and there was nothing to discuss with—the person who had the power (Dudayev), and those who were willing to negotiate (the opposition) did not have the power. The bad part was that the political reality in Russia by then had become such that the president **found himself compelled to create the appearance of negotiations.**

At a time when Russian society still remained in political lethargy with respect to Chechnya, consoling itself with illusions that the situation there would "somehow dissipate," and demanded the same of the president, obvious considerations of state responsibility to that same society, to Russia (including its Chechen component), dictated the need to proceed with an **active** and at the same time **sensible** interference in this situation.

Sensible in this case means **nonmilitary;** the slightest threat of sending federal troops into Chechnya, in addition to all other factors, always and unequivocally played into Dudayev's hands. But there are also many nonmilitary ways of putting effective pressure on the situation. And those who still continued to chant in 1994, "Hands off Chechnya!" simply did not understand—or did not want to understand—what was happening in this small Russian republic abandoned by everyone to the mercy of fate.

In the spring 1994 the situation in Chechnya began to perceptibly swell with blood. The economically and politically bankrupt Dudayev regime was falling apart, and an increasing number of Chechen inhabitants began to lean toward supporting the opposition. Nadterechnyy Rayon, headed by Avturkhanov, became the all-Chechnya center of resistance to Dudayev: As early as at the end of 1993, a parallel official body of authority was proclaimed there—the Provisional Council, which soon appealed to Moscow for political support. However, while Moscow continued to wait and vacillate as to whom to recognize and with whom to conduct negotiations, among the opposition itself—and this is the most dangerous part—there was a sharp increase in the influence of military leaders, who aimed at the armed overthrow of Dudayev (by the way, the most militant among them—Labazanov and Gantemirov—were formerly from Dudayev's closest inner circle). In the summer, clashes became more frequent between Dudayev's troops and the commandos of these field commanders and Khasbulatov, who by then had also jumped into action; clashes grew into "weekend wars"; after street battles in Groznyy against Labazanov's detachment, Dudayev seized Argun, previously controlled by the latter, attacked Khasbulatov's home ground Tolstoy-Yurt, and pounded "Gantemirov's" Urus-Martan; then the opposition too began to make fighting raids on the environs of Groznyy and even to make forays into it. The traditional mechanism of maintaining peace in Chechnya—the fear of vendetta—was fractured. Chopped-off heads displayed at the square and shown all over the world became a symbol of sorts of the approaching massacre.

The situation was also becoming increasingly tense at the border with Stavropol Kray—alarming cables were arriving from there almost daily. Essentially, the Cossacks demanded a blockade of Chechnya, and these demands began to acquire, almost, the form of ultimatums after four consecutive attempts to hijack buses with hostages, as well as hijacking of helicopters from the Mineralnyye Vody area and flying them to Chechnya.

On 7 September the Analytic Center presented to the Expert- Analytic Council under the RF President a report "On the Political Situation in the Chechen Republic," which contained proposals for resolution of crisis in Chechnya, which could be described as "peaceful competition of two systems." The proposal was to provide open socioeconomic and political (**but under no**

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circumstances military!) support to three northern regions of Chechnya, whose population by then had made it clear that they considered themselves part of the Russian Federation.

The meaning of this strategy was first of all to normalize life in the regions loyal to Russia and hence to increase their attractiveness in the eyes of the population. So that in a year, when Dudayev's term in office had expired and the time would come for new elections to republic bodies of authority, Chechnya inhabitants could make their own conscious choice as to which authority suited them more. In addition, this was the only way one could hope to keep the republic from an impending civil war—by taking under control, if not Dudayev, then at least his adversaries, to protect and strengthen the political wing of the opposition headed by Avturkhanov and Khadzhiyev, and to neutralize its field commanders.

This is a good time to say at least a few words in defense of the opposition. Today for some reason it is common to believe that the entire Chechen opposition had been "invented" by the Kremlin and had no support in the society. This is absolutely wrong. After all, the referendum announced by the oppositionist parliament was twice derailed by Dudayev precisely because he could not hope to win it.

In reality, since 1993 opposition to Dudayev included far from just the top former party nomenklatura (quite the contrary, many of them fit into the "revolutionary regime" faster than others) but also most members of the ChR parliament elected in the end of 1991, the Constitutional Court, heads of city and rayon administrations, leaders of almost all parties and movements, and tribe and clerical leaders (one of the first to rebel against Dudayev's authoritarianism was the universally respected in Chechnya Supreme Mufti Arsanukayev, for which he was later punished by Dudayev, who organized his demotion and replacement by a more agreeable one). Some Moscow journalists, who quoted in 1994 the pro-Dudayev statement of the "ChR parliament" perhaps simply do not know that this "parliament" is merely a woeful remnant, headed by Dudayev's relative Idigov, of what was left after the June (1993) bloody rampage.

But this is not even the main point. The Russian democratic public supported the Tajik opposition, including the military, which participated in the bloodiest civil war of the postwar period and which has taken the lives of at least 100,000 people. So why was their attitude so unequivocally negative toward the Chechen opposition, which was fighting one of the most disgusting tyrannies in the post-Soviet world?

It was all because the existence of such an opposition "did not fit" with the moral-political "national liberation" doctrine described above. If these people were against "independence from the empire," it means that they were its stooges, betrayers of their people. Of course, there are different kinds of opposition. There are "professional revolutionaries" Gantemirov and Soslambekov, who could not agree with Dudayev on how to share the power, and there are also professional scholars, true intellectuals who have never lusted for power—Khadzhiyev, Gakayev, and many others.

Those who today reproach Khadzhiyev for political unscrupulousness because of his consent to head the pro-Moscow government of national revival should be advised that he had already been offered the post of the head of government by Dudayev—a post that remained vacant. Khadzhiyev was among the first to realize the mistake that Chechen democrats, and he among them, had committed by facilitating Dudayev's rise. Khadzhiyev was among the first to openly demand an investigation of Dudayev's oil machinations and then his resignation, and took the leadership of the democratic opposition to the regime, for which he was stripped of the "right to live on the sacred Chechen soil." And if today, trying to salvage what may still be salvaged, he agreed to take upon himself the role of kamikaze, it is unbecoming to throw stones at him for that.

It appears that the "heroic-patriotic" view that is so habitual in the Soviet man—to see "counter-revolutionary elements" as something deserving only of contempt—has also taken root in the Kremlin. The inability or the lack of desire to deal with the Chechen opposition as political partners worthy of respect and trust (rather than "cannon fodder" in operations of self-assured Moscow strategists) apparently were the reason why the Analytic Center's recommendations were ignored by the leadership.

What prevailed, as we know, is a different approach, which could be described as "conspiratorial-reckless." After September 1994 a solid shroud of mystery descended over the "Chechen scene" of Russian policy. The Analytic Center stopped receiving any assignments across the entire spectrum of issues related to this policy; the channels of information flow to it also shrunk. Some time later, Shakhray was removed from supervising the Chechen problem, and his functions were transferred to a person completely new to this sphere—Yegorov. It became clear that a new, "top secret" phase of Chechen policy, portending nothing good, was beginning.

10 Feb p 4: "4. Authority and Society on the Barricades"

There are many known examples of using military force in order to resolve or localize international and domestic conflicts. Under the pressure of force, Saddam Hussein agreed to the recognition of Kuwait and partial disarmament; in order to force peace, NATO aviation bombed Bosnian Serb positions. Regular troops were used by the Government of Great Britain—in the Falkland Islands and Ulster; by the Government of Sri Lanka—in the war with Tamil guerrillas; by the Government of Mexico—with Indian guerrillas; by the Government of Colombia—with the Medellin cartel, which was supported by a considerable part of the population; and in many other countries.

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But in a democratic society there are a number of conditions that are mandatory to the state to observe when it uses force in the resolution of regional conflicts. Which is, first and foremost: exhausting peaceful means of conflict resolution, and the society's willingness to sustain casualties and bear material costs, as well as its confidence in the military's ability to act not only effectively but also in a civilized way.

These conditions were not met before the Chechen war began. Even if we admit that the possibility of reaching agreement with Dudayev within the framework of the Russian Constitution was unlikely, there was still hope for change in the Chechen Republic after the elections planned there for 1995. As to the society's consent to conduct a war, this was out of question: Sociological surveys conducted since 1991 show that the fear of being dragged into an armed conflict is one of the strongest concerns felt by Russian citizens. These moods intensified when crisis situations arose inside Russia or in neighboring states. Most heads of economic agencies and businessmen also felt extremely negatively about the prospect of getting into a war, being aware of its ruinous effect on the Russian economy.

Why then at the end of 1994 did President Yeltsin, who had been accused over a period of three years of excessive pandering to Russian republics, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Georgia, suddenly decide to undertake an extremely risky military expedition?

The press most frequently gives the following answer to this question: The president wanted to prop his declining rating with the help of a "victorious little war." This guess would have been credible had it not been for one circumstance: A person who wants to reinforce his authority in the society does not place himself at odds with the press and does not act counter to public opinion. And that the reaction to sending troops would be resoundingly negative did not even need to be forecast. After the tank foray on Groznyy, clumsily organized by Russian special services on 26 November, everything had already spilled out: angry criticism in the press, hot debates in the parliament, and even demands for impeachment. But in reality massive criticism of the president began even earlier.

Already at the beginning of 1994, many people began to feel that the "love affair" between the president and the liberal public had moved into a phase of "forced cohabitation." On the one hand, the president, by proposing the idea of the Agreement on Social Accord, came too close ideologically to his recent adversaries, and their national-great power rhetoric somehow imperceptibly began to become part of the everyday vocabulary in the Kremlin. But many liberals too, in turn, began to think that they could easily do without Yeltsin.

One was getting the impression that the political forces that supported the president for three years all of a sudden in a way fell out of love with him and were only looking for a pretext for a breakup. Yeltsin, for his part, also began to distance himself from his liberal allies, and became increasingly influenced by the forces for which the only close-to-heart and understandable notions are "great power," "firm authority," "our armor is strong and our tanks fast!"

The November fiasco of the secret special operation to seize Groznyy demonstrated that the "armor" was not all that strong, but this only prompted adoption of the next, even more irresponsible decisions, the psychological readiness for which had apparently formed long before their beginning.

As soon as the course was taken toward military action, all key decisions were made in strictest secrecy. Therefore, the circle of people privy to the discussion of the Chechen problem immediately and sharply shrunk. There was no way for the Presidential Council to be involved—it is filled with "public advocates," and you cannot trust them with a secret. The Analytic Center cannot function without drawing on support of nonstate and nonsecret institutions—rule it out. Neither is the presidential advisers service overall designed for military affairs. Hence, the decisionmaking process was locked onto Security Council members, first of all the "muscle" ministers.

As if it were not enough that a considerable part of the president's staff had been cut off from any expert evaluation of "military-Chechen" plans, the latter were not discussed even within agencies represented in the Security Council. In the Ministry of Defense, decisions were made without the participation of its collegium and counter to the opinion of a number of deputy ministers. Yegorov, the head of the entire operation, did not make the collegium of his Ministry for Nationality Affairs privy to secret plans, as a result of which his deputy Mikhaylov, appointed to head the delegation at the talks with Chechnya, went to Mozdok without knowing that a war would begin before the talk entrusted to him could commence.

The smaller the circle of the initiated, the higher the probability of mistakes—if for no other reason than that the authors did not have professional opponents. When on 27 December, already after three weeks of military operations, Oleg Lobov spoke for the first time to the Expert-Analytic Council and briefly described the plan for subsequent actions in Chechnya, council members were literally shocked by the unbounded optimism of the "planners." Answers to all questions very much resembled the well-known Russian principle: "Hopefully we will get it done somehow."

Once again, the underestimation of Dudayev's political and military potential manifested itself. Apparently the military believed that since the opposition forces had so easily entered Groznyy, a "paratrooper regiment in two hours...." But the main shortcoming of the small circle of people who made the decisions was that nothing in this circle could provide a counterweight to personal ambitions. Some needed the war in order to clear their

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smeared reputation; others—to prove that they were worthy of having been pulled out of the provinces and given high posts in Moscow; and yet others—to raise the authority of their agency, and with it, their own.

From whom did they try to keep the military campaign plans secret, though? From Dudayev? But he had been preparing for war for three years: He had purchased arms, built three lines of defense around Groznyy, fortified areas on the way to it, and guerrilla bases in the mountains. When the opposition got its hands on heavy armaments, preparations for a war with Russia speeded up, and after the Russian military group concentrated its forces near Mozdok, Dudayev no longer had any doubts regarding the imminent beginning of military operations. And at the same time, it was precisely during that time (the end of November and beginning of December) that the secrecy in preparation of the plans related to the Chechen crisis reached its high point. Apparently, the point of this exercise was to keep things secret from the until-recently "friendly" press and "friendly" factions in the parliament, which had been most vocal in denouncing the November actions of the special services in Groznyy. Today is it obvious that the negative reaction to sending in the troops **had been expected**, and it was this that they wanted to "outmaneuver" by quick military victory, counting on the principle that "winners are not judged."

"Quick" did not materialize, and all the newspapers, from democratic to communist, came down on the authorities with frenzied criticism. We would not think of calling on the press to hush up the sins and horrors of this reckless military gamble. But the problem is that neither the most veracious information nor the most sincere pathos are able to provide an answer as to what to do and how to do it.

All that has been achieved so far with the help of the resounding criticism is to embitter some generals and militant politicians, prompting them into increasingly ruthless and reckless, delusive-convulsive knee-jerk reaction: first—as soon as possible to win a crushing victory; next—to pull out by the teeth at least some of its symbols (take the palace, raise the flag) without sparing either our own soldiers, or our adversary's volunteers, or poor civilian residents who got in the way. With a completely deformed system of making and carrying out political decisions, unceasing criticism of the authorities, alas, produces a reaction opposite to the one intended.

Painful proof of this is the appointment of the head of territorial administration of federal organs of executive authority in the ChR. One gets the impression that the only motivation for choosing Nikolay Semenov was to prove to public opinion that the authorities could not care less for this opinion. Newspapers trumpet that the Chechen war pursues purely colonial goals, that Moscow wants once again to enslave the Chechen people?—so here is a Russian governor-general for you! Democrats sound alarms that this war is a trial run for the revanchist forces, that the nomenklatura-communist restoration is imminent?—here is a "soldier of the party" for you, from the classic deck of "second secretaries," equally fit to supervise Chechen "organizational affairs" and Kyrgyz industry!

It is unlikely that the sad experience of a similar appointment in Kazakhstan, followed by an explosion of nationalist passions, has been completely forgotten. And Groznyy of 1995 is not Almaty of 1986. There is not a single Russian governor-general appointed from Moscow in any Russian republic today. What is this if not open taunting of the public opinion, and not only of Moscow democrats but of the entire multiethnic federative Russia. And whether the new head is good or bad as a professional is beyond the point. There will be nothing and nobody for him to supervise in today's Chechnya.

This is how the gears turn in the snarled mechanism of today's executive authority. But the actions of the legislative branch seem to be completely ineffective as well. Nearly every deputy faction individually speaks against the Chechen war. But this is at rallies and in front of television cameras, while when they are together, in the Duma or the Federation Council, the deputies have not adopted a single decision capable of halting, even temporarily, military operations. Calls for talks were strictly abstract—neither chamber has ever defined its position on most important questions: Who would conduct talks with whom; on what conditions or without preliminary conditions; whether to halt military operations and when—immediately or after the Chechen side surrenders its arms; and so on. Even in the past, the parliament never showed a particular desire to assume extra responsibility (since, thank goodness, the new constitution has not burdened it with much), and it needs to do so even less on the eve of elections.

The war goes on, and with it increases the split in Russian society, and there are already signs that the latter is spilling into an all-Russian political conflict. The public exchange of officials on different sides of the barricades by such pleasantries as "bastards" and "skunks," regardless how we may feel about each of these people individually, is a bad sign. An old joke comes unbidden to mind—about "such a struggle for peace after which no stone will be left unturned." Today essentially we already have two Chechen conflicts: one in the North Caucasus and another in Moscow. These are different conflicts, but there can be only one principle of their resolution—**negotiations.** It is just as meaningless and dangerous to declare a "Cold War" on the authorities as it is to continue military operations against Dudayev. It already happened to us when political barricades turned into armed ones, and it hardly needs to be explained who will profit today from "transforming an imperialist war into a civil one."

We have to live with our current Russian authority for another year and a half—an enormously long time by current measures; and therefore today more than ever we

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need public accord initiated from "below" rather than from "above." In this accord it is necessary to define a common position on getting out of the Chechen crisis and related issues, on increasing public control over the actions of authorities in crisis situations, and especially civilian control over actions of "muscle" structures.

As to the principle of resolving our own Chechen conflict, we propose once again to return to the plan of "competition (or least co-existence) of two systems" until elections are held in Chechnya.

If we look at the map of military operations, it is easy to notice that over two months of fighting, the federal authorities got under their control the same northern territories that had recognized Russia's jurisdiction even before that, plus Groznyy shell-beaten into dust. Continuing the war will bring not only new casualties, comparable in scale with those already sustained, but also may push Russia to the brink of political and economic catastrophe.

In these conditions we proposed, first, **to immediately halt military operations,** freezing the disposition of forces at their current lines of deployment, and second, for representatives of the northern regions (the Chechen opposition) to begin talks with Dudayev or, at their discretion, with other persons representing the interests of the rest of Chechnya's regions, in order to set the time for holding elections in the ChR and the form of dividing the power for the period until they are held. Representatives of the OSCE, the Chechen diaspora, and Russian human rights organizations may act as intermediaries in such negotiations.

We see the tasks of the federal authorities at this stage first of all in ensuring compliance with the cease-fire terms, which will preclude the possibility of Dudayev's supporters destroying the Chechen opposition. Negotiations on this matter may be limited to the participation of representatives of the military command of both sides—the Ministry of Defense and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Russia and, correspondingly, Dudayev's general staff and all military formations fighting on Dudayev's side. For representatives of the RF political leadership, however, it makes sense to begin talks with representatives of the Chechen political leadership only after intra-Chechen agreements are reached on the principles of organizing authority for the transitional (until the elections) period.

The subject of such talks should be first of all the question of **demilitarization** of Chechnya—phased, perhaps—as well as the questions of cooperation between the parties in the matter of restoring the most important transportation communications, the social safety net, objects of social infrastructure, and so on.

Leaving Chechnya in the position of a "punished republic" is, of course, out of question. It is not by their own will that thousands of Chechens have taken to arms today, and they are fighting not for Dudayev, not for his phantom and false "independence"—they are fighting for their human rights and freedoms, which were trampled into dirt and blood. It would hard to expect anything different from a people in whose language the word "freedom" is part of the greeting. We say: "Be well!; Chechens say: "Be Free!"

* * * *

It is not our observation that anybody trying to grasp the ends and the beginnings of the current Russian time of troubles would be hard-pressed to refrain from the language of Ecclesiastes: **"But that has already been over the centuries...."** The resemblance to the situation at the beginning of the century is striking. The same childishly impatient, unrestrained, frenzied kicking of the authority, which, as it turns out, instead of angel's wings grows a bureaucratic belly. And the same snobbish-bossy inattention, aggressive reluctance, and inability of the authorities to listen to the voice of public criticism. The same vulgarized "simplification" of the idea of individual freedom to the slogan of "popular freedom." And the same savage elation of a marginal over temptations of social revanche opened by a "popular revolution."

"What was also is now...." Except that **what was**, was the "working class that rose against capitalist exploitation," and **what is**, is an "indigenous ethnic group that has rebelled against imperialist oppression." **What was**, was the "revolution on the tail of an imperialist war," and **what is**, is a "war on the tail of revolution." **"....And what will be already has been"**—civil war, a national catastrophe?

We seemingly already have "gotten rid of the slaves in ourselves." All that is left to do is to "get rid of the fools in ourselves." Otherwise, we will be quickly turned into slaves again. Because this also **already has been.**

Railway Bridges in Dagestan Blown Up

LD2702104095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1012 GMT 27 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Manvelov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 27 TASS—Two bridges were exploded in Dagestan last night, ITAR-TASS was told in the the press service of the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations today.

An unidentified explosive device went off at 1:00 a.m., destroying several pylons of the Girkelskiy railway bridge in the Khasavyurt district. The saboteur act paralysed the traffic.

An hour later, around 2:00 a.m., there was a blast at a bridge across the Yamantsa River, Novolakskiy district. The ministry said the traffic across the bridge was unaffected.

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Russian Troops Fired Upon in Ossetian-Ingush Zone

LD2602232595 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1800 GMT 26 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The situation in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in the north Caucasus remains complicated, Georgiy Kantemirov, minister of internal affairs of North Ossetia, said today. He announced that in the past 24 hours military details and militia posts had come under automatic fire seven times.

In connection with this, mobile groups of Russian troops and sub-units of the North Ossetian Ministry of Internal Affairs had switched to an intensified mode of service on the frontier with neighboring Ingushetia. This measure, Kantemirov stressed, has been undertaken with the aim of preventing terrorist acts and stabilizing the situation in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict zone.

Shumeyko Opposes Reducing Number of Regions

LD2402213595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1926 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kudymkar (Perm Region), Feb 24 (Interfax)—Chairman of the Russian Federation Council Vladimir Shumeyko said he was against enlarging Russian regions thus reducing the number of the federation's constituent members from 89 to about ten.

Shumeyko told an Interfax correspondent in Kudymkar (the Perm Region, West Urals) today that the idea had not yet matured. Shumeyko took part in the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the Komi-Perm autonomous region in Kudymkar. He said it was early to speak about artificially increasing the federation's constituent members.

In particular, the idea of enlarging Russian regions was stated by leader of the Party of Russian Unity and Concord [Accord] parliamentary faction, former minister for nationalities and regional policy Sergey Shakhray.

Supporters of this idea believe that unification of those federation constituent members surviving on budget subsidies with economically well-off regions would produce a positive effect on the economic situation and reduce the danger of separatism.

Shumeyko said hopes that artificial enlargement of regions would pave the way for quickly improving the life of people were unjustified. He said it was necessary to be ahead of the times in the economy while politics must follow the economy.

Shumeyko said the federative treaty had saved Russia from a collapse. He said the federative treaty and the constitutional principle of equality of all the federation's constituent members were the foundation of the single state.

Far Eastern Miners To Halt Coal Shipments 1-5 March

LD2402180495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1529 GMT 24 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Krivopalov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vladivostok February 24 TASS— A meeting of the council of the directors and trade union leaders of the Far Eastern coal industry, meeting in Vladivostok today, has declared complete mistrust of the president and the government of the Russian Federation. It also decided to stop shipping coal to all the consumers without exception from March 1-5.

Due to the insufficiency of government subsidies and the insolvency of many coal consumers, the debt to the miners now adds up to 200 billion roubles and reached a critical level in February. The "Severnaya" pit in the town of Partizansk remains idle for one month running. Coal output is dropping sharply every day at 14 pits of the "Primorskugol" joint-stock society. The "Luchegorskiy", "Pavlovskiy", and "Urgalugol" coal workings are working most unstably, especially in the recent period. Their coal is used by the region's most powerful Primorskaya district power plant, as well as the Vladivostok and Khabarovsk thermal power stations.

ITAR-TASS was informed by Pyotr Kiriyasov, chairman of the joint committee of coal workers unions, that if the miners failed to force their clients, including the state, to settle their debts to the miners, the crisis will lead to the inevitable and quick collapse of the territory's coal industry. The Far Eastern miners have urged all the mining enterprises of the country to back their demand for the dismissal of the president and the government of the Russian Federation.

Shaymiyev Views Fight Against Crime

954F1441A Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN in Russian 18 Feb 95 p 4

[Speech by M. Sh. Shaymiyev, president of the Republic of Tatarstan, on 10 February in Kazan: "Respect for Law—the Basis of Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **As has already been reported, a joint meeting of the collegiums of law enforcement organs of Tatarstan was held on 10 February in Kazan. President M. Sh. Shaymiyev took part in its work. This is a paraphrase of his speech.**

Assembled here today is a broad component of representatives of law enforcement organs, on whose activity and understanding of the importance of the processes that are occurring in society the results of the fight against crime depend, M. Shaymiyev noted at the beginning of his speech. We live at a time of unique revolutionary and evolutionary changes, and we are being compelled to resolve tasks that are to a certain degree contradictory.

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There is an obvious need for a transition to a social-market economy, without which it is impossible to establish real democracy in any society. At the same time, radical changes under conditions of weakening state administration and the division of property are engendering a number of problems. One of these is crime. It manifests itself today in all spheres. If we in Tatarstan had not adopted appropriate laws in time, it is difficult to imagine what the situation would be like. It can be said confidently now: These measures were timely. Possibly modest, but concrete results have been achieved. Russia has also taken this path. This gives us the right in the future to intensify the fight against crime.

Speaking of the great work that the law enforcement organs have conducted, M.Sh. Shaymiyev dwelt on unresolved problems. Unfortunately, he noted, against the background of some reduction in crime throughout the republic, it has increased in a number of cities and rayons. In the lead here are Kukmorskiy Rayon (an increase of 49 percent; chief of the ROVD [rayon department of Internal Affairs] is R.N. Khayrutdinov, and head of administration is M.K. Gatiyatullin); Pestrechinskiy Rayon (34 percent; M.M. Sharipov and F.Sh. Khabibullin); Zeledolskiy Rayon (31 percent; V.I. Bogatyrev and S.A. Kogogin); Bugulminskiy Rayon (28 percent; V.S. Naumov and B.F. Zakharov); Aktamyshskiy Rayon (22 percent; F.A. Nafikov and A.G. Khabibullin).

There is no reason for calm; after all, more than 60,000 crimes were committed in 1994. Of course, there is now more coordination and mutual understanding in the actions of the organs of Internal Affairs, the court, and procurator supervision owing to common efforts, although complaints against one another still exist. At one time we noted indignantly how few criminal cases were being investigated—a total of 11,000. In 1993 it was 22,000, and now, 32,000 criminal cases have already been investigated this year. At the same time, the ability to solve crimes has increased, and last year reached 74 percent. Workers of law enforcement organs must continuously encounter and eliminate causes that interfere with well-coordinated activity. Today's meeting is especially valuable for this reason, the president emphasized.

A substantial part of the expenditures for intensifying the fight against crime is covered at the expense of the republic's budget. There has been a significant improvement in the technical equipping of law enforcement organs, and the number of personnel of our republic's MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] has been increased. In 1994 alone the number of employees increased by 26 percent, or 8,700 persons. Thus there is a force that can be relied on and will restore order. But your work and mine is not becoming any easier; after all, of the total number of crimes, more than one-third are grave crimes. Adequate measures have to be undertaken to fight them.

Special alarm is caused by crimes committed by minors. On the whole in the republic the number of crimes committed by minors is growing. Working with teenagers is tricky, and measures undertaken by law enforcement organs alone are not enough. Inasmuch as this collegium is attended by heads of administration of cities and rayons and our ministers, let us think carefully about how to conduct this work with joint efforts, M.Sh. Shaymiyev noted. He cited these figures. In 1994 alone, 1,600 children in the republic were not going to school. Educational establishments have started to get rid of "difficult" children. This is intolerable, and schools must not abandon such children, no matter how difficult this might be. This work also concerns the administrations of rayons, cities, and a number of republic organs. The question has to be examined at a meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers, and this problem has to be presented to society as a whole.

The increase in crimes by some youth is also associated with drug addiction. The scale of the use, preparation, storage, and sale of narcotics is unprecedented in Tatarstan. In a year the increase in crimes associated with them totaled 54 percent. The republic proved to be morally unprepared for this. After all, drug addiction was not characteristic of our population, but now this problem is beginning to assume a threatening character. Five hundred and twenty kilograms of narcotic and virulent substances have been confiscated. The number may soon be in tonnes. This cannot be viewed calmly; after all, we are talking about our future.

There is one more problem—job placement and a resolution of the future of people who have been released from prison. It is immoral to pretend that this problem does not exist and not to resolve it, M.Sh. Shaymiyev emphasized. Statistics show that more than 10 percent of the total number of crimes are committed by people in this category a second time or repeatedly. Let us not postpone resolution of this question, and let us pass an appropriate law. Or it will be necessary to connect this problem with tax benefits for enterprises that offer jobs to these people. It will be necessary to come up with other forms of assistance as well.

M.Sh. Shaymiyev invited the attention of those assembled to the question of effective collection of taxes and duties in the republic, which, as is well known, serve as the pivotal finances of the state. We must achieve the order that is established in a civilized society, the president said. No one should evade timely and full payment of taxes. At the same time, it is the task of state and law enforcement organs to create the kind of conditions that would allow them to function normally, to receive their incomes, and to pay taxes on time.

We had a very important discussion last year with the leaders of tax services and the minister of finance, M.Sh. Shaymiyev said. There was a reanimation in their work after this. The Tax Inspectorate and the Tax Police Department of Tatarstan (Sh.S. Badamshin and S.V. Mashin) uncovered numerous cases of concealing income from taxes. As a result of this, the sum of

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payments additionally transferred to the budget amounted to about a trillion rubles. In comparison with other regions, we disclosed more tax evaders. Besides Moscow and St. Petersburg, no one else has such figures. That is, we accomplished important work, although it must be noted for the sake of fairness that we had more opportunities for its activation. This is the first thing. Second: Judging by the data there is not one region in Russia, except Tatarstan, where such underpayments were disclosed, and where only 15 percent was returned to the budget. We must resolutely establish order here. It is difficult for the Tax Inspectorate and the Tax Police Department to do this by themselves. The participation of the Procuracy and the MVD in this matter is necessary. The ground must burn under the feet of violators of the tax law. The budget deficit that was carried over from last year has to be covered by the receipt of additional sums. We are talking about large sums. We have enterprises that can ensure a good tax base. The work will succeed if everyone exhibits understanding. This concerns heads of administration of cities and rayons and all the services. Improvement in the tax policy and strict control over the receipt of taxes—this is the guarantee of a firm financial base in the republic.

Further, M.Sh. Shaymiyev dwelt on the problems of training and selecting personnel. While intensifying the fight against crime, he said, it is necessary to consider the level of training of people who work in our law enforcement organs. It is necessary to conduct very significant work with personnel, especially in the MVD. Otherwise, if infringements of the law are committed by people who work in the law enforcement organs, this could to some extent raise doubts among the population: Are we on a democratic path of development? It will be worthless if with such a fight against crime we damage our democratic formation.

Look, even when we very sternly undertook to restore order, there was no such number of cases of unjustified arrests of suspects. This indicator has now reached almost 50 percent. Are we not beginning to be at variance with our population, or more correctly, with its law-abiding part?

Or, for example, take this fact. Last year internal affairs organs inspected more than 1.5 million motor vehicles. This frequently gave rise to conflict situations that should not have occurred. All these questions have to be approached carefully and with patience, and authority should not be abused. We receive a lot of letters and complaints on this score. Behind all of this are offended feelings, incompetence, irresponsibility, and frequently rudeness on the part of individual employees of law enforcement organs. They have to be taught high standards, and the selection of personnel has to be approached more scrupulously.

The president emphasized that he has always spoken for and will continue to speak for the construction in our republic of a rule-of-law state without interfering in the activity of the law enforcement organs. Even the thought of commanding them must not be tolerated. This also concerns the heads of administration that have interdepartmental commissions. It is through them that it is necessary to regulate problems that arise. No one can be above the law.

Speaking of the recently established republic commission on personnel questions under the president of the Republic of Tatarstan, M.Sh. Shaymiyev noted that the first persons of the law enforcement organs of the rayons and cities will go through this commission, in coordination with the leaders of republic organizations, jointly with the heads of administration, without violating the forms of going through representative organs, and so forth. It is possible that other managers who head the most important sectors of work will also be put in this category. All of this will make it possible to come to a more objective and unbiased assessment of one or another candidacy.

Further, M.Sh. Shaymiyev noted that the number of appeals to official organs by citizens associated with ensuring legality and protection of law and order came out in first place, surpassing even appeals on housing problems. Well, that is the way society is reacting to the problem. This is one of the main problems today, and it disturbs the people more than even the price increases. Therefore, the fight against crime must be put in first place.

M.Sh. Shaymiyev turned attention also to the work of law enforcement organs among the people. In order to remove many of the appeals and statements of citizens, everyone has to meet with the people, be it the rayon procurator, the militia chief, or the military commissar, not to mention heads of administration.

We were always amazed, the president noted, why abroad almost every second person has a legal education. Well, because people in a democratic society live strictly according to the laws, which you have to know. A legal education is required for each member of society. Let us also begin to work continuously in this direction. All forms here are good. We must not regret the time spent on this; after all, what is done on the part of organs of state authority is undertaken for the protection of the population and in the interests of our entire multinational people.

Tatarstan Labor Statistics Cited

954F1444A Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN in Russian 21 Feb 95 p 1

[Report by the Employment Administration of the Tatarstan Republic State Committee on Labor: "The Labor Market: Annual Results"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is increasingly apparent that unemployment has today entered the ranks of our most critical problems. True, the unemployment level in Tatarstan at the end of 1994 was the lowest in the region,

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comprising 0.77 percent of the number of persons employed in the republic economy (0.22 percent at the beginning of the year). For Russia in general, this index was 2.3 percent (1.1 percent as of 1 January 1994). For neighboring republics and oblasts: Chuvashia—6 percent, Udmurtia—4.9 percent, Kirov Oblast—6.5 percent, and Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast—2.1 percent. This problem has mainly affected urban residents. In Kazan, Naberezhnyye Chelny, Nizhnekamsk, Almetyevsk, and Yelabuga, for example, the level of unemployment exceeds the average republic level.

Unfortunately, manpower supply exceeds its demand. The requirement for workers declared by enterprises and filed with labor and employment organs as of the beginning of 1995 was 3,241 individuals. This means the number of vacancies decreased 1.4-fold. Competition for each job position has intensified. Today more than six persons compete for one open position. Almost all vacancies (89 percent) are for laborers and the requirements are virtually all male. It has therefore become quite difficult to effect job placement for women, who comprise 85 percent of the unemployed. Youth constitute 36 percent of those out of work, including 14.5 percent who are graduates of educational institutions. Some 59 percent of the unemployed have higher or secondary specialized education.

The republic Employment Service must act as client for all educational institutions engaged in occupational training. Following the situation as it has been unfolding, specialists of the Tatarstan Republic State Committee on Labor undertake various measures to hold back the unemployment rate. These include occupational training, labor reorientation, free labor-skills enhancement, self-employment for those who have lost jobs, and temporary employment.

Constant contact with employers assists in improving the effectiveness of occupational training for the unemployed. Most of those sent for training are guaranteed job placement. The percentage of people for whom jobs were secured following preliminary occupational training at the direction of labor and employment organs increased from 9 percent in 1993 to 14 percent in 1994, when 2,730 discharged employees and unemployed citizens were sent for training. This is one-and-a-half times the number for 1993. The total number of individuals undergoing training at the direction of labor and employment organs was 3,542.

The Provisional Regulations on Job Placement in Temporary Positions for Minors has been in effect since summer 1994. Some 23,537 pupils of general-education schools have obtained jobs in accordance with these regulations.

Quotas have been introduced for effecting job placement of poorly protected segments of the populace, in accordance with which 2,887 people obtained work, including 76 disabled individuals.

One form of temporary employment of the populace is social work. In 1994, 1,310 citizens participated in social projects—half of these were unemployed.

With assistance from labor and employment organs, 46 unemployed individuals set up their own business, chiefly in the spheres of production of consumer goods, provision of everyday and consumer services, and production and processing of agricultural output.

Due to the absence of suitable work, 2,995 unemployed individuals of pre-retirement age obtained the opportunity to retire early with pension.

One of the most active forms of employment regulation is the establishment and retention of job positions. Assets of the State Employment Fund were used to create 190 new jobs and retain 4,710 positions. Compensation benefits were paid to 5,820 workers at 15 enterprises on leave without pay at the direction of the administration.

Job fairs are becoming commonplace, offering the commodity that is in shortest supply—jobs. Services offered those who apply include direct contact with employers, the opportunity to use computer data banks, occupational consultations, and assignment directives for retraining.

As of 1 January 1995, 20,426 nonworking citizens seeking work were registered with the Employment Service. Of this number, 13,978 were unemployed and 11,688 were receiving an allowance.

Unemployment in the republic may increase significantly in 1995. According to estimates, the unemployment level by the end of the year may be over 2 percent on average throughout the republic.

Omsk Governor Polezhayev Views Regions' Assertiveness

954F1334A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 8 Feb 95 p 9

[Interview with Leonid Polezhayev, governor of Omsk Oblast, by Aleksandr Krotkov, with an afterword by Yelena Tregubova; place and date not given: "Leonid Polezhayev: 'Forward, Regions!'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Krotkov] Leonid Konstantinovich, how do you evaluate the prospects for the democratic transformations in Russia? And what role do you assign Moscow and the regions?

[Polezhayev] Now, when the third attempt this century is being made to turn Russia's face toward Europe, to return it to the channel of European civilization, I am afraid that this repeated effort could end in tragedy. For the psychology of totalitarianism as before holds sway over hearts and minds. The complex of centralism, the desire to rule any and everything from a single solitary

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point, has become literally a genetic requirement of that generation of people that lives, acts, and grows in Russia's political field.

Unfortunately, our dearly beloved Moscow represents the worst embodiment of this idea. Because it was precisely in this city, which was decreed by fate to be the capital of the communist empire, that a class of leaders formed that cannot let go of the idea that the existence of an enormous power, down to the smallest details, is determined entirely and indivisibly by its will.

The Moscow rulers and politicians have long been overcome by an anemia of a certain type. I mean a lack of trust in the provinces, suspicion toward leaders of enormous territories, often lying thousands of versts from Moscow. The regions have no rights, and that means that there is no real responsibility for the fate of Russia as a whole. And as a result, that state foundation upon which the whole community building was erected in the first place falls into decay, weakens, and is eroded.

So that the Russian oblasts' current aspiration to greater independence is not the caprice of freedom-loving atamans. It is an objective process, which political and sociological science must take into account when elaborating concepts of new state construction.

But what do we see now? The regions are literally wresting the rights they need away from the center. Not privileges, not boons, but precisely rights, without which they are literally tied hand and foot. And for the sake of acquiring these rights, they perforce resort to blackmail, threatening the center with sovereignization, separation, and God knows what all....

[Krotkov] And you really believe that these are just empty threats? Sincerely?

[Polezhayev] What can guarantee us that the spirit of rabble- rousing and adventurism, which at this point is still sleeping but which is in fact extremely characteristic of the Russian people, will not be roused to outrage right here, in Siberia? That the kernels of separatism will not suddenly put forth in the severe Siberian soil luxuriant shoots?

What use is there in hiding it—such ideas are abroad in society.

The center of gravity of state power is now moving from the capitals to the provinces.... Both in tsarist Russia and in Soviet Russia, the Siberian expanses were counterbalanced by a bloc of Slavic peoples living in the European part of the state. Today, Ukraine and Belarus, having separated themselves out, have deprived Russia of this counterbalancing factor. The part of Russia that remains is not capable with its economic potential of counterbalancing an enormous region, stretching from the east of the Urals all the way to the Pacific Ocean.

What is needed is not simply a new concept of state construction; what is needed is a re-evaluation of those that constitute it. It is to this question, incidentally, that I dedicated my book "Forward, Heavy on the Brakes...."

[Krotkov] Well, and what do you propose?

[Polezhayev] We are attempting to work out a model state that is new for Russia, which—we must speak plainly about this—is not characteristic for Russia, which has gotten used to tsar benefactors, to wise leaders, and in general to power personified in one individual.

Professing the principle of the special role of the regions in the new state order, I rely first of all on the experience of Omsk Oblast. After all, it is precisely we, Omskites, who were the first to advance the idea of the regionalization of economic reform.

We asked ourselves, why does reform have to be realized in the same way everywhere in Russia? After all, our own Siberia, for example, has nothing in common with the Kuban. One cannot conduct such profound, fateful transformations following a single, unified model. Yes, the center is obligated to propose a concept of the reforms that is common for all, but the realization of these principles should be the prerogative of the regional authorities.

Questions of tax policy, foreign economic activity, and land relations can certainly be managed by local organs.

Who said that Siberia should be a land of private farmers? I, for instance, strongly doubt this. The Kuban and Chernozem Russia are suitable for private farming; in Siberia, the climatic, geographic, and ethnic circumstances call most of all for a communal character for the conduct of agriculture. It was not the communists who thought this up. A collective approach of a kind to agriculture and livestock raising was observed even during the colonization of Siberia by Russian peasants. By himself alone, not even the most prominent landowner could withstand the taiga, the isolation, and the Siberian cold.

In Omsk Oblast, more than 8,000 solid private farms have been formed. But at the same time, the traditional kolkhozes and sovkhozes are becoming acclimated to the demands of a market economy, are transforming into joint-stock companies, and the given managerial structure does not acquit itself badly.

Why should the conversion of the defense industry take place according to one and the same schema, the same for everyone?

Today, displayed on a stand at the Polet aerospace association, is the second replica of the launch accelerator of the Energiya rocket system. No one in the world has a similar apparatus. It could come out in the United States no sooner than in 10 years. It is characterized by extraordinary power, and it is ecological and reliable to the highest degree. The famous Buran was put into orbit with the help of just this accelerator.

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So what are we to do—give up this fantastic production and turn to the production of trash bins, as has seriously been suggested to us? Could the oblast administration, could I, as its head, reconcile ourselves to such a vulgar approach to the fate of the military-industrial complex?

[Krotkov] What do you propose instead?

[Polezhayev] We were the first in Russia to work out a regional program of conversion, including not only the famous "boxes," that is, the military plants, but civilian ones as well. Formerly, they did not interact with one another at all, but now they are joining their efforts in order over the course of four years to master the production of dozens of peaceful production designations. I reported on this program to President Yeltsin, and it was approved by special decision of the government. Although it is true that they did not earmark money for it. But that is not important; the main thing is that now our hands are untied.

And we are the only region in Russia that has begun to pull the military-industrial complex out of a condition of shameful stagnation.

[Krotkov] Still, will your regionalization of the economic reforms not lead to the disintegration of Russia—just as happened in its time with the USSR?

[Polezhayev] It seems to me that the intoxication with reckless sovereignization, of independence for independence's sake, has already passed. People who came to power on the wave of democratic transformations, who knew little about economics and even less about the science of management, sincerely believed that every republic, having cut itself away from the enormous mainland, would heal well. And then the dream finally came true, the partition was effected, but not a single state on the territory of the former Union began to live better.

This was to blame for the destruction of an economic mechanism that had come together over decades.

And so, fighting for the regionalization of the reforms, we assumed that the oblasts would be given a chance to re-establish lost economic ties, to integrate into an all-national economy. After all, it is obviously stupid to build on our territory a new metallurgical combine or to look for a new raw-materials base, when we can cordially agree with our neighbor on mutually advantageous deliveries, just as before.

[Krotkov] So do you believe that the reunification of the USSR could still take place?

[Polezhayev] I do not comfort myself with the hope that the rebirth of the political union is possible, and, I dare say, it is not even worthwhile to agitate for that, so that illusions and unrealizable hopes should not be aroused to no purpose. But that some stable economic formation will arise on the territory of the former USSR, I do not doubt for a minute.

Afterword

The residents of Omsk Oblast with whom this SEGODNYA correspondent was able to have a talk related that Governor Polezhayev is realizing the "regionalization of the reforms" in practice. Leonid Polezhayev is considered in his home oblast a champion of the interests of the agrarian lobby, so that his protest against his oblast becoming a "land of private farmers" is not fortuitous. Through him, the "Red agrarians" are achieving the preservation of the kolkhoz-sovkhoz system in the form of so-called "joint-stock companies"—slightly modified sovkhozes, whose bosses try by any means not to permit the conception of a strong, competitive body of private farmers. And a significant portion of these relabeled sovkhozes remain, as before, loss-producing or of low profitability. The land allotment with which people are permitted to leave the body of these "joint-stock companies" is exceedingly small—nine to 10 hectares. As a result, the size of most private farms does not exceed 20-30 hectares, and in the conditions of the infertile lands of the given region, it is impossible to make enough of a profit on such a meager plot to purchase the necessary agricultural equipment. According to the calculations of specialists, taking into account the peculiarities of the local lands, the size of a profitable private farm should be no less than 100 hectares. However, small farmers today are beginning to come together in larger and viable associations, which will have to compete with sovkhozes in conditions of the administrative protectionism of the latter.

As Omsk Oblast residents testify, there are practically no dairy products now in stores throughout the entire oblast. Economists are convinced that this is a natural consequence of the oblast administration's policy of artificially keeping prices down. At the same time, goods are beginning to flow across into other regions, where they can be sold more profitably. But the Omsk authorities, instead of liberalizing prices, are trying by administrative measures to impede the taking out of goods, attempting, in effect, to create a "border" around their region. Omsk residents say, with envy, "Look, Moscow lives upon imported goods, but they practically never get as far as Omsk—the leadership says that it is supporting its own producers, and as a result, we have no milk."

Nizhniy Novgorod Mayor Sklyarov Views Career

954F1390A Nizhniy Novgorod NIZHNEGORODSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 Jan 95 p 2

[Excerpts from an interview with Nizhniy Novgorod Mayor Ivan Sklyarov, by Vladimir Noskov, under the rubric "In First Person": "On Personal Life, Friends, and Tastes"; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Noskov] Ivan Petrovich, it will soon be a year since you became Nizhniy Novgorod's mayor. Your name is now associated here with political stability, development of housing and road

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construction, improvement in public transportation operations and the crime situation, the opening of new farmers markets and organizing of agricultural product fairs. In turn, many Nizhniy Novgorod residents are interested in your personal life. To the extent it is possible, let us talk frankly about it.

[Sklyarov] I have no objections. Let us begin with the fact that I came to Nizhniy Novgorod more than three years ago, when Boris Yefimovich Nemtsov offered me a job and invited to move here from Arzamas. At the time, he had just been appointed oblast governor. Before that, we met in the Russian Supreme Soviet, where we had been elected even before August 1991. And although we are people of different ages and different views, we became friends, sharing the same ideas regarding the transformation of life in Russia, reorganization of the state.

Frankly, I had already decided that I would stay for good in Arzamas, where I had spent the best years of my life. Over there I know practically everyone—by sight and by character. Because I had worked as chairman of the city ispolkom [executive committee], and then first secretary of the CPSU city committee. And I could stay there, but agreed to become first the oblast's vice governor, and then mayor of Nizhniy Novgorod. As to my personal life, it is open to anyone—it takes place in the public eye of Nizhniy Novgorod residents. I have nothing to hide, since I spend most of my time at work. [passage omitted]

[Noskov] How did you fit into this small circle of people that existed behind the Kremlin walls in Soviet times and has already formed now?

[Sklyarov] The life of people at the top, both in the Moscow and Nizhniy Novgorod Kremlins, has always intrigued our compatriots. And this is not surprising. Very little information trickled down from there to ordinary people regarding what was taking place there. I myself was curious in the past about what was happening behind both Moscow and Nizhniy Novgorod Kremlin walls when, for instance, no consultations or conferences were held there. Now I know: What is happening is routine daily work. Leaders meet with people, deal with vital issues of life support for the city and oblast population. I myself, by the way, prefer live contact with people on site rather than working in the office. I visit, for instance, the Termal plant, and get a charge of optimism for the whole day. I frequently visit new residential areas. I would like to believe that it is also due to my participation that in these difficult economic conditions the city received last year more than 300,000 square meters of housing, and 200 families moved from decrepit housing stock into new apartments.

Looking back at three years of my work in the Nizhniy Novgorod Kremlin, I have regret, of course; some things should have been done differently. There have been mistakes. In some matters, we should have shown more persistence, a more principled attitude, more decisiveness. I am currently very concerned, for instance, over the situation in agriculture. Although one would think this should not concern a mayor of a strictly industrial city. Therefore, from the very beginning I began organizing farmers markets for sale of agricultural products. They are currently operating in all eight districts of Nizhniy Novgorod. There is mutual benefit: City residents have fresh and more affordable foodstuffs, while their producers get, so to say, live cash. Thanks to this, they are able to purchase equipment in villages and to pay wages on time.

Much could be done to ease the situation of people in the military-industrial complex. It hurts to see unique equipment and highly trained specialists sitting idle. Although in this respect too, together with the governor and city Duma deputies, we initiate various actions to force our legislators and the government to deal with this sector's problems.

[Noskov] Ivan Petrovich, does it not upset you that you are referred to as an economic manager more than as a politician?

[Sklyarov] I will tell you honestly: This suits me very well. Because if a mayor begins to play political games, he does not have the time to deal with the problems of the city economy. Although I do meet on a regular basis with representatives of political parties, movements, and unions. I have no plans to join them, however. I believe that a mayor must represent the interests of the entire city's population rather than any particular party.

[Noskov] Many people are interested how your relations are developing with other Kremlin bosses: the governor, the president's authorized representative, the chairmen of the Legislative Assembly and the city Duma.

[Sklyarov] This is a reasonable question. Have you noticed that if in a family husband and wife do not get along, their children as a rule also grow up to be good-for-nothings? Because the parents' quarrels left them with no time to deal with everyday household problems, let alone bringing up the children. The same happens in cities where the executive and legislative branches are endlessly sorting out which of them is more important.

Thank God, we do not have that here. I have clean, good relations with the governor. From the very beginning, they have remained, let me put it this way, untainted by concessions to each other. We each have our own line. And we treat it with respect.

With Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Kozeradskiy, the Legislative Assembly chairman, it is even easier. We have known each other for a long time. Both worked in the provinces in the same jobs. We are about the same age, and our life experience is comparable. We find mutual understanding on any issue, although right now things are not easy for him: He is only getting used to a large city, beginning to get to know the people. Therefore, my support is as important for him as his is for me.

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I have been friends with Yevgeniy Vladimirovich Krestyaninov since the time he was oblast soviet chairman. This did not change—it actually got stronger—after he became president of Russia's representative here. I have to tell you that Yevgeniy Vladimirovich has greatly expanded his political horizons now; he thinks in large-scale categories, interestingly. As a person he has not changed, though, and is reliable as a friend. He is the guarantor of stability in our relations among all of us.

We became very good friends with the city Duma chairman, Ivan Nikolayevich Karnilin. He has a serious school of life behind him. He worked as the chief of a large factory shop in the Teploobmennik association. He is a hardworking person, with initiative, interesting to talk to, with a predilection for economic activities. Although at the same time he manages to conduct the Duma's work very intelligently and competently.

[Noskov] All right, but do you visit each other's homes? Are your wives friends, or this is not the way things are done in your circles?

[Sklyarov] We do things the same way other people do. We are social outside our work environment, our wives are friends, and even our children go to school together. We just celebrated the New Year together. Sometimes such socializing is simply necessary. Because each of us has the need to talk frankly, talk things out, open one's soul. It is not always appropriate to do it in the office, and frankly, there is no time for it. So socializing at home gives an additional emotional charge to each of us separately and all of us together. [passage omitted]

[Noskov] The former masters of the Nizhniy Novgorod Kremlin provided for themselves a special commissary, special hospital, special vouchers to sanitarium and recreation facilities. What perks do you have?

[Sklyarov] In the past, the snobbism among party bureaucrats was so developed that it was difficult even to imagine any of them, for instance, stooping to a conversation, say, with regular customers in a store. They had little concern for the needs of ordinary people. After all, they had the best foodstuffs, and without lines, in special commissaries. And special hospitals had all the hard-to-get medicines. Now all these special conveniences have been liquidated, and God forbid they should ever be resurrected. This is where, in my opinion, alienation of authorities from the people begins.

By the way, when we were issued special food parcels on holidays, I personally felt humiliated. I always thought: We are living in such a great country, and there is not enough sausage or smoked herring for everyone. Now look—on the eve of the New Year, there is champagne for any taste, imported and domestic sausages, or any products, for that matter, and we buy them without standing in line. And regardless of rank. Be it a governor's wife or worker's wife. Brand-name stores have whatever one may wish. No ration coupons or connections are needed. It this not a welcome change?

[Noskov] But you would agree that not everyone can afford the goodies these days. Prices in the stores are biting, although perhaps on a mayor's salary you do not feel it.

[Sklyarov] You are wrong. We do not have any extra money in our family budget. Judge for yourself. My salary is quite moderate—only R530,000. My daughter is in medical residency and gets a R43,000 stipend. My wife is a teacher; her salary is not high. So we cannot afford luxurious living on our income. [passage omitted]

[Noskov] You know, there is a bit of folk wisdom: If a boss is tough in the office, at home he is under his wife's thumb. Does this fit you?

[Sklyarov] You know, appearances can be deceptive. I may perhaps look like a stern man, but I consider myself a gentle man. I do not think I fall into the category of tough bosses. Sometimes, when the job requires making an unpleasant decision with respect to someone personally, it upsets me very much. I take everything to heart, as they say.

And at home I am hardly under my wife's thumb. I am from a Cossack family. Over there, this is serious business. I have seen since childhood what the relations should be between parents, as well as their relations with the children. Specifically, in my family there has never been a struggle for power, sorting out who is the boss. But I, on my part, constantly tell my daughter that her mother is in a way the head of the family. When principally important questions arise, however, the opinion of every family member should be heard and taken into consideration.

Nizhniy Novgorod 1994 Crime Figures Cited

954F1390A Nizhniy Novgorod NIZHEGORODSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian 24 Jan 95 p 5

[Excerpt from a report by A. Iudin: "The Streets Have Become More Orderly After Difficult Holidays. And Over the Year as a Whole"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *Another year is behind us—difficult, chaotic, simply cheerless. For most of our compatriots, in any case.*

If one can speak of hopes that at least somewhat came through, it is perhaps a certain easing up of the pressure of crime.

According to UVD [Administration of Internal Affairs] data, over the past year about 66,000 crimes were registered in the oblast. This is 8 percent fewer than last year. The total number of grave crimes declined by one-tenth.

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The greatest decline was registered in car thefts—by one-third. Also encouraging are the statistics of apartment burglaries (28 percent fewer), robberies (25 percent fewer), and muggings (20 percent fewer).

With respect to a number of categories, however, militia reports registered an alarming growth. This includes murders (3 percent more in the oblast, and in Nizhniy Novgorod even 13 percent more), grave bodily harm (8.5 percent more), and rape (6 percent more). By the way, the latter type of crime is less characteristic of the oblast center than of the periphery: The trend is reversed here—a 14-percent decline. There is more hooliganism.

Crime in the economic sphere increased in all categories. The leaders are illegal foreign currency deals (a 59-percent increase) and counterfeiting (a 50-percent increase).

Measures to strengthen public order seem to be producing effect: The number of crimes committed in pubic places has declined. At the same time, the "contribution" to this indicator by drunks and nonworking individuals increased 1.5-fold.

Nevertheless, a certain decline in the general wave is obvious. There are many reasons for this: beefed-up militia staff; equipping the OVD [oblast administration of internal affairs] with hardware, communications, transport, and creating a network of stationary militia patrol posts. In the final count, the effectiveness of these steps is reflected in such an important indicator as the percentage of crimes solved.

"In this respect," says Petr Sibirev, first deputy chief of the oblast UVD, "we do not look too bad compared to Russia. The percentage of crimes solved here is about 5 points higher than in Russia as a whole. This holds true for practically all categories of crime.

"For instance, we solve more than 87 percent of murders (the average for Russia indicator is 75 percent), 67 percent of muggings (56.5 percent for Russian as a whole). One can see the same picture with respect to grave bodily harm, rapes, and theft of all types, including apartments burglaries.

"We are not fishing for compliments. On the contrary, we try to soberly appraise our work and find vulnerable spots...."

UVD specialists themselves see such a vulnerable spot in the percentage of robbery cases solved, which is lower than in Russia on average. Mainly this is such a seasonal plague as "plucking off" hats—they account for more than 60 percent of this type of crime. [passage omitted]

Economic Issues

Yasin: Future IMF Talks To Focus on Ruble Stabilization

LD2402191195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1707 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Feb 24 (INTERFAX)—In addition to a stand-by loan, the future talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are likely to focus on a further credit to stabilize the ruble, Russian Economics Minister Yevgeniy Yasin told Interfax Friday [24 February].

Yasin said Russia needed the $6 billion credit in March or April to speed up stabilization of the ruble. "Signs of stabilization became more clear in February," he said.

While the inflation rate in the first week of January 1995 was 4.3%, in the first week of February it went down to 3.8% and in the second week it fell to 2.4%. Yasin was convinced that an even lower inflation rate was "predetermined to a considerable extent" for April and May.

If the government manages to keep down inflation and stabilize the ruble, the need for an IMF stabilization credit will be less by this autumn, Yasin added.

Promises 'Macrostabilization'

MM2702081095 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Feb 95 p 1

[Report by Tamara Smirnova: "Don't Expect Any Mercy. Economy Minister Learns Firmness From the IMF"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Of course, it was not to be expected that the economy minister would rush to criticize the president's annual message. At a press conference specially convened on this subject Yevgeniy Yasin drummed into journalists the fact that he is extremely satisfied with that historic document, especially the part establishing the fixed nature of the state budget. The minister found that, by comparison with last year's message, this year's is distinguished by great realism and by correctness in the setting of tasks. It remains only to perform them just as correctly.

How does the country's chief economist see the way out of the crisis? All his hopes boil down to investments. "Investments are the motor which can drive the economy out of any hole."

State investors currently account for 86 percent of investments. The second source is the population's money. However low and meager the living standard of Russians, the population somehow contrives to save 20 percent of its money. The economists' dream is to put to work the few rubles which Russians have stashed away in their hose. But the snag is that citizens are not investing their hard-earned cash, having had their fingers burned by all those MMM's and their ilk. Distrust of the existing banking and financial structures is the biggest problem today. And how the economy needs "long-term money."

As of today credit indebtedness in the country exceeds 5 trillion rubles [R]. The total level of state investments is envisaged as just over R9 trillion.

"Whatever the pressure on the budget, whatever holes open in it, this reserve will not be touched," Yevgeniy Yasin stated. "We will display the utmost stubbornness

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in this regard. Exactly like the IMF," the minister added. "We are preparing for a third stage of curbing inflation through tight budgetary policy. Yes, it is possible that production will stagnate somewhat further and that unemployment will increase. But it must be understood that we are undergoing a structural crisis. If we manage to show a reduction in inflation for just one month, the IMF's attitude toward us will improve markedly...."

The prospects for macrostabilization were outlined fairly enticingly by Yevgeniy Yasin, who even went as far as to promise to bring the level of inflation down as early as March to "a unit figure"—which evidently meant 1 percent. The only trouble is that the government has too many enemies and ill-wishers. They are striving to thrust spokes in the reformers' wheels. Now they insinuate a law on restoring citizens' savings, now a law on invalids, and then—really quite seditious—a law on raising minimum pay.

"What we need right now is not mercy and compassion," the minister stated in this connection, "but an exclusively professional approach. If these laws are adopted, there is no reason for me to sit in the government."

Thus yet again a course toward further reducing the population's living standards was unmistakably confirmed, and the government has certified that it fears no beast more than socially significant laws. And it intends to fight them mercilessly.

IMF Doubts Moscow's Ability to Fulfill Pledges

MK2502131095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 25 Feb 95 p 4

[Report by Natalya Kalashnikova: "Passions Stand-By (preceding word in English) Style"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When politicians talk about sensitive things—the budget process and IMF credits—it is worthy of attention. Especially when a debate unfolds simultaneously with the start of the second, and decisive, round of negotiations with the IMF mission in Moscow. But when an opinion about this process is voiced, in rather tough form, by persons both concerned and interested, this is all the more noteworthy. Such a debate was held 23 February at the initiative of the German Hanns Zeidel Foundation. Representatives of the Central Bank, the Finance Ministry, leading entrepreneurial structures, and the State Duma Budget Committee met with their counterparts from the FRG. It is quite justifiable that problems of cooperation in the investment sphere and Russia's relations with international financial organizations evoked the most emotional reaction: The FRG is Russia's largest creditor.

Yesterday Russian and IMF experts began their work: Working consultations were held; the delegation heads planned no meetings. The start of negotiations (apparently not accidentally) coincided with the State Duma's approval of the draft budget in third reading, which, in principle, should facilitate the dialogue. The start of consultations was preceded by a fairly optimistic statement by Economy Ministry head Yevgeniy Yasin that all questions about the $6.25 billion stand-by credit were resolved: Only "some technical and psychological problems" are left. The "technical" ones include the IMF's doubts about the fate of special exporters and state procurements. According to the minister, the government will promulgate "political decisions" on these matters in the very near future. Talking about the IMF's "psychological doubts"—as to whether Russia is ready to fulfill its obligations—Yasin stressed that "they will be dispelled if inflation reduction rates are maintained" (he believes this is feasible).

The subject of IMF "doubts," mentioned by the Economy Ministry head, was meanwhile broadly aired in the course of the above discussion between the Russians and their partners from the FRG. In particular a German diplomat, who stressed his proximity to Russia's negotiations with financial organizations, made approximately the following point. First, Yeltsin's message to parliament does not formulate the mechanism of reform implementation clearly enough. Second, there are different people in the Russian Government: For instance, there is reformer Chubays, but there are also others. The IMF (after Chechnya) cannot but be concerned over the further course of reform—not only from the point of view of budget expenditures. The subject of political risk on Russia's credit and investment market was raised in a presentation by an influential German banker: According to him, Russia could receive up to $85 billion worth of investments within 25 years, but Western investors have shelved these projects. Third, although Poland was in its time provided with a stabilization fund (under the project, with respect to Russia it could be $6 billion), in the case of Moscow it would be advisable to wait a little: In conditions of instability the money could end up in speculators' hands. So, first the stand-by and then, after careful analysis of how effectively it is used, the subject of a stabilization fund could be raised again. True, there are also doubts that the stand-by program will justify itself, if the war in Chechnya drags on.

The discussion was joined by Andrey Nechayev, former economy minister, who is currently head of the Russian Financial Corporation. The resume by the minister, who has experience in dealing with fund experts, sounded weighty: The impact of the success or failure of Russian reform on world evolution is so great that the IMF could soften a number of its demands. There are also complaints about IMF missions coming to Moscow. First, their composition is constantly changing, and Russian negotiators have to answer the same questions all over again, which deprives the dialogue of continuity. Second, the fund does not properly use the expert assistance of Russian economists (which point, incidentally, was accepted by the Germans) while the majority of missionaries are representatives of "Third World" countries (sometimes with a poor knowledge of Russian specifics).

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In conversations with KOMMERSANT- DAILY's correspondent this point was also corroborated by other Russian participants, who are involved in the negotiations by virtue of their official responsibilities.

All could be written off to "personal opinion" were it not for one circumstance. For a second time the decision to grant Russia IMF credits has moved to a political level: Last spring Moscow did not receive the second tranche of the STF [Systemic Transformation Facility] credit until IMF head Michel Camdessus met with Viktor Chernomyrdin, and now the capital is waiting for the world's main financial arbiter—tentatively in early to mid-March. True, the Russian side bears part of the blame: Moscow has not even once fulfilled in full the obligations given to the fund, and there are quite warranted doubts that this will also be the case this time around: The reform path is too thorny. Yet Russia's mala fide record is matched by the G-7's. In Munich and Tokyo, agreement was reached on large-scale packages to assist Russian reform (more than $43 billion, which, however, is less than what was promised and actually delivered to little Mexico, which now also has its own Chechnya: the Chiapas Province). Presumably, the situation in Russia would have been somewhat different had the West fulfilled its promises in a timely way, including with respect to giving Russian goods greater access to world markets. Yasin's conviction that with Camdessus' arrival relations with the IMF will be clarified is quite substantiated: Provision of credits in a situation when the budget has been drawn up geared to Western aid calls not only for an expert-technical appraisal but also for a balanced political decision.

Oil for Sugar Deal Will Cause $1 Billion Losses

LD2402152695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1149 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Feb 24 (Interfax)—The rejection of the idea to exchange Russian oil for Cuban raw sugar will spell ruin of the Russian sugar industry and, as a result, the surrender of positions on the domestic market to foreign sugar producers. As soon as in 1998, Russia may come to import 5 million [metric] tonnes of white sugar and lose $0.8 to $1.0 billion on the sugar imports.

The heads of several Duma committees Sergey Glaziyev (used to head the Russian Foreign Trade Ministry), Vladimir Gusev, Vladimir Lukin and Viktor Ilyukhin, as well as several other lawmakers, wrote a letter to the National Security Council and federal government to explain that Russia cannot afford the rejection of the oil-sugar deal with Cuba which has traditionally been supplying the Russian plants with processed sugar beet. In the lawmakers' view, the purchase of more expensive raw sugar on the world marketplace will be sure to inflict "colossal economic losses" on Russia.

The "unjustifiably slow" work on the appropriate Russian-Cuban documents and the spread of "false reports on the unavailability of Cuban raw sugar and Cuba's failure to meet international commitments" tend to spoil Russian-Cuban relations and lead to the collapse of the Russian sugar industry, the letter, whose authors treat the sugar problem as a security matter, says.

In 1994 Russia harvested 13 million tonnes of sugar beet. It harvested 25 million tonnes in 1993 and 28 million tonnes in 1990. In 1994 it produced no more than 1.7 million tonnes of its own sugar and it needs 5 million tonnes. The country that used to process up to 2 million tonnes of raw sugar in dead season reduced its Cuban imports to 660,000 tonnes in 1994.

Factors on Caspian Oil Crisis Assessed

954F1465A Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR in Russian 18 Feb 95 p 6

[Article by Zhores A. Medvedev, special for SOVETSKAYA SIBIR: "The War for Caspian Oil"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The explanation for the relative calm displayed by Western governments with respect to Russian methods of restoring constitutional order in Chechnya is what is commonly called "realpolitik." More than 20 large Western oil and oil and gas companies are currently investing in and conducting exploration of Caspian oil. Existing projects call for about one-half of additional exports of oil to be transported through reconstructed and new oil pipelines going through the North Caucasus to Tuapse and Novorossiysk across the territory of Chechnya. In 1993 about 35 million tonnes of crude oil and petroleum products were shipped for export from Black Sea ports equipped with oil terminals (Batumi, Tuapse, and Novorossiysk). The plan was to increase this export traffic to 100 million tonnes by the beginning of the next century, mainly through new oil development in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Astrakhan Oblast. An alternative project, lobbied for by Turkey, assumed the construction of two longer oil pipelines—from Azerbaijan and Central Asia—through the territory of Iran and Turkey to seaport terminals on the Mediterranean. The third project, proposed by Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, considers the possibility of building a relatively short pipeline from the eastern Caspian region directly to the south, through the territory of Iran to the Persian Gulf. For the United States and Great Britain, whose oil companies Chevron and British Petroleum play the leading role in the international consortia developing Caspian oil, Russian routes for new pipelines were preferable until recently. First, they were considered cheaper to build, since they would be traversing flatlands and be built along already existing transportation arteries. Second, neither Great Britain nor, and especially, the United States wanted to find themselves dependent on Iran. The situation changed dramatically in July 1994, when Turkey unilaterally decided to limit the passage through the Bosporus of large-capacity oil tankers from the Black Sea, citing ecological safety.*

The Key Position of Groznyy in the Russian South's Economy[subhead]

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The "constitutional" justification for the occupation of Chechnya by the Russian military is very weak. Chechnya's unilateral declaration of independence at the end of October 1991 was in conflict with the Constitutions of the USSR and the RSFSR, which in 1994 no longer existed. As to the referendum on the new Constitution of the Russian Federation in December 1993, it was not held in Chechnya as it was considered to have no direct bearing on it.

In order to avoid war, the danger of which had already begun to glimmer in November 1991, Russia was willing to grant Chechnya special status and maximum autonomy, on condition that Russia would retain full control over transportation communications through Chechnya and joint control over Groznyy's oil production and petrochemical industries. Until 1929 Groznyy was not part of the Chechen Autonomous Oblast altogether and until 1991 the majority of the city's 400,000 population were Russians. (Footnote 1) (The Chechen Autonomous Oblast was separated from the "Gorskiy [Mountain] Republic" and made an independent entity on 30 November 1922. Groznyy together with the oil fields remained a North-Caucasus Kray district with the capital in Rostov. In 1929 the Groznyy district was included into the Chechen-Ingush ASSR.)

The North Caucasus, on the territory of which, especially in the foothills regions, live 19 aborigine Caucasus ethnic groups, is mainly populated by Russians. Of the 16.5 million persons populating North Caucasus in 1987, the aborigine population comprised only 3.2 million. However, the proportion of Russians declines from west to east, and in four eastern republics comprises the minority—35 percent in Kabardino-Balkaria, 33 percent in North Ossetia, 30 percent in Chechnya, and 11 percent in Dagestan. The western part of the North Caucasus region, which includes Rostov Oblast and Krasnodar and Stavropol Krays, is the main agricultural center of Russia. It is here that the greatest surplus of grain has always been produced, which then went to the Transcaucasus, the Urals, and Siberia. Support for effective large-scale agricultural production in the North Caucasus was provided by the agricultural machine- building plant in Rostov-na-Donu, and gasoline and diesel fuel coming from refineries in Groznyy. The strategic Rostov-Baku railroad, connecting the North Caucasus with the Transcaucasus, goes through Groznyy. Ninety percent of all grain consumed before 1991 by Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia was delivered from the North Caucasus. After traffic was suspended in 1992 on the railroad (connecting Rostov with Georgia along the Black Sea shore through Abkhazia), the Rostov-Baku railroad became the only transportation link between the Transcaucasus and the other CIS countries and Europe. Through Chechnya runs the Baku-Makhachkala-Tuapse oil main and pipelines of local significance that transport oil from southwestern areas of Astrakhan Oblast. It is precisely this key position of Groznyy in the system of communications in the North Caucasus that rendered impossible any attempts to put economic pressure on Chechnya for the purpose of achieving compromise solutions. The Chechens simply took from the commodity traffic through their territory whatever they needed.

The military option of occupying Chechnya and its capital Groznyy, however, emerged unexpectedly, without careful preparation. It was an inevitable reaction to the suspension of rail traffic through the territory of Chechnya. Because of the critical food situation, Azerbaijan urgently purchased from Russia on credit 300,000 tonnes of grain in the beginning of October 1994. However, delivery of this grain from Krasnodar and Stavropol Kray to Baku proved impossible because of the railroad blockade in Chechnya. Azerbaijan and Georgia found themselves on the brink of famine and had to turn to Iran and Turkey for help. It was obvious that these particular countries were now the true "masters" of the Caucasus, regaining the position they had held until the end of the 19th century.

The Armenian Factor[subhead]

In the Armenian-Azerbaijan war over Nagorno-Karabakh, which lasted almost four years, Russia supported Armenia, while Turkey helped Azerbaijan. Iran took a more neutral position, concerned that strengthening Azerbaijan could stimulate separatist tendencies among the 9 million Iranian Azeris. After the disintegration of the USSR, nationalist Abulfaz Elchibey, whose position was pro-Turkish, became president of Azerbaijan. He refused to join the CIS and demanded the removal of Russian military bases and Russian border guards from the country. Armenia, on the contrary, joined the CIS and kept the Russian military bases, including protection of its external border by Russian border troop posts.

By the beginning of 1994, when Geydar Aliyev, who replaced Elchibey as president, unsuccessfully tried to change the course of the war, Armenia had already achieved its main strategic goals. The entire Azerbaijani territory between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh had been cleared of Azeri population, and Karabakh became part of Armenia.

Moreover, a "cordon sanitaire" had been created around Nagorno- Karabakh from the west, north, and east (along the Yevlakh-Agdei- Fizuli line), that is, a strip of Azerbaijan territory 20-30 km wide, from which all Azeri population had also been evicted and villages and settlements subsequently destroyed. About 1 million Azerbaijanis became refugees. The Armenian army stopped only several kilometers from the city of Yevlakh, through which the Baku-Tbilisi railroad and two Baku-Batumi oil pipelines passes, and through which Azerbaijani export oil was transported.

A cut-off of these arteries would have been an economic catastrophe for Azerbaijan. It was necessary to sign a truce agreement even though it meant acknowledging defeat. Signing the truce agreement was also prompted

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by the fact that the consortium of Western oil companies headed by British Petroleum was reluctant to sign an agreement with Aliyev on development of Caspian oil as long as war continued in this region.

Only after having agreed to a rather humiliating truce and after six months of complete suspension of military operations was Aliyev able to sign on 20 September 1994 in London an agreement on Caspian oil, which guaranteed Azerbaijan multibillion Western capital investment. Russia also got 10 percent of the stock of the new oil consortium. However, the transportation problem remained unresolved.

The cheapest method of transportation could be to modernize the already existing Baku-Batumi and Baku-Makhachkala-Tuapse pipelines. The consortium planned to increase the current level of oil production in Azerbaijan during the first phase from 12 million tonnes a year to 25-30 million tonnes a year, which only slightly exceeded the oil production peak Azerbaijan achieved in 1965 (22 million tonnes).

The flare-up of the conflict in Chechnya and the cut-off of transportation arteries here exposed the vulnerability of the project to build a new pipeline through the territory of the North Caucasus. Modernization of the Baku-Batumi pipeline, which is only 540 kilometers long, was much cheaper than all the other projects. But this option would permanently preserve the terms of the truce and deprive Azerbaijan of the opportunity in the future to oust the Armenians from the occupied territories they had subjected to ethnic cleansing. In addition, Turkey's decision to limit transportation of oil by tankers through the Bosporus and Dardanelles removed any Black Sea options in the future.

In October 1994 Aliyev spoke at a meeting with Turkish President Suleyman Demirel in support of the Turkish project for the pipeline. The possibility of building a pipeline from Baku to the Turkish port of Seyhan on the Mediterranean Sea made it more likely that in subsequent years pipelines from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan could be linked with it. This could render unnecessary the pipeline from the Tengiz oil fields in the northern Caspian region to Novorossiysk with a capacity of 17 million tonnes a year, which was already close to completion. Its construction began when the USSR still existed.

Meanwhile, in Chechnya not only extremists but President Dudayev also threatened to begin blowing up oil and gas pipelines and even nuclear power stations in the event the Russian military attacked the republic. Not only Aliyev but also Nazarbayev and Niyazov began to lean in favor of the Iranian-Turkish option. Nazarbayev was planning to bring Kazakhstan's future oil exports to the level of 50-60 million tonnes a year. In these conditions, Russia decided to take extreme measures.

The Bulgarian-Greek Factor

However, Turkey has two more historical enemies in the Black Sea- Mediterranean region: Bulgaria and Greece. Turkey's announcement of a "permit-based" regime of transporting oil through the straits, which prohibited utilization of large tankers, dealt a severe blow not only to Russia but also to Greece. It was the Greek fleet of supertankers that played an important role in the exports of Caspian oil. Supertankers are the cheapest way of transporting oil. Besides, loading oil into a foreign-flag tanker already constitutes an act of sale. The Rotterdam oil exchange trades in filled tankers.

In September 1994, two months after Turkey imposed its restriction, Greece and Bulgaria proposed to Russia a new plan which had tremendous advantages. This plan envisaged loading oil into tankers in Tuapse and Novorossiysk and transporting it through the Black Sea to the Bulgarian port of Burgas. From here, through a 350 km pipeline the oil could be pumped over to the Greek port of Alexandropolis in the Aegean Sea in the Mediterranean, not far from the mouth of the Dardanelles Strait.

This plan would completely take Turkey out of the game, depriving it of all transit fees and pipeline investment. By all calculations, the Turkish pipeline would have been about 2,000 kilometers long and would have cost $6-7 billion to build. In addition, its construction would have taken several years, since the route traversed mountainous areas.

The estimated cost of the Bulgarian-Greek pipeline would be no more than $800 million and it could be built considerably faster. Russia immediately agreed to this plan and in October 1994 signed a so-called "protocol of intentions." Now in order to restore Russia's influence on the fate of Caspian oil it was necessary to ensure normal functioning of all transportation arteries going through Chechnya. This looked initially like an easy task. Unfortunately, an operation that required a scalpel got carried out with an ax. But this reflected the personal taste of the two leaders, Yeltsin and Dudayev, who rejected any compromises.

Yakut Leader To Sign Economic Accord With South Korea

LD2502094595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0924 GMT 25 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow February 25 TASS—A large-scale agreement on economic cooperation between Russia and South Korea will be signed during a visit by president of the Sakha (Yakutia) Republic Mikhail Nikolayev to Seoul, starting this Sunday [26 February].

Press secretary of the Yakut government Vladimir Semenov said in a telephone interview with ITAR-TASS on Saturday that the agreement was fully ironed out by the sides and will be signed by the Yakutia head on behalf of the Russian Government.

The agreement providing for the implementation of several major projects in Russia, will be of a long-standing nature to encourage economic and technical

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cooperation between the two countries in manufacturing sectors, the power industry and the development of natural resources in Yakutia, Semenov stressed.

The visit to last till March 1, will be made at the invitation of the South Korean Ministry of Trade and Industry. The trip will be aimed at promoting Russia's efforts to boost trade and economic relations, including those of its subjects, with countries of the Asia-Pacific region.

The visit programme provides for Nikolayev's meetings with members of the South Korean cabinet and representatives of South Korean business.

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International Affairs

Kiev, Chisinau Fail To Sign Border Cooperation Treaty

LD2502110595 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 0600 GMT 25 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Ukrainian delegation, led by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko, yesterday ended its official visit to the Republic of Moldova.

For two days, Ukrainian-Moldovan negotiations were under way in Chisinau. The sides failed to sign all of the documents. This primarily applies to agreements on cooperation between the border regions and [words indistinct]. Despite the Ukrainian delegation's insistence on their signature, there remained differences in the sides' views and stances. And while Ukraine has an interest in this cooperation, Moldova faces the diktat of certain political considerations, namely the lack of settlement in the Dniester conflict.

As for the documents that were signed at the negotiations, they represent two protocols on informational and consultative cooperation between the foreign ministries of Ukraine and Moldova. An agreement on investment promotion and mutual protection was initialed and the sides exchanged certificates on the ratification of the treaty on legal assistance and legal relations in civil and criminal cases. [passage omitted]

Good Relations With Moldova Confirmed

LD2602093795 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0600 GMT 26 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On 25 February the press center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made public a Ukrainian-Moldovan communique on the results of the official visit to Chisinau by a Ukrainian state delegation. The delegation, led by Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko, included representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry of Defense, the State Committee for the Defense of State Borders, and the State Customs Committee.

It was emphasized during the course of the talks that relations between the two states are good neighborly ones and are of a special partnership nature. Certainty was expressed that the documents signed as a result of the visit would promote the further development of a legal base for bilateral cooperation. The sides expressed themselves in favor of speeding up ratification by the parliaments of the treaty on friendship, good neighborliness and cooperation, and also for putting into practice agreements on cooperation on border issues. The participants of the talks emphasized their mutual interest in intensive development of trade and economic relations.

Ministry: Sale of Bombers to Russia Not Finalized

LD2502170395 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 25 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Some mass media, referring to Petr Deynekin, commander in chief of Russia's Air Force, have disseminated reports that the defense ministries of Ukraine and Russia had achieved accords on the transfer of a group of Ukrainian strategic bombers and air-launched cruise missiles to Russia. They are also producing an expert assessment of the value of the aircraft made by the Russian side.

Anatoliy Murakhovskyy, deputy head of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry's press service, when asked by the Novyny news agency to comment on this report, stressed that in essence it runs ahead of the true course of events. In particular, the press service considers it premature to speak of a final resolution of the issue of transferring the aircraft and cruise missiles, and even more so to name some monetary sums.

At present special expert groups are evaluating the technical state of the aircraft and are working on the principles for calculating their value and a payment mechanism. In addition Anatoliy Murakhovskyy noted that not only the strategic bombers and cruise missiles but also the whole complex of ground support equipment, which services the above-mentioned aircraft group, are to become the subject of a final accord. He also emphasized that this agreement is of an advantageous nature for Ukraine.

Shmarov Defends Rukh-Opposed Air Defense Accord

MK2502111095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 25 Feb 95 p 4

[Report by Viktor Zamyatin: "Russia-Ukraine Relations. We Do Not Need Someone Else's Skies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The agreement on cooperation in air defense systems, signed by Ukraine at the Almaty CIS summit, has drawn contradictory reactions: the military claimed it was necessary, while national democrats thought it was treacherous. Valeriy Shmarov, Ukraine vice premier and defense minister, stated his opinion thus: One can do without an agreement, as without many other things—for example, the army could just go back to the "trekhlineyka" [7.62-mm rifle Russia adopted in 1861]

The Ukrainian Rukh (and not just Rukh) does not tire of saying that the agreement contradicts Ukraine's nonalignment status. Shmarov thinks differently: The document corresponds to Ukraine's legislation and does not threaten its sovereignty. This stance is shared by General Mykhaylo Lopatin, commander of Ukraine's Air Defense Forces. He recalls: Russia alone possesses information from space vital to early warning systems.

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Another argument for the agreement is the fact that the "Identify Friend or Foe" codes, which are the same for all CIS countries, will not be changed soon. Another weighty argument for the agreement is the fact that Ukraine has no spares for military planes (40 percent of the Ukrainian Air Defense Forces are not battle-worthy) and firing ranges. Lopatin stresses that the agreement is only about cooperation, not about forming a union and being subordinate to the main Air Defense Staff of Russia. Coordination will be taken over by the main staff of united air defense systems. Ukraine's "contribution" to the united system is two missile-attack early warning centers (in Crimea and Transcarpathia), and a share of radio communications intelligence.

National Affairs

Kuchma Comments on Reform, Chechnya in Lvov

WS2702083095 Lvov MOLODA HALYCHYNA in Ukrainian 16 Feb 95 p 2

[Report by Yuriy Nykorak on news conference by President Leonid Kuchma in Lvov; date not given: "There Is No Need To Hold Consultations; It Is Necessary To Work!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite the words about the abolishment of district councils of people's deputies in Lvov, as the president himself admitted, his trip to Lvov Oblast and the conference with local entrepreneurs proved to be successful and useful. The most important thing is that he could feel understanding and support for the reforms he had initiated.

Meanwhile, we offer for your attention excerpts from Leonid Kuchma's news conference, which was held at the end of his visit.

About the Crimean Problem

"I never heard Yeltsin saying that Crimea is Russian territory. On the contrary. you should know that it was owing to Yeltsin himself that a treaty was initialed at my meeting with him stating clearly and precisely: 'Territorial integrity and inviolability of borders.'"

About the Future of the CIS

"I used to repeatedly state that there is no return to the Soviet Union. As for the initiatives of both left- and right-wing forces, attempts to hold a referendum to decide whether we should return to the Soviet Union or withdraw from the CIS are futile. Time and money should not be wasted, because the people of Ukraine have already determined their position at the referendum. However, from all points of view (particularly, from the economic one), we must cooperate. Our relations with CIS states should not be maintained at the expense of other states, including those in the West."

About the Future of the Ukrainian Army

"I view our future Army as a professional one; it should not be manned with young guys, who are drafted into the Army and handed weapons three short months later, but rather with people who join the Army on a professional basis. However, this may take a long time."

About the Demand That Russia Pay Compensation to Ukrainian Citizens Who Were Victims of Political Repression in Soviet Times

"This issue should have been raised three years ago, immediately after the breakup of the Soviet Union, though, we still have to think of how to resolve this problem and conduct negotiations.... It was necessary to think hard when we 'were getting a divorce.'"

On What Parties Will You Rely?

"On the common sense of society, that shows that there is no alternative to the course of radical economic transformations in Ukraine."

When the Ukrainian-Russian Agreement Was Initialed, at the Request of the Russian Side, the Word "State" Was Deleted From the Part Concerning Borders. Why Did the Russian Side Insist on That? Why Did the Ukrainian Side Agree? Does It Not Run Counter to International Law?

"All of this lies within the framework of international law. Tell me, please, what kind of borders exist between states? State borders. There are no other borders.... The sooner we sign this agreement with Russia, the fewer opportunities will emerge (in Russia as well!) to profit by this."

First Deputy Prime Minister Ye. Marchuk, Commenting on the Signed Document, Noted That Ukrainian Sailors (Including Those Who Are Ukrainian Citizens) Will Be Given an Opportunity "To Complete Their Service" With the Russian Fleet....

"The Russian side is categorically opposed to our fellows serving there. We, on the contrary, are in favor of this.... It is in our interests, both from the military and economic viewpoints, that our servicemen do their service there."

What Is Your Attitude as Ukrainian President Toward the Conflict in Chechnya?

"This is an internal Russian affair, which will have to be resolved within the framework of the Russian Constitution. It is a different matter that we cannot approve the methods which they are using to resolve this problem."

About the Power Hierarchy in Lvov Oblast

"I only know that there are no district councils in Lvov, instead, there are district administrations. This is an absolutely correct decision. There is no need to hold consultations. It is necessary to work!"

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The Multiparty Issue

"The future belongs to the multiparty system. For that, parties must have strong support in society. Along such lines, quantity is not an indication of quality. Let us hope that we will have that quality."

About Joining NATO

"The process of joining NATO by East European states must be more or less evolutional. This stance adhered to by Ukraine is well understood and supported in the West."

About Terms for the Deployment of the Russian Fleet in Ukraine

"The main differences between the delegations of Russia and Ukraine concerned the base: Is Sevastopol the base or is the base located in Sevastopol? So, the Russian delegation agreed with the 'in' option. There are still no concrete terms there, just a declaration has been drafted. The main thing is that the sides agreed to remove this issue from the agreement itself."

About the Work of the Conciliatory Commission on the Law on Power

"Today there are two different viewpoints. The first pertains to the president and the government. The second deals with who 'dissolves' whom. However, in my opinion, we are already too 'dissolute.'"

What Did You Gain From the Trip to Lvov?

"I obtained answers to virtually all questions, which I had prior to my trip. Primarily, I realized that in the economy, problems of specific enterprises should be resolved on an individual basis. What place it occupies in the general structure and whether it is necessary at all. Maybe, the state should rather grant it to its working collective than continue carrying this burden. But the state must think about the people and support them. For that, it needs the support of society. I have found such support here."

No Black Sea Fleet Command Reaction on Chechnya

LD2502182195 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 25 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Is the Black Sea Fleet's Marine Infantry preparing for raids in Chechnya? So far there has been no official reaction by the Black Sea Fleet command to yesterday's appeal to the personnel of the Black Sea Fleet's Marine Infantry units, Captain Second Rank Andrey Grachev, head of the Black Sea Fleet press center, informed a Ukrinform correspondent.

The fleet's Press Center has disseminated information that, on 24 February, Black Sea Fleet sailors stated their desire to stand shoulder to shoulder with the Marine Infantry of other fleets in Chechnya. They expressed their initiative in the form of a special appeal to the Russian Navy's commander in chief, and also to the commander of the Black Sea Fleet's Military Council and the chiefs of its shorebased troops. The Press Center's report gives an account of the appeal. It is not known who signed it and what the procedure for adopting this document was.

Public organizations in Sevastopol, particularly those of a Ukrainian or Crimean Tatar tendency, have expressed their negative attitude toward sending Black Sea Fleet sailors to Chechnya.

Report on Meeting of Kiev, Crimea Deputies

954F1486A Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Feb 95 p 1

[Report by Supreme Council Deputy O. Kirillov at plenary meeting, recorded by A. Dorogan; date not given: "Simferopol-Kiev: In the Dialogue Phase"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A working group of deputies of the Supreme Council of Crimea, which conducted negotiations with Ukrainian members of parliament on problems of mutual relations and determination of the authorized actions of the legislative bodies of Ukraine and Crimea, has returned from Kiev. Deputy O. Kirillov, a member of this group, presented at a plenary meeting information on the results of the negotiations. It will be of interest to the readers also, I believe, to know how the dialogue between the spokesmen for the Crimean and the Ukrainian corps of deputies is developing. We reproduce the text of the report presented by O. Kirillov and the deputies' questions to him and the responses to them heard at the plenary meeting of the session.

[Kirillov] Guided by the principles worked out at the meeting of the chairmen of the Supreme Council of Ukraine and the Supreme Council of Crimea on 26 January 1995, our working group placed on the agenda the entire set of relations between Crimea and Ukraine.

From the first minutes of our time spent in the Ukrainian parliament we had to adjust our work plan and include in our schedule meetings with representatives of all political forces. We offered Derzhavnist, the faction, that is, which prepared the plan for the elimination of Crimea's republic status, a meeting and debate, an open, direct debate.

A discussion that was difficult but generally useful for both parties was held. The same kind of discussion was held with members of the Interregional Group of Deputies, representatives of the Yednist faction, the Agrarians, and the Republican and Communist Parties. We emphasized at each meeting that the immediate implementation by the Supreme Council of Ukraine of the law "On the Delineation of Authority" in the form in which it was adopted on 30 June 1992 could be the foundation for the further harmonization of unclarified legal provisions. Mention should be made of the increased degree of understanding by many political forces in the Ukrainian parliament of the impossibility of a further growth

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of tension in relations between Ukraine and Crimea and, on this basis, of an increase in constructive trends in the mood of the deputies. This is creating a particular background for the negotiating process. Although this factor should not be exaggerated either, in our view. The negotiations will be very hard going and complex, which was very eloquently shown by round one. An indicator of the constructive nature of the mood of some political forces in the Ukrainian parliament is the agreement that was reached for the time of the negotiating process on a termination of mutual political attacks both in the news media and at the parliamentary level and the discussion or adoption of documents that could stabilize the situation. A meeting on 8 February of a commission which was to have discussed the Crimean question and to have offered it as the main item on the agenda of the session of the Supreme Council of Ukraine was in this channel canceled. The basic propositions of a protocol of accord had been agreed in principle by the evening of 8 February. At that time, on Wednesday evening, we were in quite a confident frame of mind. But on Thursday morning our positions caved in because the details of the latest parliamentary crisis in Simferopol had been obtained in Kiev and had become the property of many political forces in parliament. Positions in the Ukrainian Supreme Council hardened. We were offered at 2100 on 9 February a draft protocol containing wording which the Crimean delegation could not accept.

Unfortunately, round one of the negotiating process culminated in the adoption merely of a joint statement. We consider this result far more modest than what had been expected. Nonetheless, considering the increased degree of constructiveness in the Ukrainian parliament and the fact that a step in the organization of the negotiating process at the new, qualitatively different stage of the relations of Ukraine and Crimea and Ukraine and Russia has been taken, our working group considers the further path of the negotiations promising, although very difficult, and believes it possible to hope for their constructive outcome.

[KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA] So we must now, in your opinion, before deciding anything here, glance over our shoulders at Kiev?

[Kirillov] Each person must recognize that this is an extraordinarily serious process, and each will adopt his own decision in relation to this process. We did not have the authority to seal an accord on paper, we merely agreed the matter to be desirable. If this accord operates, it could stabilize the degree of trust that arose in the frank discussions between different political forces in the Ukrainian parliament and the working group of the Supreme Council of Crimea. I believe that each politician will interpret this matter in the context of the negotiations that have begun.

[KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA] Which of the factions that you listed above has a greater understanding of our Crimean issues and is accommodating in regard to them?

[Kirillov] I would not want now for the purpose of the contemplated negotiations to emphasize a polarization of forces or identify the forces which occupy this position or the other. As varying are the levels on which the Crimean parliament operates, the Ukrainian parliament is varied to the same extent. There are forces that have attempted perfectly clearly to speak in the language of ultimatums and references to the legal provisions of international law. And there have been forces that, not raising the matters that have immediately given rise to disagreements, have concentrated their attention on those that might serve the unifying process of the two groups. I believe that this is a customary situation, which will be resolved in the process of harmonization of positions.

[KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA] It is not entirely clear in what capacity you were negotiating or whom you represented. You have said that you lacked authority other than that of a working group of the Presidium, but in this case you report serious accords, the achievement of a certain rapprochement of positions, and so forth. Are we talking about this being the position of the Supreme Council of Crimea? Or are these the opinions of the three or four persons who are members of this group and who are engaged in practical work and training in the sphere of negotiations?

[Kirillov] The question of the powers of the working group of the Presidium arises constantly and will, probably, continue to arise. But I have called your attention to the fact that the working group operated as a component of the deputies' Commission for Interregional Policy, which has been approved by the Supreme Council of Crimea and which has certain powers. The list of powers of this commission is quite extensive.

[KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA] What arguments did the Derzhavnist faction present in justification of its idea of the elimination of the statehood of Crimea?

[Kirillov] For very understandable reasons I would not want to put these things in words for there is a universally recognized procedure of discussion on particular topics, and I should mention that the discussion was difficult, but perfectly open. The entire Derzhavnist faction, which is seriously prepared in matters of public law and which is headed by Igor Rafailovych Yukhnovskyy, of whom you know, was present. I believe that this, I stress, open, discussion was of benefit to both parties.

President Cancels Decrees of Crimean Leader

LD2402163395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1551 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev February 24 TASS—Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma has canceled several decrees of Crimean leader Yuriy Meshkov as "running counter to the Ukrainian Constitution and laws."

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These include the decrees on the Crimean permanent representation and the Crimean president's service for security and interstate relations. In the opinion of Kiev, independent foreign policy and security are not in competence of the autonomous Crimean republic and the Crimean supreme power bodies are not authorized to tackle them.

The Crimean decrees to suspend the activities of the Crimean Supreme Soviet, regional, city and borough councils and annul mandates of their deputies, as well as the decree to hold a referendum on the draft Crimean constitution on April 9, 1995, have been canceled as well.

National Bank To Stop Domestic Use of Dollars

LD2402191695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1707 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, Feb 24 (Interfax - Ukraine)—Ukraine's National Bank will not go back on its decision to stop issuing licenses for the sale of goods and services within the country for foreign currency, Bank chairman Viktor Yushchenko warned on Friday [24 February].

As for licenses issued earlier, the Bank hopes to obtain consent to their invalidation from the president and government very soon, Yushchenko told reporters in Kiev.

The Bank stopped issuing such licenses from November 18, 1994, planning to ultimately ban all use of foreign currency in domestic trade from February 18, 1995, by canceling earlier licenses. But, under government pressure, the Bank decided on February 18 to extend earlier licenses pending "a special directive."

"The forces which should have taken part in stabilizing the national monetary unit unfortunately took a different position on the matter," Yushchenko complained. He said the Bank's measure "effectively meant not limiting the use of the dollar in Ukraine but limiting the operations of 1,146 structures which held such licenses" and which "have no serious effect on the Ukrainian market." Over the last three months only three of them have applied to the National Bank for permission to continue using foreign currency after February 18, Yushchenko said.

Bombs Explode in Simferopol; Linked to Arrival of Experts

LD2402215995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2147 GMT 24 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lev Ryabchikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Simferopol February 24 TASS—Four bombs blew up on Friday [24 February] night in various districts of the city of Simferopol.

The most powerful one tore down a wall in a building in the Kievskaya Street and crushed window-panes in the neighbouring palace of schoolchildren.

Local police forces work in an emergency regimen; interior troops joined intensified patrolling of the city's streets, Vasiliy Zhukov, chief of the Simferopol city department of the interior told ITAR-TASS. The search for the wrongdoers has been of no avail so far, he added.

Informed sources are inclined to link the terrorist act with arrival in Simferopol of a large group of police experts, led by Deputy Ukrainian Interior Minister Valeriy Chernyshev. The group purposes to investigate several assassinations and terrorist actions, which took place in Simferopol.

From the beginning of the year, 13 bomb explosions went on record in the Crimean capital.

Economic Issues

Deputy Speaker on IMF Credits, Monetary Emissions

LD2502210495 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1620 GMT 25 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Cherkassy Oblast, 25 Feb (UNIAN)—Oleksandr Tkachenko, deputy chairman of Ukraine's Supreme Council, does not rule out that another monetary emission of 30,000-35,000 billion karbovantsi will be carried out in March. He stated this on 25 February at a field sitting of the Cherkassy Oblast executive committee in the village of Ploskoye ("Hammer and Sickle" collective farm), in which the heads of rayon councils of people's deputies took part. The sitting was devoted to the adoption by parliament of the resolution "On the State of Preparations and Creation of Favorable Conditions for Spring Field Work in 1995."

Oleksandr Tkachenko reported that, according to calculations by the Ministries of the Economy and Agriculture and Food, 96,000- 98,000 billion karbovantsi would be spent on spring field work, of those "27,000 billion in February, approximately 36,000 billion in March, 25,000 billion in April, and 25,000 billion in May."

"We have lost the balance of production in the state, technological discipline, and the balance of confidence in those whom we elect and appoint," the first deputy parliament chairman said. He called on agricultural employees to increase discipline, assuring them that only if this is done can one count on spring field work becoming "the beginning of the stabilization of Ukraine's economy".

Oleksandr Tkachenko reported that $150 million of the IMF's reserve "standby" credits would be used to buy means for protecting plants and spare parts. To the observation that one of the IMF's conditions was that

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the credits be used for targeted programs, he stated: "We will use the credits as is expedient for us, and not how they want."

Government Approves Privatization List

LD2402232695 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in English 2200 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On Thursday February the 23d Ukraine's large privatization list was approved by the Ukrainian Government. A statement to this effect was made by Yuriy Yekhanurov, chairman of the State Property Fund, at a press conference at Ukrinform's headquarters in downtown Kiev. According to Mr. Yekhanurov, the list comprises 5,600 state-run entities, of which 852 enterprises have issued their stock to be readily available to prospective buyers. Mr. Yekhanurov disclosed the list has been drafted to contain 1,000 entities. Through the agro-industrial complex's delayed actions, some 2,400 entities remain suspended pending the government's final decision. As Mr. Yekhanurov stressed, the cabinet is likely to remain adamant in demanding the list's finalization before April the 1st. According to the press conference's sponsors, appointment of certificate auction center superintendents is nearing completion with first five such centers having been opened. Next week similar centers will stage their presentation ceremonies in the Volyn region and in Donetsk, which will be followed by centers in Poltava and Odessa. Mr. Yekhanurov admitted some problems in finding building to house the centers and equipping them with the necessary facilities.

Privatization of Sea, Danube Ship Lines Opposed

WS2402133395 Lvov INFOBANK in English 1042 GMT 24 Feb 95

[From the "News Service" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Supreme Council Commission for the Fuel and Energy Complex, Transportation and Communications appealed to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and other parliamentary commissions with a request to include the Azov Sea Shipping Company and the Ukrainian Danube Shipping Company (UDASKO) on the list of companies which should not be privatized. This was reported to an INFOBANK correspondent by People's Deputy Volodymyr Sevryukov, head of the Sub-Commission on Sea and River Transportation. The commission supports the same position on the Black Sea Shipping Company. According to Sevryukov, the main stocks of the Black Sea Shipping Company were estimated at $23 million, the equivalent of the value of one ship. The Commission on the Fuel and Energy Complex, Transportation and Communication made a request to audit the financial activities of the Azov Sea Shipping Company.

Reform Council Views Edict on Bonds, Trusts

WS2702104595 Lvov INFOBANK in English 0800 GMT 27 Feb 95

[From "News Service" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV—On February 23 the Economic Reform Council, presided by the first Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine Victor Pynzenyk, examined a draft decree by the President of Ukraine "Concerning Issue and Order of Delivering the State Inner Loan Bonds Determined in U.S. Dollars." The issue of bonds is planned for 1 April. Redeem of the bonds and payment of dividends will be made in U.S. dollars. The delivering of the bonds will be made through the institutions of the Ukrainian Savings Bank. According to the draft decree, commercial banks are to receive bonus for delivering the bonds to the amount of 1 percent of the total value of the sold bonds. The bonds will have face value equal to $100. Total number of the issued bonds is 100 million. An interest rate is 6 percent per year.

The Council examined a draft law "Concerning Introduction of Alterations and Amendments to the Cabinet of Ministers' Decree 'Concerning Trusts.'" It was planned to create a committee for controlling the activities of the trusts. The draft foresees that the statute stocks cannot be smaller than 15,000 minimum wages and are to be formed by real estate, money, and securities. The real estate share may not exceed 25 percent. According to the draft law, the participants will be responsible for the obligations of the trusts not only by their entrance fees but (in case of the fees being not enough to pay a fine) by real estate share. It was offered to fix the amount of payment for non-keeping the duties of a trust at the level of 500 percent of the each participant entrance fee.

The Economic Reforms Council examined a draft law "Concerning Transactions With Given Raw Materials in External Economic Activities." It offered to cover with a duty those raw materials which are given to Ukraine in order to be processed here and be sent back to the giver, and which is supplied to Ukraine by foreign customers. The amount of a duty will be determined by the rate of the unified duty tariff, as well as taxes and yields, which are collected from the imported goods.

The Council discussed the order of giving a credit support to the enterprises in 1995. It is planned to give such kind of support to the enterprises with state property share of more than 50 percent. The costs will be given under condition of mortgaging of the enterprise property or bills received by these enterprises from their consumers.

The Council decided that transfer the property of all the Ukrainian military troops to the new owners has to be made only through the system of exchanges and auctions.

State Control Urged Over Use of Nonferrous Metals

WS2402123495 Lvov INFOBANK in English 1042 GMT 24 Feb 95

[From the "News Service" feature]

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ukrainian Minister of Industry Anatoliy Holubchenko has sent a letter to Head of the Ukrainian Security Service Valeriy Malikov. In this letter he spoke against the attempt of the Antimonopoly Committee to concentrate the collection and recycling of scrap nonferrous metals in the enterprises of the VTORKOLYORMET ("Used Nonferrous Metals") company.

The Ministry of Industry sent a similar statement to the Ukrainian Antimonopoly Committee which explained that at present, there are 14 VTORKOLYORMET enterprises in Ukraine. Each of them holds on average of only 7 percent of the market, as it is defined in the antimonopoly legislation, a monopolist should hold 30 percent of the market.

Volodymyr Yefimenko, chief expert of the Administration of Nonferrous and Powder Metallurgy and Ferrous Alloys of the Ministry of Industry, believes that collection and recycling of scrap nonferrous metal should be regulated by the government.

Lack of control over this process, as well as over price increases for nonferrous metals on the world market caused mass theft of these materials from Ukraine. Since the beginning of 1994, in Donetsk Oblast alone, 600 attempted thefts of nonferrous metals were made, with the total weight of 2,000 tons. In 1993-1994 the Ukrainian National Customs Committee prevented 261 attempts of illegal export of 248,300 tonnes of nonferrous metals from Ukraine.

Yefimenko added that the Ministry of Industry draw up necessary amendments to be made to the Ukrainian legislation concerning the provision of licenses for all types of activities regarding the collection and recycling of scrap nonferrous metals. With the exception of partially processed aluminum and titanium, which are mined domestically, Ukraine manufactures all other kinds of nonferrous metals from scrap and remains of these metals.

Zaporizhzhya Plant To Produce New Jet Engines

WS2402123295 Lvov INFOBANK in English 1042 GMT 24 Feb 95

[From the "News Service" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Zaporizhzhya plant MOTOR-SICH will start designing Ukrainian D-436 model jet engines to be used for new TU-334 planes, fire-fighting aircraft BE-200, AN-74 planes which are designed to work in the Arctic, as well as in YAK-42 planes which are successfully competing with Boeing aircraft. This information was provided to an INFOBANK correspondent by Deputy Director of the company Vyacheslav Mykhaylutsa. MOTOR-SICH plans to begin manufacturing D-27 jet engines which will have no competitors in the world and which will be used in AN-70 planes. Mykhaylutsa stated that the companies BMW and ROLLS-ROYCE established a consortium for the production of this type of plane. However, at present Ukraine surpasses them by two or three years. Currently MOTOR-SICH is importing 85 percent of spare parts from Russia, to which it is delivering 90 percent of its production. Mykhaylutsa added that his plant is also engaged in another program of designing gas- distillation devices to be implemented at special electric power plants which use gas fuel and work for distant districts.

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Belarus

Japan Provides Shipment of Nuclear Control Equipment

LD2502133995 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1600 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with the agreement between the governments of Belarus and Japan on cooperation in the field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, an official ceremony took place at the Foreign Ministry, during which the first consignment of necessary equipment was handed over. The agreement provides for the receipt by the Belarusian side of equipment and services worth over $2 million, which will be used for setting up record and control systems for nuclear materials. The larger part of the supplied equipment is intended for the academic and scientific and technical complex "Sosny." The implementation of the agreement will allow full control over storage and transport of nuclear materials on the territory of Belarus.

Delegations Visit U.S. Military Bases in Germany

WS2702081595 Minsk BELAPAN in English 1200 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Within the framework of the Servicemen to Servicemen program, two delegations of the Armed Forces of Belarus visited the Headquarters of the European Command of the United States Army in Stuttgart, Germany, in February of this year. According to the information received, one of the delegations headed by Colonel Yuriy Syamenchanka, chief of the headquarters of the Fifth Army Corps, familiarized itself with the structure of an army corps of the U.S. Land Forces. Little later, the other delegation was in Stuttgart to study the organization of troop transportation in the United States Army. The delegation was headed by Colonel Mikalay Nyavolka, chief of the Military Transportation Service at the Belarusian Defense Ministry.

Deputies Discuss Ban of Weapons Destruction

LD2402185195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1707 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Minsk, Feb 24 (INTERFAX-WEST)—The Belarusian parliament meeting on Friday [24 February] decided to call a special session on March 1 to discuss and appraise President Lukashenka's statement yesterday on banning the destruction of conventional weapons.

Speaking in Minsk on Thursday, the president announced a ban on the elimination of conventional arms because of the newly-emerging imbalance of weapons in NATO's favor. The deputies are also expected to either reject or ratify the latest package of agreements with Russia which includes a common customs area, joint financial-industrial groups, the leasing of army installations to Moscow and agreement on the status of Russian troops in Belarus; each agreement was signed by government representatives on both sides in Minsk on January 6. They will also consider the outline friendship treaty and agreements on joint customs and border controls that presidents Lukashenka and Yeltsin signed in Minsk on Tuesday.

A leader of the opposition People's Front, Vladimir Zabolotskiy, told Interfax that Lukashenka's decision to ban the destruction of conventional weapons envisaged by the CFE treaty was in violation of the country's Constitution. He also said that under the existing Constitution, the country must not move away from its sovereignty to form any military or political alliances against anyone.

Opposition members believe it is up to the Prosecutor's Office and the Constitutional Court to give a legal assessment of the president's statements and plans, while the parliament is expected to pass a political judgement of them.

Khvostov on Halt To Arms Destruction

LD2402195295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1733 GMT 24 Feb 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MINSK, Feb 24 (Interfax-West)—The decision of Belarussian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka to suspend elimination of excessive armaments under the treaty on limitation of conventional arms in Europe was due to two reasons: the lack of required funds and possible threat of the balance of force in Europe breaking, Belarussian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Khvostov [name as received] told Interfax today.

He said the balance of forces could be broken because of NATO extending itself to the east. Khvostov said the treaty on conventional arms in Europe had been signed while the Warsaw Pact had existed. He said the intention of the former Warsaw Pact signatories to join NATO could break the present balance of forces.

However, Khvostov made it clear that financial problems were the main factor for Belarus suspending liquidation of armaments.

At the same time, Khvostov sai d Belarus would not like to have a NATO member-state as its closest neighbor (Poland was meant—IF).

Belarus has inherited from the ex-USSR one of the European strongest armies. Belarus has about 2500 tanks, 340 planes and about 3000 armored vehicles.

The Belarussian army has about 90,000 soldiers. Moreover, Russian strategic troops serving about 40 Topol missiles with nuclear war-heads are stationed in Belarus.

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Belarussian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka said in Minsk on Thursday during the festive ceremony dedicated to the Day of Defender of Fatherland that Russia and Belarus had agreed to cooperate for defending the Belarussian borders with Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.

Lukashenka Inspects Army, Comments on Reform

WS2702084595 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian 21 Feb 95 p 1

[Report by Anatol Slanewski: "'Our Army Is Reliable,' Believes the Belarusian President After Visiting the Pukhavichi Garrison"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since Belarus became independent, all of its leaders, without exception, have considered it to be their responsibility to visit the Pukhavichi garrison, to meet with soldiers from the distinguished Irkutsk-Pinsk division and the special task force brigade deployed there. On 17 February, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka also spent most of his workday in Marina Horka. As the president himself noted after the visit, this was his first meeting with servicemen, but definitely not his last. Alyaksandr Lukashenka is going to visit all large garrisons this year.

Speaking about his impressions from the meetings with soldiers, Mr. Lukashenka stated the following: "My impressions are as follows: I think that I have exaggerated the level of our Army's disintegration. Now I feel that our Army is reliable, and that devoted people are serving in it. I have been told that previously, but today I have had the pleasure to become convinced of this myself."

The Belarusian president attended exercises in tactics and drilling, talked with young servicemen, met with them at the Officers' House, and visited a test range, at which he reportedly (journalists were not admitted) assessed the tactical and firepower characteristics of the Israeli "Uzi" machine gun, U.S. M-16 rifle, and other types of weapons. The president also met with the residents of a military town, including soldiers' families transferred here from so-called "hot spots" in the former Soviet Union a few years ago. Since then, families of many officers have been living in completely unadapted dwellings. At the same time, there are around 70 vacant apartments in Marina Horka, which have been abandoned by servicemen who have left our country. Mr. Lukashenka promised to provide assistance and assured that the garrison servicemen's housing problems will be resolved this year.

Later that day, the president met with officers from the unit and their families. In his speech, Alyaksandr Lukashenka addressed **the economic situation and the Army's problems**.

"Virtually for six months," the president said, "we have been living on our own money; we are paying for everything in full. And I think that this is a great achievement. Partners have begun to respect Belarus. True, it is too early to speak about any economic breakthroughs, but it is encouraging that the decline in production has been halted."

Alyaksandr Lukashenka noted that the Army's prosperity depends on the economic situation. Nevertheless, he emphasized that "we will not allow anyone to harm the Army." Speaking about **reform in the Armed Forces**, which is being conducted to establish a "strong, well-trained, and intellectually sound army," Mr. Lukashenka said that he will not allow anyone "to cut the Army to the quick." "Since I did not create the Army, I have no right to destroy it. We have stopped scrapping equipment, because we understood that we can profit from this, even before others understood that. We are ready to sell weapons. I have promised the Tajik leadership to assist the in establishing an army. Let them pay. If they do not have money, let them give cotton or aluminum...."

The president attached particular attention to **relations with Russia.**

"We have agreed to establish contacts with the Russian Armed Forces on the condition that no single Belarusian soldier will be sent to a hot spot." "And you can be sure about this," Alyaksandr Lukashenka said. The president emphasized that military cooperation with Russia is of a strategic nature. Russia's military orders do not allow our defense enterprises to stand idle.

The president also reiterated his opinion regarding "intentions of Poland and, partially, Lithuania" to join NATO. "This cannot but alarm us. I would not like the armed forces of this bloc to be near our borders."

Speaking about the **situation in our country**, Mr. Lukashenka reminded that elections are to be held soon. In this regard, the president called on servicemen "to be vigilant," since "certain people are already trying to drive a wedge between the president and the power structures." Alyaksandr Lukashenka noted that he does not demand any political activity from the Armed Forces, and requests only one thing—that division and disarray in the Army be prevented.

There had to be a caustic remark addressed to the Supreme Soviet. "If it was up to me, I would forbid current deputies from running in the upcoming elections, for they have ruined our country and violated the Constitution of the country in which we used to live."

The president also said that he is going to carry out his election promises concerning the state language and symbols, privatization, and relations with Russia. "I promised to initiate a referendum. I will soon submit corresponding proposals to the Supreme Soviet. I am ready to hold this referendum, even if I am threatened with putting the issue of confidence in the president on the agenda."

Taking into account all of the aforementioned statements, one can draw the following conclusion: This spring will be hot, in terms of politics.

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This same day, on 17 February, Prime Minister Mikhail Chyhir also visited a military unit—one of the motorized rifle regiments from the Rahachow Division.

Defense Minister on Army Discipline, Reform

WS2702082595 Minsk RESPUBLIKA in Russian 23 Feb 95 p 4

[Interview with Defense Minister Anatol Kastenka by Uladzimir Rudenka from the press service of the Belarusian Defense Ministry; place and date not given: "Holiday Reflects Workdays"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Day of Defenders of the Fatherland and the Belarusian Armed Forces is special for servicemen, veterans, and those who will serve in the Army in the future. The ranks of the military have always honored traditions of devoted service, heroism, combat glory, and devotion to the Motherland. Our interview with Colonel General Anatol Kastenka, Belarusian minister of defense, which was held on the eve of the holiday, began with this question.**

[Rudenka] **Anatol Ivanavich, the adage "fathers' heroic deeds are their sons' wings" was one fully embodied by educational work among soldiers. How is the educational process currently being organized in the Army? Have traditions of older generations, primarily ones related to combat, not been forgotten?**

[Kastenka] They must not be forgotten, since they represent more than our famous history, which cannot be rehashed. Combat traditions of frontline soldiers are a cornerstone upon which our Army has been, and is still standing, and a guarantee for the protection of statehood and stability in society. One cannot become a true soldier without the feeling of holy allegiance to military duty.

I will frankly say that nowadays, unfortunately, many young people do not honor patriotism. Commanders have to literally start from scratch, since at schools, vocational schools, high schools, and institutes of higher education, patriotic education is dying before our very eyes. Hence there are so-called dodgers, that is to say, those who disobey the law and, without pretext, fail to report to conscription centers. The last draft exposed them as well. Over 1,500 draftees did not arrive at conscription centers, and moreover, the majority of them were from Minsk and Minsk Oblast. This is why military-patriotic work with the younger generations has come to the fore in the Armed Forces. Plus, preparations for the upcoming celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Great Victory are serving as a great stimulus for this work. Lessons of courage, meetings with frontline soldiers, and so-called open days are being conducted in units and subunits. The Defense Ministry Military-Scientific Association, along with the Central Officer House, have prepared an interesting series of events entitled "Steps of Great Victory," which will leave no Belarusian serviceman or worker indifferent. Patronage is also developing. Creative organizations such as the Writers Union, the Composers Union, and many amateur artistic groups are actively participating in this work.

[Rudenka] **As the saying goes, a holiday reflects workdays. Our workdays are uneasy...**

[Kastenka] There are actually many problems in our country, including the Army. I am convinced, however, that they will be resolved by joint efforts. The main thing is that there are people who know how to work hard and perform their tasks professionally. Hence there are certain achievements in strengthening discipline. We must not set ourselves at ease, however. At a recent session of the Defense Ministry Collegium, the issue of military discipline was deemed a priority. We are not going to put up with violators of military order.

[Rudenka] **You mentioned dodgers. Still, there are soldiers who desert military units as well...**

[Kastenka] Currently, for example, we are searching for 50 soldiers. Great sums of money and many servicemen are involved in these searches. We have had to publish the names of deserters in the press. After all, sometimes neither his relatives, nor neighbors know that a soldier has escaped. They even hide themselves from their parents, who do not suspect that their sons have committed such indecent deeds. Publicity has helped us a lot. Many deserters have returned to their units.

Enthusiasts of similar "runs" should also think of the material consequences. Henceforth, all expenses spent on searches for servicemen who desert their units without leave must be covered by the offenders themselves, or by their parents.

[Rudenka] **Is this not connected with the notorious "bullying of conscripts?"**

[Kastenka] Each case is carefully investigated. You should know that, most often, references to nonstatutory relations prove to be unconfirmed. Still, there are some cases of mockery in the military. We do not conceal them. Just the opposite, they are made public, and perpetrators may even face criminal charges.

Harsh measures and a range of events aimed at strengthening military discipline are already producing positive results. There is currently a quite healthy atmosphere in many military units.

The openness of the Army, as well as close contacts with parents, company staffs, and public organizations will allow us to get rid of such an abnormal phenomenon as "bullying" in the future.

[Rudenka] **Will the process of manning troops on a territorial basis contribute to this cleansing?**

[Kastenka] Unconditionally. I will frankly say that we have made an uneasy decision to introduce a new principle of manning. The idea is to send conscripts to

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serve in military units located near their homes. However, such possibilities do not exist everywhere, still, in places where they do exist, the territorial principle is already in force. Let soldiers spend weekends with their relatives and friends, let parents meet commanders more often, and let them obtain firsthand information about their sons. This will benefit both sides.

[Rudenka] **Will it not happen that, having gone on leave, a soldier will start drinking, and will give up the service as a bad job...**

[Kastenka] There are some grounds for such fears. But it is time to change the psychology based on the words "lest something happen." Those who are looking for adventures will finally find them, even being locked up. We rely on soldiers' conscious attitude toward their service and behavior. If a soldier serves well, let him visit his parents and meet with friends more often. This is a normal thing. By the way, in France and other civilized countries, a soldier does not even think of not returning to his unit on time after visiting home. So, our commanders also hope for mutual understanding. In this regard, an experiment is being carried out in one of the regiments of the 120th Guards' Rohachew division. All sergeants and soldiers, who are not on duty on the weekends, can go home. They are supposed to return to their units by Monday morning. Those who violate these terms are deprived of such leave by a commander's decision. The experiment will last six months. If the results are positive, this innovation with weekend leave will be extended to the entire Army.

[Rudenka] **Anatol Ivanavich, what is currently the main concern of the defense minister?**

[Kastenka] The priority task of the Defense Ministry Collegium is to conduct profound reform in the Armed Forces. Routine reductions, which have been conducted so far, have not produced expected results. I will say something else. We have so far had no integral concept of establishing armed forces of an independent state. Therefore, we are facing tremendous work. This work should conform to the spirit of the current times, as well as the military and political situation in the world. As our work proceeds, many things will change, so that the Belarusian Army becomes an army of a sovereign country. A program for profound reform envisions new approaches to an entire range of issues such as manning, military education, military command, or social protection of servicemen....

[Rudenka] **Servicemen, who have their own holiday...**

[Kastenka] Day of Defenders of the Fatherland and the Belarusian Armed Forces is not only a holiday for servicemen. This is a special day for all of the Belarusian people, the people who have their own army. Their own! I emphasize this not accidentally. An appropriate attitude toward the Armed Forces should proceed namely from this fact, at both the state and national level.

I sincerely greet veterans of the Armed Forces, frontline soldiers, our servicemen, and the Belarusian people on the occasion of this remarkable holiday. I wish everybody happiness, well-being, confidence, and optimism.

Customs Agreements With Russia Viewed

WS2702083895 Minsk SEM DNEY in Russian 18 Feb 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Myasnikovich by Svetlana Kalinkina; place and date not given: "'Transitional' Period Will Last Approximately 10 Years"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The Belarusian-Russian agreements, recently signed in Minsk, have elevated relations between our countries to a qualitatively new level. It is so new that some people see a threat to the Republic's sovereignty behind this, while others—increasing trends toward integration within the CIS. A SEM DNEY correspondent has asked Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Myasnikovich, who represents Belarus in our relations with Russia, to assess the documents signed in Minsk.**

[Myasnikovich] An economic union, the establishment of which was supported by CIS countries, envisions signing documents in three primary areas such as free trade, a customs union, and a monetary union. A corresponding agreement on free trade was signed a long time ago. Yet, there was one "but." It was decided that states should draw up a list of goods, regarding which a system of restrictions and exceptions would be introduced in free trade. Everybody began adding their own goods to this list, and as a result the good idea came to a standstill. It was then decided to set similar trade rules at a bilateral level. In 1993, Belarus and Russia signed an agreement on free trade with exceptions and restrictions. Categories of goods, on which customs duties were to be imposed, were defined.

Now we have gone further and decided to abolish restrictions and exceptions in mutual trade. All goods will enter our countries' markets without customs duties. This is very important for us. We will obtain equal access to the Russian market and an opportunity to set equal prices, or nearly equal prices.

[Kalinkina] *What changes must be introduced in our legislation, so that it conforms to these documents, in particular, the one on a customs union?*

[Myasnikovich] This would require insignificant changes, since much has already been done. For example, in the area of customs policy, we actually have the same tariffs, particularly, with regard to custom duties that make up the price of a commodity. The new agreements conform to our legislation in the area of foreign economic activities. True, questions regarding customs duties have arisen, since our Customs Code and all approved tariffs were set proceeding from the interests of Belarus. After a careful analysis, we came to the conclusion that Belarusian and Russian legislation must

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be unified in this area. Such unification already took place last year, in general, to increase the volume of duty-free imports and the volume of imports with low customs duties. At the same time, we had to protect our producers, and to increase customs duties on imported goods, the equivalents of which are produced by our domestic industry. An approach to issues concerning exports was the same.

Of course, there are different interests. Russia believes that it is necessary to introduce substantial customs duties on imported vehicles, since it has the GAZ, VAZ, and AZLK auto plants. The Russians fully justifiably believe that their products should be sold on the domestic market in the first place. Since we do not produce light cars, it makes sense to abolish customs duties on imported cars, which are as high as those in Russia. Our tariffs should be lower. We must think how to prevent transfers of automobiles from Belarus to Russia. After all, there will actually be no border.

Or, for instance, Russia wants to encourage domestic producers of sugar, and to do that it introduces a high customs duty on its import. Our approach is completely different: The Republic is able to produce a mere third of its demand for this commodity, so the customs duty on imported sugar should equal zero, which will make it possible to substantially reduce its price.

[Kalinkina] *What must be done in the near future?*

[Myasnikovich] We must define our positions on unification of legislation, settle our relations with third countries, and come to terms with regard to the issue of equipping borders. We have already discussed stages of lifting customs controls with the chairman of the State Customs Committee. Probably, this will be done first with regard to air shipments, then—railroad, and after that—vehicle transport.

[Kalinkina] *Why are there differences between the periods during which economic and military agreements will be in force? The former are to be in force for 10 years, and the latter—for 25 years.*

[Myasnikovich] Our economists calculated that a "transitional" period, from the current situation in which our economy needs additional privileges to a situation in which it will be able to function in universal conditions, will last approximately 10 years. And namely this period was stipulated in our agreements. The agreements on Russia's use of military facilities will be in force longer, since it would simply make no sense to sign them every 10 years. Certain military facilities, for example in Baranovichi, have yet to be built, and we must carry out a great deal of design work.

[Kalinkina] *At a news conference in Almaty, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin admitted that negotiations are already under way with CIS countries which are ready to join a customs union. What are those countries?*

[Myasnikovich] Yes, actually, there are countries willing to do so. But we, as well as Russia, are concerned over the fact that countries, in which there is an unstable political and economic situation, might want to join the union. Even we can hardly meet our budget provisions, and these countries do not have budgets at all. The Georgian prime minister, for example, stated that their budget revenues amount to as little as 52 percent of the essential minimum, and even this money is coming from international funds. Or, for example, let us look at Azerbaijan. Their industry is standing idle, international vehicle traffic has been halted, and trains are not running. What kind of budget is there? And if in such a situation a country states that it wants to join a treaty, one must consider everything carefully. After all, consequences of similar actions will rest on the shoulders of our taxpayers.

Lukashenka Addresses Tele-Radio Employees

LD2402223595 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1700 GMT 24 Feb 95

[Address by President Alyaksandr Lukashenka to employees of the National State Tele-Radio Company in Minsk on 24 February—recorded; Lukashenka speaks in Russian throughout]

[FBIS Translated Text] Television and radio are today justly seen as unsurpassed information media. They help people to pass their free time and give a good opportunity for millions of television viewers and radio listeners to take part in the life of the republic [words indistinct]. Presently the republic possesses quite a developed system of television and radio communications. There is one television program which itself covers 98 percent of the territory of the republic. Radio broadcasting covers 100 percent of the territory with its first program broadcast on long and ultra-short wave and 96 percent in the medium- and ultrashort-wave range of the second program. We are seen and listened to by residents of the border rayons of Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine. But it would be incorrect to state that we rule over the whole space of the republic. The television company "Ostankino" covers 95 percent of our territory, the Russian channel—65 percent, St. Petersburg television—16 percent. The residents of Brest and Grodno oblasts receive all the programs of Polish television, the Ukrainian [two words indistinct], Lithuanian and Latvian ones in the rayons of Grodno and Vitebsk oblasts. If we consider that lately we have seen satellite dishes, appearing like mushrooms after the rain, which receive programs from foreign satellites, then one cannot speak about one's own full occupancy of television and radio time.

The fact that the programming of National Tele-Radio-Company amount to less than 30 percent of the programming of Russia's television and radio broadcasts on the territory of the republic presents nothing but concern and anxiety. I do not want at all to cause a

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confrontation between those air wave masses. I understand that [several words indistinct] it developed not today and yesterday, but under the conditions of the Soviet Union. Today as you know very well, the social, economic, and political image of our republic has changed. The sovereignty of an independent republic obliges all of us to review [word indistinct] of television and radio and to do our best in order to ensure that programs of national television and radio companies take their due place in the information space.

I understand that it is not an easy task. One has to look for ways of solving this problem. For the sake of objectivity I want to say justly that Belarusian television and radio suffers an acute shortage of modern electronic and (?lighting) equipment. Weak technical capacities do not allow improvement of mobility of work and limit creative possibilities of the collective. I will be frank that I see problems with [several words indistinct] solution with the help of technical re-equipment of television and radio.

On the other hand, I must tell you just as frankly that Belarusian television has not got a sufficiently high level of competence and professional qualities both in relation to journalists and cameramen and artists. Everyday expectations have been lowered at all stages of program preparation on the part of managers.

In the same context I would like to express my attitude to the television as state mass media. Not because I see it just as a presidential structure, but also that you belong to the state and are a relevant institution on the territory of the state— I mean that too. Half a year has passed since your structure was reorganized. What has changed? No doubt there is now a feeling of novelty, new subjects and forms are sought. For example, one does not like to miss the signature tune of the program, Radio-fakt; I always listen to that program. People react promptly to Televisionnaya Vertikal which is dedicated to investigation by journalists of the letters and complaints sent to the administration of the president. Rather interesting and entertaining programs are born. Your program, Novosti, has lately become more interesting, i.e. there are many beautiful, young or already famous (?journalists) who have a positive influence on our mentality.

[FBIS Translated Text] However we have not met here to exchange compliments and to part with a feeling of deep satisfaction. Our meeting today is purely business, therefore, I again repeat: Take no offense if you hear unpleasant opinions. The first estate must look for points of connection with the fourth estate. And the fourth estate must [several words indistinct]. You represent the fourth estate and television and radio hold a central position in its structure. Not a single current publication can compare with you in audience coverage and the force of impact on minds and hearts of people. The electronic press is a powerful and irreplaceable instrument in the formation of public opinion [word indistinct] at the stage of a democratic process. This is what the talk is going to be about.

How significant is the contribution of television and radio journalists to our common objective. First of all [words indistinct] say. We expected and are expecting from you something more; I would say much more. Your participation in the life of the country is insufficient but also is ambiguous and in many aspects contradictory. When one watches and listens to your programs, a question arises unfortunately too often: From where does this militant incompetence come, this demonstrative unwillingness to support the political course of the president of the country? I envisage a question: What wrong is there in it? We have freedom of press and a journalist has a right to support any opinions. I agree with that. We are building a law-governed state and pluralism of opinions is protected by the law. However there is one No here. You work for a state tele-radio company, I stress, a state one. And this obliges you to do everything for the benefit of our state.

It is important now to preserve peace and accord in society, to consolidate the people around the democratically elected leadership and block attempts by extremists to rock the nation loose and cause conflict and confusion. Some of you (?for some reason) are quite inclined to do so. [Words indistinct] If they loved without joy they will part without sadness, forgive me for (?being rude). We do not intend to convert these people to our faith. They, however, should seek to employ their professional abilities somewhere outside state television and radio. This also is a requirement of journalistic honor and of basic rules of order.

You must agree with me that it is unnatural and wild for individuals to make use of the newspapers of the state they dislike in order to attack its authorities.

I am trying now to have fewer meetings with journalists and react acrimoniously to your attacks. When, however, I see the screen do injustice to me personally... [pauses] The matter, though, is not squaring personal accounts, although it looks like there will have to be some of this. TV and radio is reminiscent of a patient who, while suffering from a grave illness, is showing some of the first signs of recovery but whose recuperation has been unforgiveably long drawn-out.

Resent me or not, I shall say openly that the main reason for your troubles lies in your very home: You have repeatedly failed to establish order there.

When new people took charge of the company, their enthusiasm barely lasted long enough for some restructuring and a reshuffling to take place. Most importantly, what has not happened is that no competent creative force of like-minded people has formed yet who would be able to operate state policy in the area of information with initiative and interest.

This is because TV and the radio have been taken prisoner of war by corporate and individual interests, with this dependence not decreasing. The opposite is true and it has lately in many respects increased. It is also

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my fault. This, indeed, is a presidential structure, as has been said here, and the president should have probably long ago abandoned these ambitions since the young president—and I do not mean his age but the length of time in office—should have none.

Sometimes there is not enough time.There would sometimes be no time. At other times, ambitions would overpower everything. So one ambition was probably superimposed over another. The scythe has hit a stone and this is the result.

In the course of the presidential campaign, some declared the support of Vyacheslav Frantsevich and others took a liking to Paznyak or Shushkevich. An election is called such because, inevitably, there emerges a variety of likes and votes.

Journalists may find that they should not get involved in the game of big politics. Your profession requires an objective (?outlook) and no service pass is worth exchanging for a party card. I would like you as the fourth estate—(?and the power it is indeed)—to be above these political parties, (?influences), movements, passions, and so forth.

Moldova

CE Official: Dniester Dispute 'Domestic Affair'

AU2402194595 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1930 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bucharest INFOTAG, 23/2/1995—"The admission of the Republic of Moldova to the Council of Europe (CE) will signify not only its recognition as a European state, but also support to its democratic reforms," President Snegur said at today's meeting with Miguel Angel Martinez, president of the Bureau of the CE Parliamentary Assembly, who is on an official visit to Chisinau at present.

At the meeting, which was attended also by Parliament Chairman Petru Lucinschi and Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli, the head of state has pointed out that Moldova seeks to bring its legislation in conformity with European norms, and has established a special commission for that purpose.

Reviewing the current situation in Moldova, President Snegur expressed hope that a compromise solution for the Dniester settlement will be found by the end of the year, and all controversies eliminated. With this aim in view, Chisinau has been actively cooperating with the OSCE [Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Permanent Mission to Moldova and with the Russian President's special envoy.

On behalf of the Moldovan leadership, Snegur voiced a request that the Council of Europe renders assistance in the implementation of the Russian 14th Army withdrawal agreement, specifically in what concerns the armaments.

He pointed out that contacts with foreign countries are based on the policy of good neighbourly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation.

Miguel Angel Martinez has stated that Moldova shall become a full-right member of the Council of Europe this coming spring. He said Dniester cannot blackmail the western part of the country, and the dispute with the eastern part cannot be an obstacle in admitting Moldova to the Council of Europe.

In than context, the high guest has emphasized that the Dniester dispute is a purely domestic affair of the Republic of Moldova, exactly like "the Chechen question" is the internal problem of the Russian Federation.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pays Official Visit

Meets OSCE, Russian Officials

LD2402230095 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in English 2200 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] As the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry's press center reported on Friday, 24 February, Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko, who leads a governmental delegation to Moldova, met with OSCE mission head Philip Han and Russian presidential emissary Vladlen Vasyev at the Moldovan Foreign Ministry in Chisinau. Mr. Udovenko also met with officers of Ukrainian ethnic organizations in Moldova and visited the Ukrainian Kotsyubynskyy Lycee in downtown Chisinau and the Ukrainian Embassy there. Concurrently intensive negotiations were reported under way involving the two parties' working groups, headed by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry's special envoy, Andriy Ozadovskyy, in charge of political and humanitarian issues, and First Deputy Minister for Foreign Economic Relations Viktor Hladush, in charge of trade, economics and customs issues. Deputy chairman of the State Committee for Borders was reported to lead the Ukrainian delegation's working group for legal aspects of state border protection.

Inter-Ministerial Accords Signed

AU2502204795 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1911 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau INFOTAG, 24/2/1995—Moldovan and Ukrainian Ministers of Foreign Affairs Mihai Popov and Hennadiy Udovenko signed several inter-ministerial documents here today. In particular, these are the agreement on the joint settlement of activity of diplomatic missions, protocols on cooperation in the field of cooperation and consultations between the two ministries, on the exchange of ratifications, etc.

Senior officials of the two countries' ministries of foreign economic relations signed the inter-governmental agreement on promotion and mutual protection of investments.

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Summing up the results of the Ukrainian minister's two-day official visit to Moldova, both ministers have classified it as "successful," and expressed their satisfaction that they managed to discuss a broad spectrum of problems pertaining to bilateral relations. They expressed confidence that the visit will give a new powerful impulse to cooperation between the two neighboring countries—not only at foreign ministry level, but also at parliament and government level.

View of CIS Shared

LD2402191795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1707 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, Feb 24 (INTERFAX-UKRAINE)—Ukraine and Moldova have similar views on the CIS, foreign ministers of the two countries Hennadiy Udovenko and Mihai Popov said at a joint news conference in Chisinau Friday [24 February].

Udovenko was critical of the CIS efficiency. He said that the CIS agreements do not work.

He explained that Ukraine does not intend to quit the CIS but wants the organization to operate more effectively, objects to its coming a transnational structure and is displeased with the emergence of a large bureaucratic CIS machinery which will eventually work for its own purposes.

Popov said that Moldova places emphasis on economic cooperation within the CIS framework. He added that Chisinau would never sign documents infringing on Moldova's sovereignty.

Ukraine Willing To Mediate in Dniester

LD2402194395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1733 GMT 24 Feb 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, Feb 24 (INTERFAX)—Ukraine will join the talks between Chisinau and Tiraspol, Moldovan Foreign Minister Mikhai Popov told a news conference attended by his Ukrainian counterpart, Hennadiy Udovenko, in Chisinau Friday [24 February].

According to Popov, Ukraine's involvement in Transdniester settlement will not affect the existing settlement mechanism implying mediation by the Russian presidential representative, Vladlen Vasev. "It would be incorrect to believe that the existing mechanism has exhausted itself. Ukraine's involvement is a kind of additional guarantee. This will not distort the created balance of good offices," he remarked.

For his part, Udovenko emphasized that Kiev regarded the Transdniester conflict as Moldova's internal affair. At the same time, he admitted that Kiev was concerned over the proximity of the conflict area to its border. "The Ukrainian leadership is pressured by a number of parliamentary deputies who demand Kiev's more active involvement in the settlement process," he added.

Commenting on his meeting with Transdniester officials, Udovenko pointed to its "well-mannered character." "They turned to us through Chisinau. This is correct and tactful. In this way, we are ready to cooperate with them," he said.

Udovenko noted he had discussed the pull-out of Russia's 14th Army from Moldova through Ukraine. "The issue is complicated by the need to ensure a safe shipment of the cargo," he said.

Udovenko said he was unaware of violations of ethnic Moldovans' rights in Ukraine. About 20,000 children learned in Moldovan schools in Ukraine, he added.

The two ministers supported raising the efficiency of the CIS, notably in the economic sphere. Popov remarked that "Moldova did not take part in the discussion of military and political issues in the CIS. We support a commonwealth which would not infringe upon our interests. Ukraine supports us in this," he emphasized.

'Active' Role Pledged in Dniester

AU2502204995 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1911 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau INFOTAG, 24/2/1995—Hennadiy Udovenko, Ukrainian foreign minister, has stated that Ukraine shall activize its role in the Dniester dispute settlement. At today's press conference in Chisinau he said that the issue was discussed during his official visit to Moldova and the sides reached an agreement on the issue.

"The Ukrainian stance concerning the Dniester problem is definite: this is an internal affair of the Republic of Moldova. The conflict zone borders our national territory, and this is a matter of our anxiety. But, bearing in mind Moldova's territorial integrity, we may only cooperate with Tiraspol through Chisinau. That is exactly why we met with Dniester officials in Chisinau, in the Moldovan Government building, and not in Tiraspol. We believe this to be correct and tactful," Udovenko said.

Answering INFOTAG's question about what will the Ukrainian participation in the Dniester settlement be like, the minister replied that this is yet to be determined through further consultations. "Ukraine's participation will by no means signify that the currently used status drafting mechanism is exhausted. And their joining the process at its final phase shall not be to the detriment of the existing balance of forces, but only as an additional guarantee of security," said Mihai Popov, Moldovan foreign minister.

Ukraine has not been considering opening a consular section in Tiraspol, Udovenko said, and stressed that this question can only be decided upon with an official

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consent of the Republic of Moldova, and if the Ukrainian budget finds money for the purpose, which is not available at present.

The ministers said they also tackled the complicated questions of the Russian 14th Army transit via the Ukrainian territory. Udovenko failed to answer who will undertake the transit expenses.

Meanwhile, 14th Army Commander Aleksandr Lebed stated a few days ago that the transit expenditures will be worth approximately the Ukrainian gas debt to Russia.

"We shall strictly observe the Moldovan-Russian Army Withdrawal Agreement and the appropriate additional protocols. We realize the removal is a fairly costly operation, but Russia has experience in withdrawing its troops from remoter countries. All arising problems shall be solved in the framework of joint consultations," Mihai Popov said.

Moldova and the Ukraine have similar stances in international organizations and mechanisms, the two foreign ministers have confirmed at today's news conference.

During Udovenko's visit to Chisinau the sides have agreed to draw up a schedule of bilateral consultations on the international organizations issues.

The two countries's positions largely coincide also concerning cooperation in the CIS framework. "In the CIS, the member countries have signed about 400 agreements, but most of them do not work. That is why we speak for a higher efficiency of the CIS, particularly in the economic field," Udovenko emphasized.

"In the CIS we take part only in economic issues, and we would like them to be solved more efficiently. We support such a CIS that would promote consolidating our statehood, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. We did not and shall not sign documents that would infringe on our interests," said the Moldovan foreign minister.

Opposition Backs Membership in CE

AU2402195095 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1930 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bucharest INFOTAG, 23/2/1995—The parliamentary opposition backs Moldova's striving for becoming a full-right member of the Council of Europe [CE], but presumes that the republic must observe meticulously all international law norms and human rights, opposition parliamentarians stated at today's meeting of parliamentary factions with Miguel Angel Martinez, president of the Bureau of the CE Parliamentary Assembly.

Mihai Gimpu of the Bloc of Peasants and Intellectuals has stated that "our faction generally supports the new Moldovan Constitution, but we think it has certain drawbacks."

In his opinion, the Constitution presents wrongly the role of the Prosecutor General's Office, and secures no guarantees for the independence of courts. Gimpu pointed out the "non-democratism" of the Land Code which "provides no liberty to a peasant to quit a collective farm with his own plot of land."

Sergiu Mocanu, a representative of the Popular Front in the Moldova's special guest delegation at the CE Parliamentary Assembly, has requested the European forum to assist in registering the Bessarabian Metropoly and in freeing Parliament deputy Ilie Ilascu, who is still in jail in Dniester. The opposition deputies also complained that opposition political forces receive no air time on TV and radio, and thus they have no possibility to make public their point of view on this or that event.

PSDM Leaders View Goals on Eve of Convention

AU2502193895 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1911 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau INFOTAG, 24/2/1995—The Social Democratic Party of Moldova [PSDM] will hold its third congress in Chisinau over February 25 and 26.

The forum is expected to be attended by about 150 delegates from all parts of the republic, who are planning to discuss some 10 issues, the most important ones being the political report on the current situation, the adoption of the party's new program, and the election of a new party chairman.

PSDM Chairman Oazu Nantoi said to INFOTAG that "since the last parliamentary elections, the party has lived a fairly difficult year. I can say that at a certain period the PSDM existed half-legally. This is due to the fact that many of our supporters, including state employees, are afraid to openly declare their sympathy for the PSDM. Such a freedom of expression will only be possible after the entire atmosphere of the political life in Moldova has changed."

Despite the fact that the party has been in the opposition for one year now, it is growing thanks to a sizable inflow of new members, and the party is planning to open more new subdivisions in several areas outside Chisinau.

The draft of the new program is to be presented by Anatol Taranu, head of the drafting commission.

The party's chairman is to be elected on Sunday, 26 February, by secret ballot. This will be an alternative election. The main candidates for that office are Nantoi and Taranu.

On the eve of the congress, the leader of the ruling Agrarian Democratic Party of Moldova [PDAM], Dumitru Motpan, has stated that the ruling party considers that Oazu Nantoi "is a person more democratic, more open, and more close to the PDAM politically." The PSDM's newspaper, RESPUBLIKA, prepared a special issue dedicated to the forthcoming congress, in

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which it has regarded Motpan's statement as an interference into the party's internal affairs and as an attempt to set Nantoi and Taranu at loggerhead.

The draft of the new PSDM program, to be adopted at the third congress this weekend, has been ambitiously named "The Way for Moldova." Its main provisions have been published in the RESPUBLIKA, which has reappeared recently, though in Russian only, after almost a year-long silence.

Anatol Taranu, the head of the program drafting commission, has written that "it is fairly hard to advertise social-democratic ideas in a society which has not yet received its democratic schooling, and in which the socialist idea has been discredited by the practice of communist totalitarianism." Taranu also points out that from the very beginning the PSDM has been established as a "new-wave" organization. It never had representatives of the former communist nomenklatura among its members. That was the party's advantage, and at the same time its weakness, because the PSDM was not very much experienced in organization work.

In the draft program, the Moldovan social-democrats confirm their adherence to the values of the world social-democracy fixed in the Stockholm "Declaration of Principles" of 1889, and in other documents of the Socialist International.

Taranu writes that the PSDM is against shock methods in conducting reforms and in favor of hired employees, and at the same time it is for an economy based on market relations, as the only economy capable to provide means for the social protection of the population.

The PSDM wishes to achieve its goals in close cooperation with the trade unions—in the conditions of political stability in the Moldovan society.

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Kazakhstan

Kazhegeldin Argues Case for Eurasion Union

LD2402172695 Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Feb 95 p 2

[Report by Prime Minister Akhezan Kazhegeldin—"Kazakhstan will not be a dividing shield between West and East, but a bridge"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It has fallen to us, the Kazakhs, to build our sovereign state at a difficult and troubled time.

The process of state building, of course, cannot proceed outside the context of world developments. Today's situation, to our mind, is characterized by the presence of two tendencies—integration and separatism. And they determine the essence and nature of the majority of the conflicts that arise, the degree of internal stability of countries, the success or failure of various negotiations and international initiatives. There is no need to prove that separatism, no matter what slogan it appears under—the realization of the right of a nation to self-determination, protection against discrimination, or the restoration of historical borders—inevitably leads to conflicts, economic destabilization, wars, and numerous victims. Conflicts caused by separatism are latent and practically unsolvable because they do not end with the victory of one of the sides, but let out disease to poison the whole body of the state.

But integration, aimed at overcoming chaos and disunity in achieving accord, relies on economic expediency, compromises, goodwill, and readiness to reject personal ambitions. Integration is a natural part of existence for the overwhelming majority of the population that was united by the psychology of a single state not long ago. Can we, or is it even necessary, to convince people, whose family ties have been disrupted by the new borders and whose incomes have fallen, of the reverse? The events taking place after the disintegration of the USSR in the post-Soviet space demonstrate, as nothing else can, the destructiveness of separatism and the saving possibilities of integration. Unfortunately, they also demonstrate how attractive the ideas of separatism turn out to be for some people, and how difficult it is to achieve unanimity of opinions, never mind of actions.

Nevertheless, the course of world history confirms that there is no other path for mankind except unification. There is one alternative to integration—war by everybody against everybody. We do not have to go far to find examples: Karabakh, the Dniester region, Abkhazia, and Chechnya. These regions have already learned what war, death, and tears are. This is the payment for separatism. But the bitter experience of some people has not taught others anything, it seems. As before, there are many willing to pay in their people's blood for their personal ambitions.

It is difficult to judge whether the disintegration of the USSR is a natural consequence of the break-up of the totalitarian system or whether it could have been avoided. However it was, now the post-Soviet space consists of states that do not want to restore "a great empire." They all share common values proclaiming adherence to the ideals of democracy, peace, and prosperity. The creation of the CIS was the first attempt to oppose the separation that leads to economic and political crisis. The short history of the CIS convincingly demonstrates that this unification, even if it is insufficiently active and more declarative than practical in implementing the integrational processes, could nevertheless, unite nearly all the republics of the former USSR under its banner. Many joint documents have been adopted that testify to the readiness of the independent states for political and economic cooperation in various spheres but, alas, this readiness still remains only on paper as a whole. On the agenda now is how to achieve the restoration of the disrupted economic ties and the creation of effective forms of political cooperation without infringing the national interests of each state of the CIS.

In these conditions Kazakhstan made a decisive step toward creating a new union that we see in its further development as a Eurasian union. A package of documents was prepared and signed that create the legal basis for the strategic partnership of Russia and Kazakhstan embracing all spheres of life: economic, military, trade, and humanitarian. These agreements confirm and strengthen those special relations that have always existed between the two countries. Our economies are mutually tied like Siamese twins and millions of family ties connect the citizens of our states. The agreements signed in Moscow last month practically remove the artificial barriers that existed between our countries. The agreement on a Customs Union, which Belarus has joined as well, is open for other CIS countries. To our mind, this qualitatively new formation must lead to the removal of customs barriers and to the substantial expansion of sales and services for the enterprises of the two countries. Involving the Russian Gazprom [gas industry] in the development of the Karachaganak deposit shows how natural and harmonious the mutual ties and interests of our countries are in this extraordinarily important sphere. Practically this will help cut gas prices and eliminate shortages.

A number of agreements on military cooperation regulate the urgent issues of the use of test grounds and centers and solve the problems of the material and technical provision of our armies. A single defense concept will be developed within the context of the Treaty on Collective Security signed in Tashkent in May 1992, of which six CIS countries are participants.

Without exaggeration, one can say that the agreement on the simplified procedure for taking citizenship and the treaty on the legal status of citizens of Kazakhstan living in Russia and citizens of Russia living in Kazakhstan are

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of special importance. According to the Russian diplomats, an innovatory approach was shown in the work on these important documents that deserves inclusion in textbooks on international law. These agreements create the conditions for choosing citizenship of one or other country for persons living on the territories of our states and remove from the agenda the unacceptable question of introducing dual citizenship.

Citizens of Kazakhstan and Russia arriving in either of the countries for permanent residence will be given citizenship of this country by registration with the interior bodies within three months. When concluding this agreement, we proceeded from the fact that it was necessary to remove the psychological tension of a certain part of the population of our state, and also the anxiety of those who would like to become a citizen of Kazakhstan while permanently living on Russian territory. The treaty on legal status brings legal clarity into the issues of the choice of citizenship. This is a civilized solution of the complex problem of citizenship, for in accordance with the regulations of the OSCE and the Paris Charter for a new Europe, every person has the right to choose his place of residence and citizenship. It is also important that both the interests of the individual and the state were taken into consideration in the documents signed. If, after their signature, some political forces will continue to call for the introduction of dual citizenship or deny the reality of these agreements, it will mean only one thing—they do not understand the real problems of the people who found themselves in a most complicated situation after borders arose between the new states—Kazakhstan and Russia.

Kazakhstan is the common home for all the ethnic groups and nationalities living on its territory. And those unique opportunities that our country received upon obtaining sovereignty must be equally distributed among the citizens of our states. The position of alienation from the state or its interests, as well as any forms of national intolerance, represent a real danger for the internal stability of our republic and therefore, for all its citizens irrespective of their nationality. And this is not the fruit of speculation, but a conclusion supported by the world situation. The existence of many ethnic conflicts allows some analysts to talk about the threat of the outbreak of the third world war. The internal stability in Kazakhstan is highly appreciated in international institutions. The events in Chechnya showed that the war swallows into its bottomless belly all those who fall into its arms without regard for their nationality.

The idea of a closer alliance between Kazakhstan and Russia has certain opponents on both sides. In Russia some are frightened that such an alliance will be a heavy burden on the country's shoulders that will entail additional expenditure on economic assistance to the ally. In Kazakhstan sometimes the anxiety is expressed that such a close relationship will lead to the gradual loss of sovereignty and will transform the republic into a satellite and raw materials appendage for its stronger neighbor. And it cannot be said that these fears are groundless. But the CIS is also unique in that new ideas and criteria of sovereignty are being born. If sovereignty is considered not as self-isolation, like medieval China or post-war Albania, but as an opportunity of harmoniously entering the world community, an opportunity to defend national interests in equal partnership, then it is not so hard to realize that at present there is no reasonable alternative to integration.

It goes without saying that the military alliance, under which foreign armed forces will be placed in the territory of a country, means the renunciation of part of its sovereignty. But it is under such terms that many West European countries are in NATO and the countries of East Europe want to enter. And they are not disturbed that part of their sovereignty is infringed: The advantages obtained from entering such an alliance are considerably greater.

Talking about union with Russia and other CIS countries I should stress that it does not in any case cancel territorial integrity or the inviolability of borders. These principles are the cornerstone of international security and stability, and a necessary condition for the existence of any alliance, including the alliance with Russia. And the separatist statements from some Cossack leaders are harmful not only for the internal stability of our republic, but also for the rapprochement of Kazakhstan and Russia, and therefore, for the vital interests of all the peoples of Russia and Kazakhstan, including the Cossacks themselves.

A close union with Russia does not in any way mean for Kazakhstan the renunciation of independent foreign policy and that it will follow the lead of Moscow. Thanks to President Nursultan Nazarbayev's efforts Kazakhstan has become known to the world as a state, which is making a considerable contribution to global stability. We have own interests in various regions of world, own views of international problems. And our foreign policy is neither Euro-centric or Asia-centric, it is directed at establishing friendly and equal relations with all countries. It has its own priorities, too.

One of the main priorities is the development of relations with the United States of America. Cooperation with the USA is one of the main preconditions for the republic to harmonically enter the world community and strengthen its positions in international political and financial institutions, and also obtain access to the latest technology. The experience of Kazakh-U.S. cooperation in the fields of security, defense conversion, and science and technology can be considered positive. Moreover, we have the right to consider Kazakhstan-U.S. relations an important guarantee of stability during the state construction process. This was confirmed during the recent visit by Foreign Minister Kazymzhomart Tokayev to the United States. However, we believe that economics should play an important role in our relations too. Washington is ready to give effective help to Kazakhstan in stabilizing the economy at the macro level.

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While considering ourselves a Eurasian state, and while at the same time not wishing to be left on the periphery of international relations, Kazakhstan in its foreign policy intends to adhere to a policy of diversification. In Europe, where year by year integration processes are strengthening, the European Union is of particular interest for the future, as in the near future it will speak on behalf of Europe as a whole in relations with the countries of other regions. The agreement on partnership and cooperation with the European Union recently signed by Nazarbayev will promote Kazakhstan's integration into political and economic relationships on a European level. In the field of bilateral relations we will intensify cooperation with Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Austria, and the countries of East Europe.

In Asia, relations with China will remain most important. A visit by First Deputy Prime Minister Nigmatzhan Isingarin to China is now being prepared. And the foreign minister has also been invited to visit that country as well. High-level contacts are on the agenda.

Further development of mutual relations with India and Pakistan, Japan and South Korea, is continuing; energetic actions are being taken for Kazakhstan to penetrate the Asian-Pacific region.

As before, the economic cooperation with Iran and Turkey remains promising. They remain our reliable trade partners and now are becoming particularly attractive to us as territories, which give us the opportunity to gain access to the sea and world transport communications.

We also intend to intensify our contacts with Arab countries, first and foremost with Middle East countries, a region that may become for Kazakhstan a source of investments and effective economic assistance.

Attaching considerable significance to increasing friendly relations with the Central Asian countries, we will further strengthen the economic and political alliance with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Being a consistent supporter of strengthening international security with the assistance of multilateral structures, Kazakhstan is undertaking energetic actions for convening a conference on cooperation and confidence measures in Asia. We view such a conference as a new system of mutual relations between countries of the region, where a mutual collectively based agreement guaranteeing their integrity and security will exist, and close economic cooperation and the universalization of democratic institutions will be stimulated. President Nazarbayev's initiative on this is gaining more and more understanding among Asian countries.

The unique geopolitical position of Kazakhstan lies in the fact that is it situated at the junction of the Christian and Muslim worlds. At the same time, our multi-ethnic state, which is secular, is inherently tolerant in religious matters and has a respectful attitude to the traditional values of both East and West. And we consider this an opportunity, presented to us by fortune, to serve not as a dividing shield between the two worlds, but as a bridge connecting them, a support in reaching compromise, mutual understanding, and accord. And everything must be done so as not to lose this historic chance.

President Favors Price Liberalization, 'Tough' Budget

LD2502151195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1329 GMT 25 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ALMATY, Feb 25 (Interfax)—Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev believes that the republic's major tasks for 1995 are macroeconomic transformations, stabilization of tenge (Kazakh national currency), and suppression of inflation. He also believes that Kazakhstan has no other way out of the crisis.

Nazarbayev declared this at a conference of industrialists and entrepreneurs in Ust-Kamenogorsk on February 24. Nazarbayev called to observe tough economy, to refuse from donations to unprofitable enterprises, and to oppose populist appeals "on pumping economy with empty money."

Nazarbayev stressed the need for further and complete liberalization of prices and foreign trade, lowering monthly inflation to 2-3 percent by mid-1995 (to 40 percent a year) and for speedy privatization.

Nazarbayev describes the 1995 budget as "very tough" and deems it necessary to adopt it. At present Kazakhstan's parliament is considering the budget. According to Nazarbayev, adoption of the budget with a 3.5-percent deficit would help to receive credits from the International Monetary Find, to stabilize the situation in economy, and to create investment climate in the republic.

Nazarbayev declared that currently a government of professionals works in Kazakhstan, he has granted entire freedom of actions to the government to fulfill the anti-crisis program.

Nazarbayev pointed to a stable exchange rate of tenge with respect to dollar over the last months, permanent lowering of inflation, and growth of industrial production by 1-2.5 percent monthly. In Nazarbayev's opinion, this testifies to the fact that Kazakhstan has an inner potential to surmount the crisis. In the evening of February 24 Nazarbayev returned to Almaty.

Oil Transport Issue Causes 'Significant' Losses

LD2602143495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1330 GMT 26 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ALMATY, Feb 26 (Interfax)—Kazakhstan has to suffer "significant losses" in hard currency because of the unresolved issue of transporting oil for export, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev

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told the meeting of producers and businessmen in Ust-Kamenogorsk (the East Kazakhstan).

Nazarbayev said the situation could deteriorate as a result of the amount of oil extraction possibly rising in the republic. He said that, in particular, the Tengizchevroil joint venture with the U.S. Chevron company was expected to extract up to 40-50 million tonnes of oil a year only on the Tengiz oil field. He said Kazakhstan was totally extracting about 25 million tonnes of oil a year.

Nazarbayev said the issue of oil export could be resolved by building the Caspian Sea Region-Novorossisk pipeline with participation of Russia and Oman. He said the first stage of implementing the project would be worth about $700 million. He said Kazakhstan should "also look for alternative solutions." Nazarbayev also mentioned his talks with the Turkish government on constructing a pipeline to the Mediterranean Sea via Turkey and Iran.

Citizenship Agreement Not Yet Ratified

954F1506A Almaty KARAVAN in Russian No 9, 22 Feb 95 p 3

[Interview with Viktor Mikhaylov, deputy chairman of the Committee for International and Interparliamentary Relations of the Supreme Council, by Yelena Poluyanova; place and date not given: "....But Being a Citizen Is Obligatory"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Kazakhstanis who have not prior to 1 March presented a statement in writing on their rejection of citizenship automatically become citizens of the republic.**

As Nikolay Belorukov, head of the Department of Legality, Law and Order, and Judicial Reform under the president, told our correspondent, approximately 70,000 statements in writing on a rejection of citizenship of Kazakhstan had been registered as of the start of the present year. In his opinion, the Agreement on the Simplified Adoption of Citizenship Between Kazakhstan and Russia, signed at the summit, has resolved the problem of dual citizenship, in the main. The government makes no secret of the fact that the agreement was prepared to lessen the tension on this issue and, consequently, to halt the flow of departing Russian-speakers. But this agreement has yet to be ratified at this time by either the Kazakhstan parliament or the Russian Duma.

We asked Viktor Mikhaylov, deputy chairman of the Committee for International and Interparliamentary Relations of the Supreme Council, to comment on the situation.

[Poluyanova] Viktor Petrovich, why is the ratification process being dragged out? Is there something in the agreement that the members of parliament dislike?

[Mikhaylov] Parliament does not at this time (the interview was conducted on Monday—Ed.) have the text of the agreement. We cannot, you will agree, ratify what we do not have....

This is not an isolated instance. Kazakhstan is a young state, and for this reason very many agreements are being signed. Registration and control have not been instituted in the government in the best fashion, evidently. It is far from always that documents reach the Supreme Council on time. They sometimes arrive, incidentally, with variant readings in the Kazakh and Russian texts, for example, or without a Kazakh version altogether. Nor does this, you know, speed up the ratification process. But the Kazakhstan-Russian Agreement on the Simplified Adoption of Citizenship has not yet, I repeat, reached us.

[Poluyanova] What length of time will parliament require for ratification?

[Mikhaylov] Considering all the technical procedures, from 10 days to a month.

[Poluyanova] So even if the documents arrive tomorrow, say, the agreement will not have been ratified by 1 March, in any case?

[Mikhaylov] Apparently not.

[Poluyanova] You are familiar with its wording, of course, to what extent, from your viewpoint, does it mitigate the seriousness of the question of the adoption of citizenship?

[Mikhaylov] The agreement far from resolves all problems. It is for those who are intending to leave.

[Poluyanova] There is another viewpoint also....

[Mikhaylov] Quite right. It was expressed, for example, by the prime minister in the Supreme Council Coordinating Council on Friday. He said that U.S. congressmen had given the agreement very high marks, calling it a contribution to the development of international law. But I believe that it was prepared, for all that, for the peoples of Russia and Kazakhstan, not for the U.S. Congress.

Our governments pursued their own goals: the Russian Government, to ease the headache over compatriots abroad, the Kazakhstan Government, having accepted the treaty on the status of citizens of Russia living in Kazakhstan, to realize the "golden dream" of Kazakh nationalists. The citizen of Russia, while physically present in Kazakhstan, working, and, consequently, developing the local economy, will be without rights politically. As distinct from the Kuwaiti version, what is more, he does not even need to be provided with housing and a social infrastructure. He has already built and created everything himself.

[Poluyanova] What do you propose?

[Mikhaylov] The Eurasia group of deputies has prepared a proposal for the time frame of the adoption of citizenship to be extended to the year 2000, as Russia has done.

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From the editors: According to specialists' forecasts, the process of ratification of the agreement will be difficult in the Russian Duma also. The possibility that there will on the threshold of elections be those who wish to enhance their popularity by demonstrating increased concern for compatriots abroad cannot be ruled out. As a result... ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan could be left without even the few rights accorded them by the agreement.

Verk Reports New Scandal in Parliament

954F1504A Almaty KARAVAN in Russian No 9, 22 Feb 95 p 1, 3

[Article by Viktor Verk under the rubric "New Scandal in Parliament": "A Shadow Is Cast on the 'Shadow Government'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first sparks of a new scandal ignited in parliament a few days ago. Knowledgeable individuals believe this may lead to serious consequences.

Deputies Aleksandr Peregrin and Vitaliy Roze have "crossed swords" with Salyk Zimanov, former chairman of the parliamentary Committee for Constitutional Legislation and Human Rights. Briefly, the essence of the conflict is as follows. On 21 January, S. Zimanov published an article in KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA quite eloquently entitled "No Need To Undermine State Foundations," in which the following paragraph appeared: **"...On 17 August of last year, the 'Novosti' program, broadcast from Moscow, showed a group of deputies of the Kazakhstan Supreme Council (A.G. Peregrin, V.Ye. Roze, and others), and reported that they had formed a 'shadow government' and were promoting a plan to form a separate autonomy in the northern region of the republic, with subsequent annexation to Russia."**

The "shadow" prime minister and one of the key members of his cabinet, accused in essence of anticonstitutional activity, sent a declaration to Republic of Kazakhstan Procurator General Zharmakhan Tuyakbayev assessing the assertions of their colleague as slanderous and demanding that the procuracy **"resolve the matter of filing criminal charges in accordance with criminal-procedural legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan... on the basis of a crime envisaged by Part 2 of Article 170-4 of the Kazakh SSR Criminal Code, imposing punishment for the propagation of slanderous information through the mass media."**

At the same time, a suit similar in content was filed in the Frunzenskiy Rayon Court of the capital.

In addition, A. Peregrin and V. Roze intend to exact 100,000 tenge from the respected academician as compensation for moral damage inflicted. This incident threatens to split the Supreme Council. The fact of the matter is that S. Zimanov has recently begun, and not without success, to establish for himself the reputation of a "hawk" of national-patriotic orientation—both through statements expressed in the hall and in published press materials.

In so doing, he has acquired both devoted comrades-in-arms and irreconcilable enemies from among his colleagues. Following the voting determining standings and the well-known appeal of 150 businessmen, constant duels of words between the "patriarch of Kazakh parliamentarianism" and "intransigent" market-democrats have ever more frequently come to resemble a principled confrontation between the two camps.

Workshop Examines First Free Elections

954F1464A Almaty PANORAMA in Russian No 7, 18 Feb 95 p 2

[A.G. report: "In the Opinion of the Chairman of the Central Election Commission, It Is Simply Sinful To Doubt the Democratic Character of the Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The international workshop "First Free Elections in Kazakhstan: Experience and Problems of the Establishment of Democracy," which was organized by the Central Election Commission and the Kazakhstan Strategic Studies Institute under the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan, was held on 13 February. Not all the participants represented on the list were able to present reports, in which connection the workshop lasted one day instead of the two that had been planned.

In a lengthy report Karatay Turysov, chairman of the Central Election Commission, collated and amplified the preceding conclusions and evaluations which had been heard from him at briefings and which had been stated in periodical publications. Having equated the elections to parliament and the local organs of legislative power held last March with Kazakhstan's acquisition of sovereignty and the adoption of the new constitution, the chairman of the Central Election Commission declared that the figure of 73.84 percent (the indicator of the political activeness of the citizens that took part in the ballot) is in itself convincing proof that the population of the republic "unreservedly supports the policy of democratic transformations." At the same time, Mr. Turysov believes, "there are still people both in our country and outside who are dubious as regards the democratic character of the elections held in Kazakhstan. You can delude one or two people, but you simply have to be an adventurer to fool 17 million."

There followed a comprehensive investigation of the "March miracle of democracy" on the American scale, which, as we know, includes four criteria of election validity. Judging by the words of Karatay Turysov, it is simply sinful to wonder whether these criteria were ignored. The chairman of the Central Election Commission is personally in no doubt about the fact that the March elections were valid:

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competitive—910 candidates were on the ballot in 135 head-to-head districts, and 692 candidates were registered. Of these, 64 persons fought on the government slate for 42 deputy's mandates. The following parties and movements gave an account of themselves at the elections: the People's Congress of Kazakhstan, the SNEK [Union of People's Unity of Kazakhstan], the Republican and Socialist parties, the Lad Slavic Society, independent unions, and the Union of Youth of Kazakhstan. Aside from the fact that the republic lacked a precise division of the electorate by party affiliation, no party set as its precise goal the accession to power. "There was frequently not a struggle of party platforms and programs but of individual personalities, personally ambitious at times. Lacking experience of political struggle, they endeavored to win the votes of the electorate and to enter parliament on a crest of populism and demagogic criticism of the socioeconomic and political course of the executive and other branches of power." The chairman of the Central Election Commission explains these individual pathological manifestations, for that matter, exclusively by psychological factors, saying that the ineradicable Soviet mentality ("we are a people of extremes") is to blame for everything;

periodic—international standards are observed here also inasmuch as no democratic country elects a parliament for life. The situation is similar as regards the presidency also;

representative—justifying this proposition, Karatay Turysov recalled that Kazakhstani election law makes no provision for property qualifications or limitations on grounds of sex;

conclusive.

Mr. Turysov noted certain positive innovations present in the election campaign: the establishment of a relative-majority system, the transformation of the local representative authorities, the nomination of candidates from parties, the government slate, public supervision, government funding of electioneering, an election deposit for the candidates.

Yet the chairman of the Central Election Commission acknowledged that the Election Code, which was adopted in haste, immediately after the former Supreme Council had dissolved itself, suffers from certain shortcomings. Mr. Turysov pointed to the discrepancy between individual articles and provisions and other laws, specifically: On the Unions, On Public Associations, On Citizenship, and so forth. In his opinion, it is essential also to expand the functions of the "nucleus of the election system—the Central Election Commission—on the basis of a cardinal development of its powers as supreme authority" (it is not entirely clear for what kind of expansion of powers Chairman Turysov is pleading. As practice shows, the Central Election Commission has opportunities to neutralize candidates to whom it objects).

As an example of his own miscalculations and mistakes the chairman of the Central Election Commission affirmed the insufficient work with the electorate: "We cannot just remember it on the eve of elections, it should be aware of our concern always" (again it is unclear as to the kind of specific expression in which this concern could be manifested).

Karatay Turysov called the conferees' attention to the fact that the campaign of 1994 was accommodated in a record time of only 90 days. He rejected the version of certain observers to the effect that the election campaign had been orchestrated by the executive: "It could not take part in the elections since, after the soviets of all levels had dissolved themselves, it simply could not keep pace with events." Although at a previous news conference Mr. Turysov made it clearly understood that "unless the administration intervenes, nothing is to be expected here."

Developing the thought of the previous speaker, Sergey Tikhonov, first deputy minister of justice, termed the provisions of the Election Code "constitutional, on the whole." Mr. Tikhonov expressed bewilderment at the constant hints at the illegitimacy of the government slate. According to clause 17 of Article 78 of the constitution, the president shall exercise other powers, not defined by the constitution, in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan. This is why Article 30 of the Election Code accorded the head of state the right to nominate candidates for his own list. At the same time, on the other hand, the speaker shared his doubts concerning the legitimacy of individual provisions of the Code—on the establishment of the election deposit and the introduction of the compulsory collection of 3,000 signatures in support of a candidate for deputy.

Leyla Zhanuzakova, representative of the Institute of State and Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan National Academy of Sciences, observed that various qualification requirements are employed in the election law of many countries. The Soviet election law doctrine unequivocally castigated this practice, but, in the opinion of Miss Zhanuzakova, it contains a grain of common sense. Thus Article 114 of the constitution establishes an age qualification and a residence qualification for a presidential candidate. Why should enhanced demands—a deputy necessarily having higher education, for example—not be made of professional members of parliament also? In addition, in the speaker's opinion, residence qualifications for members of parliament could in time be introduced also inasmuch as they are not simply professional lawmakers but also representatives of the interests of the electorate.

The speech of Rustem Sartayev, head of a department of the Supreme Council's Information and Analysis Center, was interesting. He made it the purpose of his investigation to ascertain how efficiently political parties had made use of the opportunity to make themselves and their programs known. According to the results of the

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analysis, he concludes that party leaders and activists were elected to parliament not as representatives of the parties but as politicians defending their own moral and practical precepts.

Three days before the March elections the Analysis Center conducted a poll of 439 respondents. Only 13 percent of townspeople were familiar with the election programs. The question of political affections in society remains open also. Only the SNEK and the Communist Party have acquired a stable electorate. On the basis of a typological portrait of the supporters of these parties we may summarize as follows: The SNEK candidates enjoyed the greatest support among enterprise managers (57.1 percent). The age qualification of the supporters of people's unity fluctuates within the 25-29 range.

Mr. Sartayev affirmed that the election results make it possible to produce a forecast concerning party building in Kazakhstan. The inadequate canvassing and the absence of striking new political figures contributed to the growth of the citizens' political passiveness. "Under the conditions of political apathy the power party wins, as a rule." Mr. Sartayev cited as a reason for the weakness of the political parties the lack of development of links with society. The parties' programs are largely of a slogan nature, and ideology clearly prevails over pragmatism. In the analyst's opinion, the present economic system is fertile soil for the accession to power of the communists.

Rustem Sartayev believes that the coming presidential elections could exert an appreciable influence on the shaping of a multiparty system in the republic. Three new political parties—the People's Cooperative, the Revival of Kazakhstan, and the Democratic Order parties—have been formed in recent months. The People's Congress of Kazakhstan Party, which has announced its "constructive opposition" to the president and the present policy, has become more assertive. The fledgling stratum of entrepreneurs is making its presence felt increasingly loudly. The speaker classes among the main shortcomings of the businessmen's movement the negative image that is being shaped in the eyes of the bulk of the population.

Gven Hofman, regional manager of the International Foundation for Election Systems (MFIS) in Central Asia, presented the recommendations of the MFIS. He declared that a government slate is inappropriate in a democratic system and should be abolished. It is essential also at a coming session to raise the question of so-called "family voting," which entails a violation of the "one man, one vote" principle. The attempts of the local authorities to undertake monitoring on election day should not be supported: An inordinate number of representatives of the administration evokes a sense of fear in the electorate.

Party of National Unity Created

LD2602093395 Almaty Kazakhstan Television Network in Russian 1500 GMT 25 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today [25 February] the third extraordinary congress of the Union of National Unity of Kazakhstan, which was created two years ago, was held.

The aim of the forum is to reform this public political movement into a party. For, according to current legislation, only a party can implement its political goals on a legal basis.

A letter of greetings to the delegates from Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev was read out at the congress. Kuanish Sultanov, the chairman of the political council of the union made a political report. He announced the creation of the Party of National Unity of Kazakhstan [Partiya Narodnogo Yedinstva Kazakhstana], which will take part in building the sovereign state and the implementation of the social economic reforms.

The congress adopted the party's regulations and program and elected its political bureau and its chairman. Sultanov was elected chairman.

Workers Movement Spokesmen on Organization

954F1485A Almaty SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA in Russian 17 Feb 95 p 3

[Interview with Madel Ismailov and Yuriy Vinkov, cochairmen of the Workers Movement Council Executive Committee, by SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA correspondent Vadim Makhin; place and date not given; under the rubric "Presenting a Public Association": "There Are No Troublemakers Among Our Ranks, Say Workers Movement Leaders"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The Workers Movement [RDK] appeared in the republic's political orbit more than a year ago, but only recently passed the registration exam in the Ministry of Justice. Why? What were the reasons for the refusal to register the rules? And did it necessitate principal changes in them?**

With this question, our correspondent began the conversation with Madel Ismailov and Yuriy Vinkov, cochairmen of the Workers Movement council's executive committee.

[Ismailov] The reasons for the Ministry of Justice's refusal were not of a principal nature and were related to our internal affairs. The Supreme Court, to which we sent our protest, upheld only one of the 11 objections, regarding the terms of powers and competence of the movement's cochairmen.

[Vinkov] I want to add that serious corrections are needed to the law on public associations. We need a

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more democratic document. In many countries registration of parties and movements is done for record-keeping purposes only. Here, however, under the guise of registration, attempts are made to permit or ban their activities.

[Makhin] Many different associations and movements are being started in the republic. As a rule, though, their entire efforts get spent in all sorts of statements and appeals, criticism of parliament or the government. Looking at yourself with self-criticism, does the same lot await you?

[Vinkov] Why call it a lot? To have the opportunity to say what you think and to be heard is not bad. This is the most important attribute of democracy. We do indeed get hundreds of letters and communications from workers and labor collectives, statements and resolutions of meetings and rallies from all over Kazakhstan. Of course, we refer them to organs of authority, including the highest ones. But they persistently refuse to hear the opinion of workers about what is going on and pretend that the working class does not exist at all.

As to the mass media, most of them (we do not have our own newspaper) either ignore our activities or present them in a distorted, truncated, often cartoonish, form.

[Ismailov] Much will depend in this respect on our competency and persistence. Our work will be difficult, especially considering that we are constantly being pressured by the state apparat. This probably is what makes us different from other public organizations.

We do not limit our activities to writing appeals and criticizing the way things are. We recently held an Almaty city conference, and elected a strike committee. We made a decision to form a workers' militia at enterprises.

[Makhin] Does that not put you in conflict with the law, which does not permit the formation of unauthorized militarized formations?

[Ismailov] But workers' militias are not militarized formations. Their task is to maintain order at enterprises during strikes, and to maintain it together with the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] during rallies, processions, and demonstrations.

[Makhin] Do you believe that the main method of influencing the authorities are strikes and rallies? As practical experience has shown lately, neither produces any effect.

[Ismailov] Strikes and rallies are civilized means of workers' struggle for their rights. So far they have not produced the desired results, in my opinion, for two reasons. The first is poor organization of the workers, the fragmented nature of their actions, and professional egotism. The second is the contemptuous attitude of the powers that be to the needs of the people. Which means that in order to be successful, workers must be more active, bold, and better organized. We have to finally get rid of the slave psychology.

[Vinkov] Rallies fulfill other important functions as well. They are a form of glasnost, a school for awakening civic activism in the people, a means of bringing people together. At every rally our movement gains new members. A rally also is a means of lessening psychological tensions, keeping people's optimistic attitude, overcoming the sense of hopelessness. Finally, at rallies we replenish our treasury through voluntary donations from citizens.

[Makhin] What constructive proposals are outlined in the movement's program?

[Vinkov] For some reason, all journalists ask us this question. And frequently behind it is a reproach: If you have nothing to offer, you should not criticize.

[Makhin] No reproach in this case.

[Vinkov] This is just as aside. Actually, we do have something to offer. We do not accept statements aimed at people of the Lenya Golubkov type, of the kind: "There is no alternative to the market!" There is always an alternative to everything. The statesmen at the helm of reforms, however, do not accept our proposals.

[Ismailov] During the period critical for the state you cannot let economy run by itself hoping that the market will put everything in its place. Organs of authority should first of all take care of the needs of the majority of the population, those ordinary people who feed and clothe us and provide us with housing and heat, light and gas.

Do not deceive us with the specter of a "bright future"—give an honest man the opportunity to have a decent life now. We have everything needed for this. And people's lives should not be small change in realizing whoever's "great" ideas and designs, a step to the well-being of a separate group of select individuals who "know how to live."

[Makhin] Do you support the idea of republic President N. Nazarbayev regarding the Eurasian Union?

[Vinkov] The Workers Movement supported and will support any practical steps aimed at increased integration of CIS countries. This requires, however, not merely intentions but practical actions. We propose to officially recognize as the main priority of Kazakhstan's foreign policy the restoration of all-Union statehood on a new, voluntary basis.

[Ismailov] I support the idea of the Eurasian Union and believe that right now we should utilize more fully and effectively the opportunities built into the Commonwealth of Independent States. In what oblasts of the republic does the movement have the most solid social base? In North Kazakhstan, East Kazakhstan, and West Kazakhstan Oblasts. The proportion of workers among

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the population there is high and their actions there are much more active than, for instance, in Almaty. Although overall in an organizational sense we have not yet achieved great heights.

[Vinkov] The movement's social base is not limited to workers. We see it as a movement of social justice that expresses the interests of all working people, and took upon ourselves the responsibility to state it, without claiming any special privileged position of the working class in society. At the same time, we emphasize that workers objectively are the group most consistently and directly interested in the development of production, in creating the material base, without which it is impossible to bring up science and culture and raise the standard of living of the working intelligentsia that has been brought to an extreme degree of impoverishment.

[Makhin] Is it necessary to develop the Workers Movement at a time when trade unions and parties of a similar direction are functioning in the republic?

[Vinkov] A considerable number of our compatriots have a certain mistrust of parties, politicians, and politics in general. That is why one of the Workers Movement's tasks is to awaken the civic conscience, politicize the population, and involve workers in the struggle for their rights. Our movement does not impose strict obligations on its members—each participates to the extent of his abilities.

Traditionally we see parties of three types—communist, socialist, and social-democratic—as our social base. Members of these Kazakhstan parties are extensively represented in the Workers Movement, although most RDK members are not affiliated with any party.

As to relations with trade unions, we all feel we are members of one trade union movement of Kazakhstan, and we fight for the unity of trade unions, against the attempts to split it.

[Ismailov] We have established good contacts with the Democratic Committee for Human Rights, with which we have conducted a number of joint protest actions. We constantly feel the support of other sociopolitical organizations and movements as well, and of national and cultural centers.

[Makhin] Many population strata are concerned that social, political, or interethnic stability in the republic may be threatened. Will the Workers Movement not become a "disrupter" of this stability? Will it not alienate its supporters?

[Ismailov] Concern for civil peace was in fact one of the reasons for the emergence of our movement. We believe that the only road to civic accord is to stop the all-out robbing of the population. With all its tremendous difficulties, this is the most civilized road, in our opinion, for the development of both society and the state. We cannot remain silent when crimes are committed. And the term "troublemakers" cannot be applied to us in any sense. We are for giving every person the opportunity to work honestly and receive fair pay for his labor.

[Vinkov] The RDK Council is currently working on the draft Social Accord Treaty, and we attach exceptionally great significance to it. We believe that social accord is not universal harmony and the absence of conflict in society—it is a struggle between different trends that should not lead to the destruction of the state, its economy, or the social and spiritual sphere. The treaty should not conceal and smooth over the conflicts that exist in society—it should facilitate their resolution.

[Makhin] What are the movement's immediate plans?

[Ismailov] We need to strengthen ourselves organizationally. We plan to hold a meeting of Almaty labor collectives' representatives, at which we will discuss the socioeconomic situation of workers both in the city and in the republic. We will participate in the all-Kazakhstan congress of public organizations and parties, which is being convened at the initiative of the Democratic Committee for Human Rights. And most importantly—conduct constant painstaking work among people.

[Vinkov] We are now working out the tactics of our actions in connection with the upcoming elections in the republic. We are increasingly confident that in a bloc with other public associations, and drawing on the common sense of citizens, we will be able to remove some most odious pro-market dogmatics from power and bring to it the people capable of turning the reform toward the people. We also intend to participate more actively than before in the report-and-election campaign in trade unions, using it to strengthen ourselves organizationally and for raising trade unions' activism in the struggle for workers' rights.

30,000 Miners 'Sentenced' to Unemployment

954F1507A Almaty EKSPRESS-K in Russian 23 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Stanislav Pesnev: "The Good Recommendations of the IMF and the Sensitive Government of Kazakhstan 'Have Sentenced' 30,000 Miners to Unemployment"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The council of directors of the Karagandaugol association recently grudgingly adopted a resolution on conversion of the coal basin to independence starting 1 March of this year.**

In short, the production association, with its 50-year history, later a concern, a state holding company, and whatever else it was called, will no longer exist. Every coal mining enterprise is becoming a separate economic component, developing a charter, opening a current account, and independently seeking work with customers. That is the way the very difficult lawsuit of the

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miners with the government was resolved, and, it is said, the only way out of the impasse facing the industry has been found.

Various opinions concerning this problem have been expressed in EKSPRESS-K. The trade unions, of course, immediately saw a threat and reacted sharply, but who is listening to them? There is 100 percent confidence in Karaganda that some of the enterprises will immediately fail. This most of all concerns mines and open pits that mine energy-producing high-ash coal. Even the names of the first candidates are known—those that are condemned—but they will not be named for the time being. It is possible that those that are being buried will on the contrary survive. It can be said with confidence that mine suppliers of coking coal that goes to the Karaganda metallurgical combine and for export, and other more or less stable enterprises, will hold on. A gloomy fate awaits the social sphere surrounding the mines: service organizations, cultural centers, and kindergartens.

In general, the issue, as they say, is ambiguous. This was talked about in an interview with V. Chayka, chief of the branch for economic analysis, conversion to joint-stock holding, and privatization, by an EKSPRESS-K correspondent.

"The Kuzbass and Rostov, where coal enterprises were also converted to independent units, went through this stage at one time. Within two years all the mines without subsidies went bankrupt. During the first strikes in Karaganda in 1989 the question of independence was also raised for the first time, but as time went on it was realized just what it is. In an industrial system like coal mining, it is easier to survive and resolve problems in a centralized way. But what awaits everybody? First, wild unemployment and closed mines. But what is to be done when there is such indifference on the part of the government?"

The general director of the Karagandaugol association is preparing an order that will probably sound like the command of a captain to abandon a ship that is sinking. Is it possible that the best minds of the country have not found a worthier fate for 30,000 miners who are facing unemployment? And what is more, this data of the employment administration is preliminary and minimal.

In this connection, the most observant specialists note the regularity that accompanies the economic upheavals in the former USSR. The good councils of the IMF that envisioned a sharp reduction in the mining of coal, the closing of unprofitable mines, and the discharge of workers were issued in Russia and in Ukraine, but over there they had the strength to refuse. There is a conviction these days in Karaganda that the councils of the good uncles are nothing other than a lever with the aid of which foreign competitors guarantee a sales market for themselves at our expense. After all, the miners of America and Australia have similar problems, there is also a glut there, and it is necessary to sell coal. So, let them work it out among themselves.

Every country should have its own experience and vision of prospects. The current proposal of the miners does not restrict itself to questions concerning subsidies. Kindergartens, housing, and houses of culture can be sold at auctions and in commercial competitions, and the resources gained can be directed at the resolution of production problems. The catch is that money from "wild" privatization (this process is not called anything else here) will in the best case end up in the state budget, which is more like a black hole.

Kyrgyzstan

Pakistani Minister Invites Akayev to ECO Summit

LD2502100895 Bishkek VECHERNIY BISHKEK in Russian 23 Feb 95 p1

[Unattributed report: "We're Invited—It Would Be a Sin To Refuse"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 22 February President Askar Akayev received Makhdum Shahabuddin, Pakistani minister of state for finance.

The special envoy of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto gave Akayev an invitation to take part in the meeting of the heads of state members of the Economic Cooperation Organization [ECO].

Work in the ECO, which unites 10 Asian states, may bring the republic great dividends, analysts believe. Intensive work is under way on preparations for the summit, scheduled to take place in Islamabad on 13-15 March. Among the documents to be considered are agreements on trade, transport, and energy.

Bishkek Wants To Join CIS Customs Union

LD2402173995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1434 GMT 24 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Mainayev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bishkek February 24 TASS—Kyrgyzstan wants to join the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, ITAR-TASS was informed today by officials of the press service of the Kyrgyz president. A package of documents is in the making to remove all the customs barriers between the republic and those three members of the union.

More than sixty per cent of all the Kyrgyz enterprises had worked for the defence of the former USSR. They employed almost 90 per cent of the country's skilled workers. More than eighty per cent of all the commodities needed by Kyrgyzstan had to be brought from other parts of the USSR.

The rupturing of economic relations affected the Kyrgyz economy most negatively. The customs barriers made its market unprofitable for many CIS enterprises.

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Local experts believe that the country's accession to the Customs Union will have a positive effect on the Kyrgyz economy.

No Party Wins Overall Majority in New Parliament

LD2402195595 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Kyrgyz 1200 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Not one of the 12 political parties that took part in the elections to the Supreme Council can form a majority in parliament. According to the Central Election Commission, out of the eight parties just 13 representatives won mandates as deputies. The Ata Meken, ErK [Erkin Kyrgyzstan], the Social Democratic Party, and the Communists won two seats in parliament. The Party of People's Unity also won two seats and the Agrarian Party won one.

A total of 82 deputies have been elected as of today. This makes up 70 percent of the complete numbers of the future Supreme Council.

Tajikistan

Preliminary Results of Parliament Elections Announced

LD2702071195 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0648 GMT 27 Feb 95

[By TIA correspondent Khovar Negmat Ochilov for TASS]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dushanbe, 27 Feb (TASS)—Today the Central Electoral Commission of Tajikistan for elections and the holding of referendums has reported the preliminary results of the parliamentary elections to the local assemblies that were held on 26 February. This important political action in all the regions of the country has taken place successfully: 85 percent of the electorate took part in the voting. This is the first time that elections have been held on a multiparty basis. The National Assembly will consist of 181 deputies, which is considerably fewer than in the republic's former Supreme Soviet. Approximately thirty observers from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, India, the United States, and other countries monitored the elections.

'Democratic Nature' of Campaign Noted

LD2502095295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0928 GMT 25 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dushanbe February 25 TASS—Parliamentary and local elections will be held in Tajikistan on Sunday [26 February].

Interviewed by ITAR-TASS, chairman of the Central Elections Commission Kholmurod Sharipov stressed that the preparations for voting "had proceeded in free democratic conditions and for the first time on a multiparty basis". He said that "rumours about alleged violations were being spread by definite political groups pursuing personal ambitions and selfish purposes, groups eager to destablise the socio-political situation in the country and to discredit the political reforms implemented by the government of Tajikistan".

Sharipov said that the democratic nature of the election campaign was evidenced by the fact that 354 candidates, representing all the social segments of the population, had joined the race for 181 parliament seats. One-third of the candidates were nominated by political parties registered at the Tajik Justice Ministry, and more than one-third—by work collectives.

Touching on the opposition's declared boycott of the upcoming parliamentary elections, the chairman of the Central Elections Commission said that their statement was dictated by the personal ambitions of the party's leaders, who do not wield today any substantial influence in the republic.

Opposition Views Election

LD2602102995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1021 GMT 26 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Kuzmin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tehran February 26 TASS—The Tajik opposition views the current parliamentary elections as unlawful and is not taking part in them, Akbar Turadjonzoda, deputy leader of the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan, told the Tehran-based newspaper IRAN NEWS in an interview published on Sunday [26 February].

The Dushanbe regime hopes to legitimatise itself by holding undemocratic and falsified elections, in which 30 per cent of voters who reside abroad are unable to participate, Turadjonzoda said.

In the opinion of Turadjonzoda, national reconciliation in the country is impossible without the formation of a transitional government consisting of impartial persons and the disarmament of the feuding sides.

Successful Elections Reported

LD2602141695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1400 GMT 26 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridnyova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dushanbe February 26 TASS—The preliminary results of Tajikistan's parliamentary elections on Sunday [26 February] testify to a high degree of civic activity of Tajik voters, Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission Kholmurod Sharipov said.

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Sharipov told ITAR-TASS that 1,850,000 voters, or 70 per cent of the electorate, had cast their ballots by 16:00 local time. The heaviest turnout was in the Leninabad, Khoatlon and Gorno-Badakhshan regions and some of the Pamir mountainous districts. In the Tajik capital Dushanbe, 45 per cent of voters had come to the polling stations by 16:00.

Sharipov stressed that all forecasts that the elections would fail had proven wrong. Despite the social, economic and political hardships, the majority of the population had made their choice, he said.

Meeting journalists after having cast his ballot, Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov said "I believe that the people of my country will make the right choice and elect worthy representatives. The parliamentary elections are an important stage of constitutional reforms aimed at building a law-governed and democratic secular state in the country."

The president described as "untenable and erroneous" the assertions by the opposition and some radical news media about the ostensibly undemocratic nature of the elections which would allegedly lead to still greater confrontation and unrest and destabilise the socio-political situation in Tajikistan.

It is for the first time in the republic's history, Rakhmanov said, that multi-party parliamentary elections are being held on a multi-alternative basis, with 181 seats in the national parliament being contested by 354 candidates.

Rakhmanov admitted that "there were possibly individual infractions during the election campaign." But Tajikistan has only begun to build a democratic rule-of-law state, he added.

Preliminary results will be announced on Monday or Tuesday.

The elections are being monitored by 27 observers from the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, including foreign diplomats and members of international missions accredited in Dushanbe.

Rebel Radio Complains of Russian Radio Interference

LD2402201595 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan in Tajik 0640 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At 0446 Dushanbe time on the morning of 23 February, when the program of "Feyz-i Sahar" ["Grace of Dawn"] was being broadcast on Voice of Free Tajikistan, and when Tajik children were reciting prayers, the equipment of the Russian service began to function. Some people were using the same frequency to communicate in Russian and they asked questions about the program. One of them said [word indistinct] about Red Army Day. But the second one cleverly explained that no, those are children reciting.

We have recorded all these conversations with special equipment. We are, of course, glad that in the middle of the night, when most people are having sweet dreams, Russians on the Tajik border listen to our programs. Yet by using this frequency at a time when our program is on the air, their conversation falls outside the boundaries of professional decorum.

In any case, they should pay attention to our programs. In the near future we will broadcast a program in Russian for them at the same time.

Opposition Says Russian Soldiers Selling Arms

LD2402171195 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan in Tajik 0640 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Supreme Court of Tajikistan has examined criminal cases involving three soldiers of the Russian 201st Division and sentenced them to various terms of imprisonment. This group, led by one Shamil Elyautdinov, were found guilty of buying and selling weapons and ammunition.

According to Baysuddin Hukmiddinov, the military prosecutor of Dushanbe garrison, at present most criminals buy their weapons from Russian servicemen. Hukmiddinov added that the heads of the Russian 201st Division are unable to prevent their soldiers selling weapons.

Our experts are of the opinion that the Russians themselves stand to gain from unrest in Tajikistan and the greater need for them to be there.

Turkmenistan

President Receives Argentinian Businessman

LD2502134095 Ashgabat TURKMEN PRESS in Russian 1420 GMT 25 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Ashgabat, 24 Feb (TURKMEN PRESS)—Turkmenistan's President Saparmurad [Niyazov] Turkmenbashy received Carlos Bulgeroni, head of the Argentinian company Bridas, who conveyed cordial congratulations to Turkmenistan's leader from Argentinian President Carlos Menem on the State Flag holiday and on the occasion of his birthday. The message also confirmed President Menem's invitation [to Niyazov] to visit Buenos Aires this year.

Dr. Bulgeroni acquainted Saparmurad Turkmenbashy with the preparations for the coming visit within the framework of which it is planned to organize a telebridge in the spring in which the two president's will participate. Saparmurad Niyazov supported this proposal and emphasized that a direct dialogue with Carlos Menem, which will have a wide television audience in both hemispheres, will demonstrate the good will of the leaders of the two states for comprehensive cooperation and will introduce Latin American business circles to the

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political credo of Turkmenistan and its economic potential. Acquaintance with Turkmenistan will continue at the international conference of political scientists and economic commentators of the leading European media. Carlos Bulgeroni, as the president of the Argentinian and European club Mercosur (South American common market), the main organizer of this conference, invited representatives of Turkmenistan to take an active part in it.

Touching on specific areas for Turkmen-Argentine cooperation, which today include two joint ventures with Bridas for oil production and gas prospecting, the Turkmen president proposed that the Argentinian company should participate in the exploitation of one of the promising oil and gas fields—the Caspian shelf. Saparmurad Turkmenbashy stressed the need to attract foreign investments and experienced oil and gas companies there.

After the interesting conversation and exchange of views on the state of affairs on the international fuel market, Saparmurad Turkmenbashy invited the Argentinian company to cooperate in the construction of an oil pipeline from Turkmenistan to Iran because Bridas, Saparmurad Niyazov stressed, which is producing Turkmen oil in the west of the country, is a potential user of this pipeline.

Having expressed his gratitude to the Turkmen president for his proposal for broad cooperation, Dr. Bulgeroni informed the president of Turkmenistan about the implementation of his instruction relating to preparation of the project for a pipeline to Pakistan. For more detailed discussion of this project, Saparmurad Turkmenbashy invited Carlos Bulgeroni to participate in his coming visit to Islamabad.

Argentina to Help Develop Turkmen Oil Complex

LD2502151995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1434 GMT 25 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anna Kurbanova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ashgabat February 25 TASS—Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov has approved of a proposal of the Argentinian Bridas oil company to prepare a large-scale project of seismic prospecting and deep drilling in the Caspian seabed.

According to preliminary estimations, the local oil stock amounts to about 2 billion [metric] tonnes, and the stock of gas is estimated at about 2,000 billion cubic meters. The stock development will also involve companies from Iran, Russia and Malaysia.

The Turkmen president has invited Bridas, which has two joint oil and gas extracting ventures in Turkmenistan, to participate in construction of the Turkmenistan-Iran oil pipeline. The company is authorized to prepare a project for delivery of Turkmen energy carriers to Pakistan. The construction of the Turkmenistan-Pakistan pipeline will be discussed at a summit of the Organization of Economic Cooperation in mid-March in Islamabad.

Information Agency Cooperates With U.S. Firm

LD2602092795 Asgabat TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 10 Feb 95 p 2

[FBIS Translated Text] The state information agency TURKMEN PRESS and the American information and advertisement firm, East View Publications, have signed two cooperation agreements. The sides have agreed that the weekly information bulletin, NOVOSTY TURKMENISTANA [News About Turkmenistan], published in Turkmen, Russian, and English, will be transmitted by fax modem to Moscow to the CIS branch of EVP International Ltd., and then to the U.S. Congress library. New foreign subscribers of the bulletin can have access to, thanks to this, the most authentic and up-to-date information about Turkmenistan. The second agreement also gives the American firm the right to duplicate, distribute, and sell the copyright of the TURKMEN PRESS bulletin, and also digests in many countries of the world prepared on the basis of it.

The firm, East View Publications, distributes abroad books, newspapers, and magazines published in the CIS. It supplies them to the biggest libraries of the world, international research centers, and academic circles of the United States, West Europe, Japan, and other countries.

Uzbekistan

Agreement With Tajikistan to Control Pollution

LD2502100695 Tashkent KHALQ SOZI in Uzbek 24 Feb 95 p 6

[Unattributed article: "The Aluminum Smoke Has Been Tamed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An agreement has been signed between the Uzbek and Tajik governments on "cutting" the poisons of the Mirzo Tursunzoda aluminum plant in Tajikistan.

Mountains divide evergreen gardens and prosperous cities and villages in Surkhandarya region and the fairy-tale Hisor valley in Tajikistan. By the way, it was in these neighboring valleys that poor [Uzbek writer] Mirzo Bobur left his final footprints in his mother country on his way to a foreign land.

These holy lands are famous for their good cotton and Dashnobod pomegranates whose seeds are so transparent. It was there that healthy and beautiful boys and girls grew up drinking spring water...

It so happened that Tajikistan's aluminum plant was built near the Hisor mountains. The plant was built on

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the outskirts of Mirzo Tursunzoda city. In the course of time, first in the neighborhood of the factory, then in near and distant villages the flora was affected.

Now it is time to tell you about the situation on this side of the mountains—in Sariosiyoskiy and Uzunskiy districts. Because of smoke from the factory the fields there became unsuitable for growing crops. There the bodies of boys became weaker and girls began losing their teeth...

In the end the governments of the two republics began negotiating with each other through the center in Soviet times; little by little representatives and commissions sought a solution and put forward proposals. But the documents they agreed were not implemented and uselessly remained in safes.

And at last, by practically and scientifically analyzing the issue, the leaders of the two neighboring countries recently reached an agreement:

—to be aware that the economic activities of one state shall not cause damage to the environment of another state, to the health of the population living there, and to its economic activities;

—to strive to coordinate efforts to resolve ecological problems;

—observing an agreement reached in February 1992 at a meeting held by the council of the heads of government of the CIS states on cooperation in ecology and conservation, as well as in line with appropriate laws of the republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the sides signed an agreement consisting of eight points.

Among other things, the agreement prescribes measures to work out a single agreed scientific-technological program for reducing the harmful effects of the Tajik aluminum plant on the environment of the area; to contain and use harmful substances formed when commercial aluminum is produced; to define ecologically safe rates of hydrogen fluoride, sulphur dioxide, and nitrogen oxide for organisms, fruits and vegetables, industrial crops, and domestic animals in hot weather conditions; the state commission for control over the conservation of the area affected by the Tajik aluminum plant shall determine what economic damage is being caused to the population and the agricultural sector; to carry out state control over the conservation of the area affected by the factory.

In accordance with the agreement Tajikistan accepted responsibility for the introduction of an automatic system for controlling pollution of the atmosphere in the area affected by waste from the aluminum plant and for covering the cost of the economic damage caused to the other party.

This agreement was signed for a period of three years. It can be prolonged to five years in the future with the parties' consent.

This international document is yet another example of the important efforts made by the governments of the two independent republics to further strengthen the friendship between the two nations.

Karimov Seeks More Debate in Parliament

LD2402223395 Tashkent Radio Mashal in Uzbek 0441 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The first session of the Supreme Assembly of the Republic of Uzbekistan continued its work in the capital of our republic today. Now over to our correspondent, Murod Mukhtorbekov, who reports on the work of parliament:

[Mukhtorbekov] Thank you. The morning session of the Supreme Assembly of Uzbekistan began its work under the leadership of Supreme Assembly Chairman Erkin Khalilov. He read out applications from deputies to create factions and blocs in parliament.

After this problem was considered, four factions were created to work within the structure of parliament. They are the bloc of the representative bodies of power, and the factions of the People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, the Adolat Social Democratic Party, the Homeland Progress Party; these were all registered. After that the heads of these factions were given the floor and they expressed their views and working methods.

During the deputies speeches, President Islam Karimov asked for the floor and noted that it is not eulogies that should be heard from the tribune, but live thoughts, diverse approaches on any given issue, and bold opinions; and that every faction should have its own view and fight for this view.

[Begin Karimov recording] As we register these groups we should pay attention to one thing, we should find an answer to one question: What are the differences between these parties? If they are going to utter bombastic words saying: long life to you, the president's policy is right and we will steadfastly follow it, then I personally am not going to like it. Yesterday, at the beginning, we spoke about this as a separate issue. I am now going to put it to you seriously. I absolutely do not like such things, and this is the first and the last time I will say it.

This is because one may seek to justify oneself by citing the president from this tribune. The president represents one branch of power, and parliament is a branch of power that bears no relation to the president. If you are going to work by citing the president at every step of the way, that will generally run counter to the constitutional structure and foundations.

That is, I want to say to the representatives of the parties that in general the president, who is a branch of executive power, should have no bearing on the affairs of parliament. Only then will we be doing the same thing—

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you with your own ways, and executive power by its ways. I have to execute the laws that you pass, and so does the government.

If that happens, the first thing that I would say is that I would be very satisfied with you; and if necessary I will bless you—God bless you—if you cite me a little less often.

The second thing I want to say is about why I have heard so much from your speeches, yet there was one thing I could not understand: As the representatives and heads of these parties, what is your attitude to the reforms that are taking place in our society? How are we going to implement reforms in this party?

I, too, am a party chairman. If this party does not have its own approach toward the questions that face us, if it does not organize a policy of its own, then this party will turn into a generalist party. [end recording]

[Mukhtorbekov] During a break in the session I had a conversation with the leader of the faction organized by the Adolat Social Democratic Party, deputy Anvar Joraboyev.

[Begin recording] [Mukhtorbekov] Today, for the first time in the history of parliament, factions and groups were organized from deputies. What moved you to create your own faction?

[Joraboyev] It is a requirement of life, a requirement of the present day, a requirement of democracy. There are 47 deputies who are members of the Adolat Social Democratic Party of Uzbekistan.

[Mukhtorbekov] They are taking part in the Supreme Assembly's work?

[Joraboyev] There are 47 deputies taking part in the work of the Supreme Assembly. That is why we decided to form a faction.

[Mukhtorbekov] What is the aim?

[Joraboyev] The first aim is to take an active part in working out the laws that are to be passed in the Supreme Assembly. The second aim is that, in addition to taking an active part in creating and perfecting these laws, although the faction and the party itself will not control the implementation of these laws in places, it will take an active part in this process.

I want to note with satisfaction that at the moment, just yesterday Akmal Qosimov, a member of our party and rector of Andizhan State University, was elected as deputy chairman of the Supreme Assembly. In addition, Abdurafiq Ahadov, Jumaboy Otamov, [name indistinct]; three people were elected as chairmen of the committee.

[Mukhtorbekov] You mean the faction is gaining in authority?

[Joraboyev] Although our faction, our party is just taking its first steps, this shows and justifies the fact that our faction is going to be one of the active factions in the Supreme Assembly. But let us state that our aim is not to organize meetings or to gather and shout in squares, but to make wide use of the tribune of parliament. We will tackle everything through parliament.

[Mukhtorbekov] You mean that factions are not cliques?

[Joraboyev] No. Factions are never cliques. They will be a sort of force trying to bring the Supreme Assembly together. Of course, we have the same aim. The methods of implementing these aims may be different. We will, of course, fight for our own methods. The aim is the same.

[Mukhtorbekov] If we take the name of the Adolat [Justice] Party, does your party and faction intend to combat various breaches of the law, and crime?

[Joraboyev] Of course. This means a very tough fight, because our main criteria is that the criteria of justice should not be violated. Let us state that we will take a very active part in the fight against corruption, bribery, and apathy—against all these diseases. Without this there can be no reform. [passage omitted] [end recording]

[Mukhtorbekov] Then the floor was given to the Supreme Assembly Chairman Erkin Khalilov. He spoke about the powers of the president, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the Supreme Assembly as defined by the Constitution. He mentioned some inconsistencies that have arisen. In order to overcome these he said that it was necessary to bring forward the elections for the president and the Supreme Assembly.

With the aim of ensuring the consistency of the reforms that are being carried out in the republic, the Supreme Assembly chairman proposed holding a referendum on the question of extending the powers of the president from 1997 until the year 2000. A number of deputies made speeches on this proposal.

When the president was given the floor, he expressed his thanks for the trust expressed in him.

The proposal of the Supreme Assembly chairman was approved by a majority of votes. The Supreme Assembly resolution decided that the referendum will be conducted on 26 March.

Deputies solved the issues of approving the resolutions of the presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan, ratification of documents connected with international contracts, treaties and conventions, and the extension of powers of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan. With this the first session of the Supreme Assembly of the Republic of Uzbekistan finished its work.

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Karimov Calls For Struggle of Ideas

LD2502131195 Tashkent Uzbekistan Television in Uzbek 1600 GMT 24 Feb 95

[Speech by President Islam Karimov at Supreme Assembly debate on setting up parties and factions in the Assembly, in Tashkent on 24 February—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] As we register these groups we should pay attention to one thing, we should find an answer to one question: What are the differences between these parties? If they are going to utter bombastic words saying: Long life to you, the president's policy is right and we will steadfastly follow it, then I personally am not going to like it. Yesterday, at the beginning, we spoke about this as a separate issue. I am now going to put it to you seriously. I absolutely do not like such things, and this is the first and the last time I will say it.

This is because one may seek to justify oneself by citing the president from this tribune. The president represents one branch of power, and parliament is a branch of power that bears no relation to the president. If you are going to work by citing the president at every step of the way, that will generally run counter to the constitutional structure and foundations.

That is, I want to say to the representatives of the parties that in general the president, who is a branch of executive power, should have no bearing on the affairs of parliament. Only then will we be doing the same thing—you with your own ways, and executive power by its ways. I have to execute the laws that you pass, and so does the government.

If that happens, the first thing that I would say is that I would be very satisfied with you; and if necessary I will bless you—God bless you—if you cite me a little less often.

The second thing I want to say is about why I have heard so much from your speeches, yet there was one thing I could not understand: As the representatives and heads of these parties, what is your attitude to the reforms that are taking place in our society? How are we going to implement reforms in this party?

I, too, am a party chairman. If this party does not have its own approach toward the questions that face us, if it does not organize a policy of its own, then this party will turn into a generalist party.

I repeat: You should have your own specific approach toward political changes, building our political statehood, building political society, conducting political reforms, economic reforms and reforming morality—the whole range of questions, even yesterday's security issue and issues regarding any aspects of our life. And then if there are any clear aims you need to fight for them. If your opinions differ from the opinions of other parties you need to convince them or, in other words, you need to try to persuade other people who are participating in the congress of your opinion or idea, and you need to fight for it.

I repeat: There should be a struggle in this congress, in this hall—a struggle of opinions and ideas. What should the people say if the manifesto is generalist and they cannot tell the difference between one party and another? They find themselves in no better position. I absolutely reject the stand which could be described as changing the names of the parties for the sake of appearance but in fact in fulfillment of presidential orders. There must be a true change in the political structure. When there is democracy such things won't work.

God bless you, I am begging you, you mentioned the president's name six times and one deputy cited the president 10 times. I may not be participating at this congress tomorrow. If I get my own representative ready tomorrow, I will go and only concentrate on my work—I have my own work to do. I have to go and do my job there.

And this assembly should discuss completely different things. You should be thoroughly working on laws here with the sweat of your brows. What do the representatives of the People's Democratic Party think the future reforms—both political and economic reforms as well as the future of Uzbekistan as a whole—should be like? Here is an issue which is simple but very interesting for our people. What is your opinion on the matter of land? The ownership of land and whether it is possible to sell land? How can we solve this problem of property in agriculture tomorrow and what is your opinion on this matter? What is your opinion on privatizing large enterprises, state enterprises, and switching over to a joint stock ownership? What is your own opinion and how is it different from the others? We should really differentiate you from others on these matters. For instance, do you have your own specific opinion on educational matters? And do you have your own approach? My approach to all parties is from this point of view only.

Speaking generally, before reviewing any document we should know beforehand, by thinking about that party, what are the fundamental and basic opinions and approaches of that party. And proceeding from this approach we should be able to tell what kind of resistance is likely to be there before laws are submitted for approval. And only after that there can be discussion. If we want to start working in this way tomorrow, then you should all be aware that the prestige of the Supreme Assembly will not be high. All we say will go to rack and ruin. Once again I beg you, please think about that. It is not a big deal if one is doing it from the bottom of one's heart and trying to take the right stand and build the

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right foundations. Therefore no one should be offended by what I say, because these are the first steps along the path of democracy and we should view it from the right angle.

What is your stand on the reforms and your principal approach? Who are you trying to win round? If we take a look at our people from the social point of view, there are people involved in the agricultural sector, industry, and construction and the intelligentsia, and various social strata. Each party should lean on someone's support in its activities. There must be a difference between the parties, my friends.

The representatives of foreign countries and foreign journalists are right to criticize the People's Democratic Party for its adherence to the past, the lack of freedom, and for not taking steps in drawing nearer, and many, many critical issues which local people are aware of themselves. Even if they do not say anything, the Uzbek people are always aware of what is going on. We should put it in the right way, and I repeat: We should start the real work. Who needs this self-glorification? Of course, there is room for foresight and respect. If ideas do not coincide it should not be taken personally. Only after that will we take the right course. It is very dangerous to have a grudge against somebody under our circumstances and it is absolutely inadmissible for deputies to allow themselves such thoughts as: You said this and I am offended by you for my whole life. There may be all kinds of rumors. Do you understand what I am saying? The deputies must not admit even the mere thought of ideas like this. There may be all kinds of rumors.

Supreme Assembly Approves Karimov Development Speech

LD2502114095 Tashkent NARODNOYE SLOVO in Russian 25 Feb 95 p 1

[UNATTRIBUTED REPORT]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Supreme Assembly of the Republic of Uzbekistan issued a resolution on the speech by President Islam Karimov on the main principles of Uzbekistan's public-political and economic development:

Having heard and discussed the speech by President Islam Karimov of the Republic of Uzbekistan the Supreme Assembly of the Republic of Uzbekistan decrees:

1. Approval of the thesis of the speech by President Islam Karimov of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the main principles of the public-political and economic development of Uzbekistan.

It is noted that the concept for the public-political and economic development, which was expounded in the speech, is the principal basis for the construction of national statehood, for the creation of a civic law-based society, and for the revival of its spiritual and moral values.

2. In their practical work the committees and commissions of the Supreme Assembly shall take into account the conclusions and proposals in the report of President Islam Karimov of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

[Signed] Erkin Khalilov, chairman of the Supreme Assembly of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Tashkent. 24 February 1995.

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Azerbaijan

Results of Government Delegation Visit to Iran Reported

NC2402210395 Baku TURAN in English 1024 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku, February 22 (TURAN)—In the near future the Government of Iran must adopt the resolution on the draft of the agreement concerning the electric energy deliveries to Nakhichevan in 1995. The draft of the agreement was submitted to the Iranian party during the visit of the Azeri governmental delegation to Iran last week.

Under the project proposed by Azerbaijan earlier, electric energy could be delivered from Azerbaijan to Iran in exchange for deliveries of Iran's electric energy to Nakhichevan. However, the Iranian party says that this region of Iran needs no additional deliveries of electric energy and asked Azerbaijan to pay for electric energy deliveries to Nakhichevan in currency.

Imanov says that the issue concerning Azerbaijan's payment of the debt for electric energy deliveries by Iran to Nakhichevan in 1994 was also discussed during the visit. The debt totals more than $6 million.

During the talks the construction of the gas pipe-line Iran- Nakhichevan was discussed too. He added that Iran will consider the project of construction of the gas pipeline submitted by Azerbaijan and in the near future the appropriate contract will be signed.

Over the past several years Baku repeatedly presented different energy projects to Iran (in particular, during the visit of President Aliyev to Iran). Although the Iranian party assures that it is ready to cooperate with us, it did not approve the projects.

Parliament Adopts Budget for 1995

NC2402153995 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1250 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A regular session of the National Assembly was held today. Our correspondent Gulsefa Ahmedova reports:

[Begin Ahmedova recording] On the occasion of the third anniversary of Khojali [in Karabakh] massacre written in blood in history, the deputies observed a minute of silence in memory of the victims of that tragedy before opening the debate on the issues on the agenda.

Next, Finance Minister Fikret Yusifov briefed the deputies on the amendments introduced to the 1995 draft budget. He said that there has been an increase in the funds earmarked for some institutions financed from the budget, such as the Republic's Academy of Sciences and AZERTAC.

In reaction to the minister's view that the road fund should be included in the budget, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Rasul Guliyev noted that it is not appropriate to infringe on the law on the road fund.

Fikret Yusifov presented views for the normal functioning of the budget. He drew the deputies' attention to the importance of adopting legislative acts on taxation and amendments to some laws. He then replied to questions and clarified the amendments made to the draft.

First Deputy Prime Minister Abbas Abbasov said that the Council of Ministers studied the draft budget and the budget deficit was set at 461 billion manats.

Chairman of the Parliament Rasul Guliyev submitted the draft 1995 budget of the Republic and the [relevant] resolution of the National Assembly to voting. Both documents were adopted after taking into account the views and proposals presented. [end recording]

Georgia

UN General: Georgia Must Withdraw Forces From Ghali

LD2402175895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1527 GMT 24 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Irina Shchegoleva]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sochi February 24 TASS—Brigadier John Hvidegaard, who is in charge of UN military observers' mission in the area of Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, has called on the Georgian party to pull out unlawful armed units from the Ghali District in Abkhazia, which came there from the Georgian district of Zugdidi, before March 1.

Abkhazian news agency informed about it on Friday. According to it, Hvidegaard made the statement the other day at a conference between representatives of commanders of Georgian and Abkhazian armed units, which have been redeployed into what is known as "safety area" with assistance of commandment of the CIS peace-making forces.

In the course of the conference the Georgian party admitted that Lieutenant-Colonel Ubiriya is in charge of armed units, which are now stationed in Zugdidi, but do not belong to any of the Georgian power structures, Abkhazian news agency said.

The Abkhazian party suspects exactly these armed units of perpetrating several terrorist acts in the Ghali District, which resulted in killings of 11 policemen, 10 civilians and six servicemen of the CIS peace-making forces since last July.

Armenia Protests Attempt To Alter Church in Tbilisi

NC2402222095 Yerevan Radio Yerevan International Service in Armenian 2030 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] As we have already reported, an attempt was made in Tbilisi to alter the Armenian Holy

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Norashen Church by putting it at the service of the Georgian church. Armenian Charge d'Affaires in Georgia Kachaturian conveyed a protest note to the Georgian Foreign Ministry on the matter.

A correspondent has reported from Tbilisi that speaker of the Georgian Parliament Goguadze received an Armenian delegation some time ago and promised to help solve the problem and addressed a special letter to Catholicos of All the Georgians Elijah II.

It has become known that the Russian, Greek, and Jewish communities also protested this action.

Muradian and Bayburdian, the representatives of the Armenian community, finally managed to meet Elijah II on 21 February. The latter promised to stop the renovation work at Holy Norashen Church as of 22 February. However, the newly appointed priest at the church demolished three more stone crosses and erased three well-preserved wall paintings yesterday morning. Enraged, the Armenian community arrived at the site of the event to defend the Armenian church. A fist fight ensued. The incident was contained after the intervention of the law enforcement organs. But the real problem remains unsolved.

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Estonia

Meri Marks 77th Anniversary of Estonian Republic

LD2402224595

[FBIS Editorial Report] Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian at 1500 GMT on 24 February broadcast a live relay of a 20-minute speech given by Estonian President Lennart Meri dedicated to the 77th anniversary of the Republic of Estonia, in the "Estonia" theater in Tallinn today.

Meri says: "Using the words of President Yeltsin: I hope that Russian-Estonian relations will continue to develop in a good-neighborly manner, on the basis of respect and consideration for each other's interests, and following the principles of human rights.

"If today were a national holiday in Russia, I would have addressed President Yeltsin with exactly the same words, and left it to civil servants to remind you that the insignia of the president of the Republic of Estonia, taken from Tallinn by Stalin's Armed Forces, is, for some obscure reason, still in the Kremlin, behind seven seals, as if Stalin's regime continued in some places, or at least Stalin's bureaucracy did. I consider it humiliating for myself, but also for constitutional Russia, to return to this embarrassing subject."

The president says that Estonia's interests in the spheres of foreign and internal policy were interrelated: "The criteria for Estonia's international trustworthiness and, moreover, the criteria for the integration of Estonia and Europe are: A stable democracy based on a market economy, an absence of territorial and ethnic hotbeds of tension, a respectful attitude toward the rights of ethnic minorities and cultural autonomy, and constitutional control over the Armed Forces, together with an open security policy and defense budget. I put international trustworthiness first because this will give Estonia a higher security threshold—in other words, the precondition for us being able to resolve our internal policy goals in a sovereign, undisturbed, and businesslike manner. This, in turn, requires an active and demanding participation in the upcoming parliamentary elections."

Meri continues: "Ladies and Gentlemen! I mentioned earlier that the only guarantee of Estonia's national security is our international image, Estonia's trustworthiness. Whether we will admit this to ourselves or not, the tragic disaster of the Estonia ferry, smuggling of all kinds, and delays in solving the issue of Kurdish refugees have regrettably damaged Estonia's good name even though we were not guilty of anything."

President Meri goes on to say that the conclusion of the EU association agreement without a transition period was a unique recognition of Estonia's fast development in all areas. The president also admitted that this will also set a new obligation for everyone: "The time for lamentation is over. Bowing our heads deeply for all those who sacrificed their lives for the independence of the Republic of Estonia, we should turn our gaze from the past to the future. We have used the past to feel sorry about ourselves: 50 years of occupation, 700 years of the darkness of slavery, 10,000 years of the Stone Age. This slavish masochism will be of little help in Europe."

Speaking about foreign relations Meri adds: "This anniversary of the Republic of Estonia is the first since the Second World War to be celebrated in Estonia free from foreign troops. The withdrawal of the Russian troops last August was a significant precondition for the improvement of Estonian-Russian relations. A presence of Russian troops in the context of the war in Chechnya will have unfavorable implications for Estonia. Of course, much work is still to be done. Estonian political parties have different views on resolving these issues. Unfortunately, using arguments of foreign policy in the preelection campaign cannot be ruled out. However, the main conclusion is important: If there is an opportunity for equal, constructive dialogue, none of the Estonian political parties will refuse to use it.

"Ladies and Gentlemen! This republic's anniversary today is influenced by the election of a new Riigikogu and Estonia's integration into Europe. The former and the latter are signs of a stable democracy. I think this is a good mark of approval, is the best mark of approval, approval of the year's work that the people, the Riigikogu, and the government have completed. Our most difficult times are now behind indeed. I congratulate you all on the anniversary of our Fatherland!"

Further on Comments by Meri

LD2402184395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1723 GMT 24 Feb 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn February 24 TASS—1994 witnessed an increased international authority of Estonia and a growth of confidence in it, Estonian President Lennart Meri told a ceremonious meeting to commemorate the 77th anniversary of the Estonian Republic in Tallinn today.

It is a special holiday today because no foreign troops are present on Estonian territory, said Meri. The 1994 Russian troops withdrawal is a prerequisite of improved Russian-Estonian relations, he added.

The agreement on the soonest Estonian admission to the European Union reached earlier this week is a most vivid evidence of confidence, said the president.

Speakers at the meeting read out congratulatory cables from heads of foreign states, including a telegram of Russian President Boris Yeltsin who hopes for further improvement of bilateral relations.

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Meri Urges Dropping Territorial Claims Against Russia

LD2702122495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1125 GMT 27 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Feb 27 (INTERFAX)—Estonian President Lennart Meri has urged for dropping the country's territorial claims against Russia.

"We must have courage to admit that the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty and the border in its wake are not the same notions," he declared in an interview with the newspaper RAHVA HA'A'L Monday.

In his opinion, Estonian diplomats must now resolve the border issue through negotiations with Russia with an eye towards Estonia best interests "much as possible now".

After regaining independence in 1991, Estonia demanded that Russia return to it the Pechora area of Russia's Pskov region, an area that was part of the Estonian Republic until 1940.

Meri warned against turning Estonia's eastern frontier "into a new iron curtain." In his opinion, "it should be more effective, acting as a filter against organized crime, arms trade, drug trafficking, and the spread of nuclear materials."

Latvia

Premier Views 'Importance' of Associate EU Membership

LD2402191295 Helsinki Suomen Yleisradio Network in Finnish 1530 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] The Baltic countries' associate memberships of the European Union are progressing: Estonia's associate membership is agreed, and Latvia believes that its relations with the EU will progress as planned. Latvian Prime Minister Maris Gailis today held negotiations with Finnish leaders on the situation in Latvia. Sari Taussi reports:

[Taussi] Estonia will become an associate member of the European Union in June. The Latvian prime minister, who was visiting Helsinki for the day, believes that the associate membership agreement for Latvia will progress further during the spring. However, Latvia and Lithuania will probably have to agree on longer transition periods than Estonia. The associate membership will mean lower customs fees and freer movement of the workforce; it will be a step toward full membership of the European Union. Let us say that it will bring the Baltic countries into the entrance hall of the EU. Latvian Prime Minister Maris Gailis emphasizes the political importance of the associate membership. He is worried about the rise of imperialism in Russia.

[Begin Gailis recording in English] We would like to be sure that our independence is forever. It means that in theory there is only one way, it is toward Europe. We belong to Europe, and we would also like to be integrated, and part of Europe. [end recording]

[Taussi] Latvia is very willing to have closer relations with the West. This willingness was also emphasized during discussions with Prime Minister Esko Aho. Prime Minister Gailis asked Finland for political support for Latvia's application to become a member of the association of the western industrial countries, the OECD.

Visa freedom between Finland and the Baltic countries was also discussed: Latvia hopes that visa freedom will be implemented as soon as possible, while Finland emphasizes that the matter can be decided as soon as border controls in the Baltic countries are of international standard.

The two prime ministers also talked again about the Nordic natural gas pipeline. There is new hope, because the new government in Sweden takes a more positive view on the pipeline than its predecessor. Gailis hopes that the pipeline will one day be constructed from Norway all the way to the Baltic countries.

[Begin Gailis recording in English] For us it is a good and important idea to have an alternative possibility to receive gas from other sources because we fully depend on Russia now for our gas supply. [end recording]

[Taussi] Currently, Latvia is fully dependent on gas coming from Russia. The natural gas pipeline will next be discussed at a meeting of the Nordic Council, which opens in Reykjavik on Monday [27 February]

[Announcer] The Latvian prime minister also met President Martti Ahtisaari today.

Recruiter of Mercenaries for Chechnya Details Efforts

WS2402140995 Riga DIENA in Latvian 10 Feb 95 pp 1,8

[Report by Toms Liepins: "Mercenaries for Chechnya Are Being Recruited After All"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Riga, 9 Feb — On Thursday, a news conference was organized by Wilhelms Rzecickis, director of the scientific research enterprise "Singonija," during which he acquainted reporters with his work in the field of recruiting free-lance mercenaries for the war in Chechnya.

In a number of Latvian newspapers, advertisments had appeared lately, offering jobs in "extreme conditions" to experienced men who had served in the army. DIENA also received an invitation from the chief of "Singonija," to attend a "meeting of specialists, who will voluntarily go to Chechnya, to help the nation survive."

At the meeting, held in a private residence in Pardaugava [part of Riga situated on the left shore of Daugava], Rzecickis told the newsmen that he had

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started to organize the free-lance mercenaries, because at the moment Latvia's main target is to help the Chechens. He said that the mercenaries will be organized in two groups. The first group will comprise medical officers, and specialists on communications and power engineering who will render assistance to the refugees in their mountain camps. The second group will consist of those who want to participate in military operations. Arms will be disbursed in Chechnya, but the money will be paid in Latvia, because the sponsors who wish to remain anonymous, live in Latvia. Rzecickis stated that neither he nor the sponsors belong to any political party. He also explained that should a mercenary get killed, there would be no commitments to his family members.

According to Rzecickis, about a hundred mercenaries have contacted him by telephone, but only a few have confirmed their intention on paper.

"I have applied in writing to the Chechnya Support Group in the parliament asking its members to organize a meeting with representatives of Chechnya to help tackle practical issues. They promised to do so, but until now nothing has been done. I have talked to Visvaldis Brinkmanis and another gentleman whose name I do not recall," Rzecickis explained to DIENA.

He added that the question of payment to the mercenaries and the form of their contract will be clarified next week. Rzecickis said that he has no contact with the Chechens, but if the parliament fails to establish it, he will have to make the contacts himself.

Brinkmanis, an assistant to Parliament Member Juris Sinka, told DIENA that he has received proposals from Rzecickis to cooperate, but has not responded, because he does not support this kind of action. Juris Sinka, member of "Fatherland and Freedom" faction and leader of the Chechnya Support Group within the parliament, denied any possibilities for cooperation with Rzecickis. "This is an unacceptable and dirty proposal for our Group. Rzecickis has indeed tried to get in touch with me, but any cooperation is impossible," said Sinka.

Representatives of the Russian Embassy in Latvia have expressed concern over the recruitment of mercenaries taking place in Latvia, to the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and have appealed to the authorities to undertake steps to stop this kind of activity.

Lithuania

Slezevicius Comments on Meeting With Chernomyrdin

LD2502115195 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 25 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] This is Madona Luckaite in the studio. I will begin the midday news with a Baltic News Service report about yesterday's meeting by Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius in Moscow.

The most important result of the meeting between the Lithuanian and Russian prime ministers is that progress has been achieved in all spheres, said the Lithuanian prime minister. According to him, the meeting was an important stage in the development of Lithuanian and Russian mutual relations. Slezevicius assessed the Lithuanian-Russian talks in Moscow as very positive, constructive, and benevolent.

As already reported, Slezevicius and Chernomyrdin met in Moscow yesterday. Negotiations between the Lithuanian and Russian Government delegations took place. The sides signed three documents: on border crossing posts, on cooperation of customs offices, and on a temporary agreement on mutual travel by citizens.

The Lithuanian prime minister said at a news conference in Vilnius that of great importance had been a verbal agreement on the return of savings by the former Soviet Union's Vneshekonombank. According to Slezevicius, Chernomyrdin promised to return as early as this year the savings and interest of Lithuanian residents, in all $10.6 million. Moscow said the return of money would begin in two months' time. However, noted Slezevicius, until mutual order with concrete dates was not established, we had no grounds to assert that the money would really reach Lithuania. In addition, Russia agreed to return savings of the corporate bodies in the former Vneshekonombank, but this would take longer.

Slezevicius considered an agreement to set up a bilateral commission on economic cooperation as a very important result. This commission will draw up various documents to regulate the protection of investments, the prevention of double taxation, the return of Lithuania's pre-war archives, and cooperation in shipping and other spheres.

Russia is not striving for a control packet of the Butinge terminal shares. This Russian stance was affirmed by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. It will become clear in the next meetings with Russian oil suppliers how many Butinge shares the LUKoil will be able to have.

The sides agreed to draw up concrete documents within the next two weeks on joint work in supplying Lithuanian enterprises with natural gas. The Lithuanian and Russian ministries of power engineering were instructed to carry out this work with the participation of the heads of the Russian companies LUKoil and Gazprom.

Russia did not agree to sign state agreements with Lithuania on the sale of oil and gas. The heads of the Mazeikiai oil refinery have been pinning their hopes on this. But Moscow considers that this is a matter for the enterprises and companies themselves, therefore they must sign such agreements.

Slezevicius denied at the news conference information disseminated by the Russian news services that the visit by the Lithuanian prime minister in Moscow meant the country's integration with Russia. In reality economic

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cooperation and mutually advantageous trade, supported by the present cabinet from the very beginning of its work, were taking place, said Slezevicius. Lithuania wished to create conditions for favorable trade with all states without any exceptions. I do not know what trade has in common with integration, added the Lithuanian prime minister. The Lithuanian trade balance clearly showed, said the prime minister, that Lithuania was integrating with the European Union. This was affirmed by the negotiations on an associated membership in that organization. They would be continued next week.

Slezevicius said he invited Chernomyrdin to pay a visit to Lithuania. This invitation was accepted. It is expected that such a visit could take place in mid-year.

EU Official Supports Baltic States' Membership

LD2402150195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1358 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, Feb 24 (Interfax)—Member of the European Union Commission for Relations with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union Hans van den Broek says the Balts' integration with the EU would help consolidate European security. He was speaking in Vilnius on Friday at the end of a two-day visit to Lithuania.

Broek called his visit "specific" coming as it did "at the start of a new era of close cooperation between the EU and Lithuania". He was confident that Vilnius would sign an associate membership agreement with the EU before long. At the same time, Broek said that the process of the Balts' integration with the EU "will be long and hard".

But he also warned against new divides in Europe saying that relations with Russia, Ukraine and other CIS state was on the EU's agenda. Broek said European stability was largely hinged on a stable Russia.

For his part, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys also involved in the news conference did not rule out that the associate membership deal with the EU could be initialled in April and signed either in May or June.

Further on EU Official's Visit

LD2402195195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1733 GMT 24 Feb 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, Feb 24 (INTERFAX)—The EU High Commissioner for Foreign Political Relations Hans van den Broek said he believed that Lithuania could become a EU associated member in the near future.

He told a news conference on the results of his two-day visit to Lithuania in Vilnius today that complete integration of Lithuania and other Baltic states with the EU would require more time and would be not so easy.

Hans van den Broek said the EU was interested in Europe not being divided again. He said the EU was paying much attention to relations between the Baltic states on the one hand and the CIS, primarily Russia and Ukraine, on the other hand.

He said stability in entire Europe to a large extent depended on stability in Russia.

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys said at the same news conference he hoped that the second round of talks on Lithuania's associated membership in the EU would finally resolve the issue.

He said there were no such problems on which the interests of the parties did not coincide.

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